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Abstract 
The establishment of peace in post-genocidal states is vital, as the experience of extreme division and 
violence can scar a population, contributing to violence and inequality moving forward. Existing 
literature on post-conflict transition and governance argues that two main systems are typically used: 
consociationalism and assimilationism. While consociationalism argues for heterogeneity in the state 
and assimilationism for homogeneity, both of these systems use the institutionalization of identity as a 
step in post-conflict recovery, through such means as proscribing or privileging particular identities. 
This study posits that this is inherently flawed, as attempts to institutionalize identity ignore its 
contextually fluid or fixed nature. In using Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda as case studies for the 
hypotheses of consociationalism and assimilationsim, respectively, this research finds that such 
institutionalization not only fails to support development towards sustainable peace, but actually inhibits 
it. This supports the alternative hypothesis proposed by this study, that post-conflict recovery and 





C'est très important d’établir une véritable paix durable entre des états durant la période suivant un 
génocide puisque l’expérience de la division et de la violence extrême peut contribuer de la violence et 
à l'inégalité dans l'avenir. La littérature sur la transition post-conflit et sur la gouvernance existante 
affirment qu’il y a deux systèmes utilises principalement : le consociationalisme, qui préfère 
l'hétérogénéité et l'assimilationnisme, qui préfère l'homogénéité. Ses deux systèmes utilisent 
l'institutionnalisation de l’identité dans le processus de la relance après un conflit ; cela se fait en 
interdisant ou privilégiant certaines identités. Cette étude soutient que ces arguments sont 
fondamentalement faux, parce que les tentatives d’institutionnaliser l’identité ignorent sa nature qui peut 
être selon le contexte fluide ou fixe. En utilisant la Bosnie-Herzégovine et le Rwanda comme objets 
d’études exemplifiant le consociationnalisme et l’assimilationnisme, respectivement, cette recherche 
constate que de telles institutionnalisations ont non seulement échoué à soutenir le développement d’une 
paix durable, mais, qui plus est, l'inhibe. Cela justifie l’hypothèse alternative proposée par cette étude, 
selon laquelle le relèvement et la réconciliation post-conflit dépendent de compréhensions 'épaisses' des 










Uspostavljanje mira u zemljama u kojima se desio genocid je krucijalni proces, pogotovo ako u obzir 
uzmemo činjenicu da razor među stanovništvom i nasilje može da ostavi užasne tragove koji mogu 
uzrokovati nasilje i usporiti napredak. Postojeća literatura na temu post-konfliktne tranzicije i 
menadžmenta kaže da postoje dva glava sistema koja se nadopunjuju: konsolidovani nacionalizam i 
asimilacionizam. Dok konsolidovani nacionalizam zagovara heterogenost države a asimilicionizam 
homogenost, oba ova sistema koriste instutucionalizaciju kao jedan identitet kao korak naprijed u post-
konfliktnom oporavku. Kao metodu koriste pripisivanje ili privilegovanje određenih identiteta. Ova 
studija se zalaže za to da ova metoda ima određenih mana—činjenicu da pri pokušaju institucionalizacije 
identiteta ignoriše njegov kontekst čvrste ili tečne prirode. Koristeći primjer Bosne i Hercegovine  i 
Ruande u studiji slučaja za hipotezu konsolidovanog nacionalizma i asimilacionalizma—ovo 
istraživanje kaže da je institucionalizacija nije najbolji način jer ona ne samo da pada ispit po pitanju 
napretka prema održivom miru, već ga ona spriječava. Ovo podupire alternativnu hipotezu za ovo 
istraživanje, da post-konfliktni oporavak i pomirenje zavise na pravom razumijevanju lokalnog 




Успостављање мира у земљама у којима се дecиo геноцид je крyциjaлни процес, пoгoтoвo aкo y 
обзир yзмeмo чињеницy да рaзoр међу становништвом и насиљe може да остави yжaснe трагове 
које могу узроковати насиље и успoрити напредaк. Постојећa литература на тему пoст-
конфликтнe трaнзициje и менаџмента каже да постоје двa главa система, којa ce надопуњују: 
консолидовани национализам и асимилационисм. Док консолидовани национализам загавapa 
хетерогеност државе a асимилационисм хомогеност, оба oвa система користе 
институционализацију као једaн идентитет као корак наприjед у пост-конфликтном опоравкy. Као 
методy користe припиcивaњe или привилeгoванje одређених идентитетa. Ова студија сe зaлaжe 
зa то дa oва методa има oдрeђeнiх мaнa—чињеницу да при покушаjy институционализацијe 
идентитетa игнорише његов контекст чврстe или течнe природe. Кoриcтећи примjер Босне и 
Херцеговине и Руандe y студији случаја за хипотезy консолидoвaнoг национализма и 
асимилационализма—овo иcтpaживaњe кaжe да институционализација није најбољи начин јер 
oнa не само дa падa испит пo питaњу напреткa премa одрживом миру, вeћ га oнa сприjeчава. Ово 
подyпиpe алтернативну хипотезу за ово истраживање, да пост-конфликтни опоравак и помирење 
зависe нa пpaвoм разумиjeвањy локалног контекста и пpидaвањa више пажње paзличитocтимa 
нeкo кaтeгopизaциjи. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Almost twenty years have passed since end of the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and with the cessation of mass atrocities came the implementation of new forms 
of governance. But how do communities that were so violently divided work towards a better 
future and a sustainable peace? It is this puzzle that drives this research, and its answer impacts 
both institutions and individuals alike. Living in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina it was common 
to hear locals speak of the state as caught in a frozen conflict, the war continuing through 
political and social avenues rather than violent, militaristic ones. But two decades have passed 
since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, an agreement intended to bring an end to the 
war as well as set up the constitutional structure of the state in the post-conflict period: one 
would expect the state to have higher employment, political participation, respect for human 
rights, and improved inter-ethnic relations. Similarly, the governance system instituted in 
Rwanda is defined by single-party rule—which some argue reaches the level of 
authoritarianism—and issues of poverty, inequality, and development persist in Rwanda. 
 Rogers Brubaker asserts that “institutional design can either exacerbate or ameliorate  
ethnic and national conflicts... good institutional design can give political actors incentives to 
work around ethnic and national conflicts, to disregard them for certain purposes, to frame 
political rhetoric and political claims in nonethnic or transethnic terms” (1998:281). So what 
exactly is a “good institutional design”? Does the Bosnian consociational system protect the 
ethnic groups from being dominated, or does it institutionalize ethnicity and discrimination? 
Does the Rwandan system allow for the population to move beyond the ethnic affiliations that 
were the basis of such astounding violence, or does it homogenize and suppress dissenting 
opinions? The answer to these questions can dictate the policy choices made in post-ethnicized 
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conflict countries so as to ensure that their efforts toward reconstruction and the prevention of 
future conflict are successful. Thus, the central research question addressed by this study is: 
Does the way in which identity is constructed in post-genocidal states affect post-conflict 
recovery? 
 The focus of this study on the importance of identity construction, ethnicity, memory, 
and communal relations places it solidly within the area of interest of the discipline of 
anthropology. For example, questions of the fluid versus fixed nature of identity are still of 
considerable interest to anthropologists, particularly regarding the ways in which conceptions 
of the self are directed and confined by the influences of a variety of actors: in this case, the 
state. The importance of this topic to international relations and political science is equally 
self-evident, as the results of this study can have implications for further research and praxis 
in peace and conflict studies, development, and international intervention. More significantly, 
however, this research addresses the ways in which these areas of academic focus overlap: how 
memory of the past is a vital component of post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation 
efforts; how reestablishing positive communal relations is necessary for sustainable 
development; and how the manner in which identity is conceptualized and constructed in a 
state is often a focus when structuring governance systems, especially in post-genocidal states. 
Ultimately, this research works to address how societies work to recover from genocidal 
violence and determine which post-conflict structures are more or less effective than others. 
 This research is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature 
and theory pertinent to this topic, divided into three sections that focus on identity theory and 
construction; post-conflict studies; and identity politics in the governance of post-conflict 
states. In addition, this chapter introduces the two hypotheses proposed by the literature and 
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tested in this research as well as the alternative hypothesis projected by this study. Chapter 3 
explains the methodological design utilized in this study—a comparative case study of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Rwanda—which relies on quantitative macro data gathered from existing 
data sets and statistical analyses and qualitative micro data gathered through interviews, 
participant observation, and content analysis. Included in this chapter as well is a discussion 
of ethics of post-conflict research, how the data will be analyzed, and the limitations and 
challenges posed by the method. Chapters 4.1 and 4.2 present the in depth case analyses 
performed through analysis of the micro-level, qualitative data of the two states, focusing on 
four elements determined to be vital for sustainable peace: political design fairness and efficacy, 
positive communal relations, economic recovery, and transitional justice. Chapter 5 turns to 
the macro-level, quantitative data, analyzing the results of six data sources, comparing these 
results to those determined from the micro-level analysis, and, finally, evaluating the 
hypotheses proposed by the literature and the implications for the alternative hypothesis. And 
the final Chapter 6 discusses the implications of this research for theory and literature, 
methodology, and policy, as well as what avenues of future investigation this study reveals. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theory 
Identity, Categorization, and Connection 
 Following the genocide of the Armenians and the Holocaust in the mid-twentieth 
century, there have been nearly fifty genocides/politicides, and despite the repeated cries of 
politicians—“Never again!” and “Not on our watch!”—the world's ability to explain and 
respond to, let alone prevent, genocide is limited (Harff 2003, 57). While primordialists 
maintain that deep-seated 'ethnic hatreds' are the root of these atrocities, more recent 
approaches have taken to looking at genocide as a strategic policy option chosen by those in 
power to satisfy particular goals. Constructivist theory enriches this approach, adding the 
additional considerations of “identity and interests and how these can change,” believing that 
“ideas, values, norms, and shared beliefs matter, that how individuals talk about the world 
shapes practices, that humans are capable of changing the world by changing ideas, and hence 
that it is necessary to show how identities and interests of actors are 'socially constructed'” 
(Karns and Mingst 2010, 50). Identity has become ever more politicized in the modern world, 
with 'ethnic' or 'nationalistic' elements existing in most modern conflicts: take, for instance, the 
recent case of Crimea, where the population's Russian identification was used as justification 
for the annexation of the territory. Given this, it is important now to understand the ways in 
which identities and the groups and categories they are tied to are constructed—particularly if 
one hopes to prevent the use of identification as a basis of violent internal conflict—as well as 
the role of identity in post-conflict recovery and governance. 
 
     Identity as a Concept 
 'Identity' is one of the most pervasive concepts in social science scholarship, and is used 
to explain a daunting variety of phenomena, from nationalism and ethnic conflict to 
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psychoanalysis, and is oft used in discussions of 'race', 'nation', 'citizenship', 'class', 'tradition', 
'culture', 'community', and 'ethnicity'. With this broad usage of the term expanding beyond 
academic circles with particular force in the 1990s, 'identity' has become so broad as to lose 
almost all meaning according to Rogers Brubaker (2004). He argues that there are five ways 
in which identity is used as an analytical term: (1) as noninstrumental and particularistic; (2) 
as collective and involving an inherent 'sameness'; (3) as deep and foundational; (4) as 
processual and interactive; and (5) as fluctuating and fragmented. The second and third are 
often grouped together as hard, or essentialist, understandings of identity, while the fourth and 
fifth are grouped as soft, or constructivist, understandings. Noninstrumental and particularistic 
conceptions of identity are compatible with both essentialist and constructivist schools. 
 Brubaker and Cooper (2000) critique the utility of 'identity' as a categorization 
altogether, criticizing the seemingly wide spectrum of signification and conceptualization. 
Believing that the two main uses of identity correspond with the dichotomous distinctions of 
'hard' and 'soft' understandings, they argue that neither can meaningfully be applied to 
legitimate, scholarly research. 'Hard' conceptions of identity, they argue, can only be used to 
refer to categories of everyday practice—such as ethnicity, nationality, etc.—as this better 
corresponds to the “bounded groupness” and “self-sameness over time” that fit the core 
meaning of 'identity' (Brubaker & Cooper 2000, 27; 2000, 11). 'Soft' conceptualizations, on the 
other hand, are seen as “too weak to do useful theoretical work” resulting from their efforts to 
“cleanse the term of its theoretically disreputable 'hard' connotations, [and] their insistence that 
identities are multiple, malleable, fluid, and so on” (Brubaker &Cooper 2000, 11). The result, 
they believe, is a concept too fluid to clearly conceptualize, let alone operationalize. 
 A number of academics continue to subscribe to this clean division between the 
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approaches, often at the very least operating under the banner of one of the camps (e.g., Connor 
1994, Huntington 1996). This division is, however, a false dichotomy that oversimplifies the 
nature of identity and its formation. Sökefeld (2001) contests Brubaker and Cooper's dismissal 
of 'identity' as an analytical term, arguing that the same elements that lead them to reject 
identity are essential to its usefulness. In his opinion, it is “the duality of essentialist and 
constructivist readings, of identity as a category of practice and a category of analysis” that 
gives the term real meaning and utility (Sökefeld 2001, 538). This concept of identity “reminds 
us strongly that identities, although posed by actors as singular, continuous, and bounded can 
be shown to be subject to the condition of plurality, intersectionality, and difference” (Sökefeld 
2001, 538). Indeed, though identity can be constantly negotiated and may fluctuate over time, 
elements can calcify or crystallize based on particular influences or forces. In other words, it 
is not that the elements that comprise one's identity change drastically, but rather their centrality 
and salience that can and do fluctuate over time and from context to context, all while 
categories of classification can experience definitional shifts. Heleen Touquet speaks to this 
process, referring to the process as reification whereby the boundaries between distinct 
categories are made very strict (2011, 160). 
 This process of reification is equally as important for the processes of collective identity 
formation as it is for those driving individual identifications. Ethnicity, race, and nation should 
be conceptualized not as bounded and homogenous, “but rather in relational, processual, 
dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated terms,” and one should view “ethnicization, racialization, 
and nationalization as political, social, cultural, and psychological processes” (Brubaker 2004, 
11; see also Nagel 1994). Some take this understanding to mean that identity, race, nationalism, 
and ethnicity are not real—this is a misguided understanding, for while they may lack an 
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'objective reality', they are real inasmuch as individuals believe that they have an 'identity' and 
act upon that assumption (Kertzel & Arel 2004, 20). Therefore, research in areas relating to 
these identifications and classifications are best served not by disputing the power, reality, or 
significance of identifications, but rather by illustrating that they are subject to reification, 
construction, and reconstruction, and are therefore much more complex than either an 
essentialist or primordialist conceptualization alone would suggest. 
 
     Identity Construction 
 Given the influence of these categorizations and their role as a means of “perceiving, 
interpreting, and representing the social world,” questions of what agents are capable of 
influencing them and to what ends they are shaped are crucial to a fuller understanding  
(Brubaker 2004, 17). Analyses performed to this end must focus on the “constructed” elements 
of identification, looking at the “ways in which ethnic boundaries, identities, and cultures, are 
negotiated, defined, and produced through social interaction inside and outside ethnic 
communities” (Nagel 1994, 152). The creation and politics of categories can be studied from 
above and below. From above, the focus is placed on “the ways in which categories are 
proposed, propagated, imposed, institutionalized, discursively articulated, or organizationally 
entrenched;” from below, however, the “ways in which the categorized appropriate, internalize, 
subvert, evade, or transform the categories that are imposed on them” are emphasized 
(Brubaker 2004, 13). Individuals, social movements, government, and ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs are among the actors that have the strongest impacts on how individuals self-
identify and represent themselves in relation to others. 
 Individuals have a degree of agency when choosing how they self-identify, but in many 
cases the “set of ethnic identities” from which they choose is “limited to socially and politically 
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defined ethnic categories with varying degrees of stigma or advantage attached to them. In 
some cases, the array of available ethnicities can be quite restricted and constraining” (Nagel 
1994, 156). This approach to individual self-representation frames ethnicity and, indeed, all 
forms of self-representation as rational choices—elements of identification can be emphasized 
or de-emphasized as “part of a strategy to gain personal or collective political or economic 
advantage” (Nagel 1994, 159). This research posits that the way in which an individual chooses 
to identify themselves may—and most often does—vary over time and from context to context. 
 Social movements can promote identification along particular lines, frequently in 
opposition to existing categories. In these instances, awareness campaigns and public appeals 
are utilized to gain the support of individuals who feel under-served by the recognized or 
emphasized identifications. Activists involved in promoting nationalist identities, for example, 
“believe that the identities they are promoting are primordial, and therefore not a matter of 
choice. Yet they are concerned that many of their co-ethnics are not fully aware of their own 
'true' identity, and so must be reminded of their roots” (Kertzer & Arel 2004, 28). Thus, 
actors—in many cases NGOs, religious or ethnic groups, or other special interest groups—
draw on narratives of subversion and discrimination based on identifications externally 
imposed (e.g., by the state, political actors, etc.) on perceived members of the group as a 
foundation for increasing the salience of a particular identity. 
 Additionally, 'ethnopolitical entrepreneurs' are positioned in such a way as to readily 
exploit existing or emerging identifications to their greatest personal benefit. These 
entrepreneurs include those who build, support, or work in association with memorialization 
efforts as well as collective trauma and memory. While often individuals acting on their own, 
these entrepreneurs can represent the interests of religious groups, political movements, and 
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community leaders. This can also include social movements, which mobilize on a grassroots 
level, advocating along the spectrum of identification, advocating categories from the ultra-
national to the civic. Ethnopolitical entrepreneurs can not only invoke groups, but in so doing 
bring them into being, reifying them and therefore contributing to how they manifest in the 
world. When these efforts are successful, “the political fiction of the unified group can be 
momentarily yet powerfully realized in practice” (Brubaker 2004, 10). They can then ride the 
wave, bringing them money and influence. 
 Ethno-national politicians are similar to ethnopolitical entrepreneurs insofar as they 
profit from the development and enforcement of boundaries dividing national and ethnic 
groups. Their efforts are most frequently directed at “generating and sustaining putatively 
interethnic conflict,” as this is what keeps them in power (Brubaker 2004, 20). It is less that 
ethno-national politicians are invested in the ethnic differentiation for its own sake, but rather 
are simply interested in remaining in power, as they are unable to offer other successful-- often 
economic or political—solutions to existing societal problems, they turn to being elected based 
on ethnic belonging. Extending beyond the nationalist politicians, the influence of government 
and official state policies in identification and categorization of the population cannot be 
exaggerated. Indeed, government structure sets the stage on which all other actors act, and is 
thus capable of setting or limiting the paths available to these actors. Most directly, state-
designated categories are routinely utilized, particularly for official use in censuses. These 
categorizations have a number of influences, most notably they can: 
serve to reinforce or reconstruct ethnic boundaries... The political recognition of a 
particular ethnic group can not only reshape the designated group's self-awareness 
and organization, but can also increase identification and mobilization among 
ethnic groups not officially recognized, and thus promote new ethnic formation. … 
Official ethnic categories and politics can also strengthen ethnic boundaries by 
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serving as the basis for discrimination and repression, and thus reconstruct the 
meaning of particular ethnicities. … Political policies and designations have 
enormous power to shape patterns of ethnic identification when politically 
controlled resources are distributed along ethnic lines (Nagel 1994, 157-58). 
 
The ability of states and their bureaucracies to “name, refuse to name, count and categorize 
their populations” grant them the “power to discipline [their populations] into thinking of 
themselves along the very lines of these categorical ways of counting” (Markowitz 2007, 46; 
see also Kertz & Arel 2004, 33). The intent behind these categorizations is rarely inherently 
malicious; categorization is a tool used to classify and compartmentalize the population in a 
way that is both easy for the state to manage and that preserves or pursues a particular power 
structure. 
 
     Collective/Communal Identity 
 Elites and states classify and compartmentalize populations out of necessity, as this 
facilitates governance to a considerable extent. But these groups form in more than name alone, 
gathering into collective identities under the influence of numerous forces, several of which 
were mentioned above. A number of scholars—namely Jenkins (1994) and Wimmer (2008)—
argue that not only can one identify a distinction between an 'ethnic category' and an 'ethnic 
group', but that this distinction is clear enough to be used in research. They propose an approach 
that sees an 'ethnic category' as something that can be imposed from above and an 'ethnic group' 
as something which is based more on self-identification and feelings of connection and 
belonging. While there would certainly be overlap between these definitions, this seems like a 
risky, if not completely unfounded distinction. As the elements that foster feelings of 
connection and belonging and the definitions used for self-identification shift over time and 
under the influence of a variety of sources, there is no definitive way to declare one 
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identification as simply a 'category' while presumably raising another up as a 'group'. In 
addition, this attempted division bears traces of primordial understandings of ethnicity and 
group identities, relying on a believed essential or inherent trait or unifying truth with 
immutable and lasting commonalities and ignoring the ways in which identities can and do 
change. 
 The concept of group/collective identity “addresses the 'we-ness' of a group, stressing 
the similarities of shared attributes around which group members coalesce” (Cerulo 1997, 386). 
Benedict Anderson uses the term “imagined community” to define nation, though this 
conceptualization can be applied more broadly to other forms of collective identity. These 
communities are 'imagined' because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion” (Anderson 2006, 6). The nation is understood to be a bounded, 
sovereign community constructed by its members through assigning it reality which it would 
otherwise lack. 
 It is important to remember, however, that these collective identities are not 
homogenous and individuals can belong to more than one collectivity at a time. Amin Maalouf 
(2001) argues that rhetoric that speaks to a single, constant, and 'true' essence or identity points 
to a view of humanity that essentializes and homogenizes, dangerous for its possible use as 
fuel for spurring inter-group conflict. He speaks to the complex composition of identity from 
his own experience of not multiple, distinctive identities, but an identity constructed from a 
variety of elements, influences, and 'affiliations,' writing: 
Each individual's identity is made up of a number of elements, and these are clearly 
not restricted to the particulars set down in official records. Of course, for the great 
majority these factors include allegiance to a religious tradition; to a nationality—
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sometimes two; to a profession, an institution, or a particular social milieu. … Of 
course, not all these allegiances are equally strong, at least at any given moment. 
But none is entirely insignificant, either. All are components of personality—we 
might almost call them 'genes of the soul' so long as we remember that most of 
them are not innate (Maalouf 2001, 10-11). 
 
It is reification of elements of identity at certain points in time and under certain conditions 
that determines the 'hierarchy' of elements of identification which is not immutable, but rather 
“changes with time, and in so doing brings about fundamental changes in behaviour” (Maalouf 
2001, 13). 
 'Ethnicity', then, can be seen as the present balance of political and symbolic struggles 
“over the categorical divisions of society” (Wimmer 2008, 985; see also Bourdieu 1991). 
Indeed, the meanings and expectations assigned to membership in a specific identification, 
ethnicity, nationality, religion, or other group can shift as the values, goals, and boundaries of 
those groups move over time as a result of political, social, and cultural changes (Tilley 1997, 
511). Take the following examples: the understanding of what it meant to be 'Yugoslavian' 
shifted as the country began to collapse in 1990 and territories that were part of Yugoslavia 
gained independence, and the implication behind identifying as “French” may have shifted as 
staunch nationalist, xenophobic, and anti-immigrant political groups have increased in 
influence. Political actors are able to influence how individuals conceives of themselves as 
members of a particular community and what benefits or responsibilities that membership 
entails through affecting the ways in which membership is determined and who is included or 
excluded by that definition. Thus, the actions of elites, politicians, or other influential actors 
can have considerable impact not only on how an individual negotiates their identity as 
members or non-members of particular groups, but also impact the boundaries of those groups 




 Actors outside of the state can also influence the development of social categorizations, 
often through less direct means, such as the integration or adoption of external identifications 
and norms or providing an alternative model, though more direct action or intervention are not 
unheard of. Booth, looking at the modern world and processes of globalization, argues that 
“identity patterns are becoming more complex, as people assert local loyalties but want to share 
in global values and lifestyles” (1991, 542). This research takes the perspective that contrary 
to what some alarmists in academia have claimed, the rise in globalization and even in a 
'cosmopolitan' identification, this shift does not spell the outright decline of nations nor their 
influence. Rather, echoing Hall's (1991) concept of multiple 'selves', international influences 
can shift the ways in which identity is understood, framed, and prioritized, but lacks the 
capacity to single-handedly eliminate an identification. 
 One of the largest forms of influence on identity formation outside of a state comes 
through the fostering particular ideologies or norms. Norms are defined as “shared expectations 
about appropriate behavior held by a collectivity of actors” (Checkel 1999, 83). This begins to 
explain how international actors can influence the development of identification, relating back 
to the ways in which changes in values, beliefs, and goals of a group correspond with changes 
in communal identification, the borders of the identification, and the meanings associated with 
membership. Historically, the largest example of this is the spread of Western values, 
particularly concerning nationalism, as these concepts drastically shifted understandings of 
communal identity and rights as well as relations within states. This influence can also manifest 
as models of alternative means through which to organize the system, changing the ways in 
which individuals conceptualize the present state of their group within the broader society as 
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well as how they envision their future (Göçek 1993). In modern circumstances, while Western 
influence continues to dominate and spread through soft power and cultural exchange, the rapid 
improvements in communication and information technology over the past few decades have 
facilitated dialogue between groups and at such speeds as would have been previously 
unimaginable (Marden 1997, 44). Additionally, increased ability to connect and communicate 
with individuals from a variety of backgrounds and experiences changes perceptions of one's 
identity; it can even serves as fruitful ground for the creation of communal identifications based 
not around ethnicity, language, or shared history, but rather on shared interests or experiences, 
such as the large communities that have formed around digital role playing games 
(Corneliussen & Rettberg 2008). 
 The ways in which membership is defined and the importance of elements that form 
the basis of shared identification are altered by shifts in values, goals, and knowledge of the 
group, unsurprisingly influencing the understood boundaries of the group. For example, since 
the Balkan wars of the 1990s, there is a considerable importance placed on Serbs practicing 
Orthodox Christianity, to such an extent that many believe one cannot truly be Serb without 
being Orthodox. Alternatively, officials are endowed with the power to determine what are or 
are not 'legitimate' categorizations: take post-genocidal Rwanda—viewed as a step towards 
reconciliation and recovery for the deeply scarred country, abolition of the ethnic terms 'Hutu', 
'Tutsi', and 'Twa' was intended to remove their social and cultural salience and force, 
dramatically shifting not only the terms in which individuals could self-identify but potentially 
shifting the ways in which communal and social environments were understood. 
 Max Weber was among the first scholars to discuss the profound impact the formation 
of ethnic groups has on social realities. He developed a concept of 'social closure' to describe 
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the establishment of firmer boundaries between groups and their resulting impact on, namely, 
access to resources, rights, and opportunities. This concept is now supported by a number of 
scholars and academics (Barth 1969; Lamont 2000; Loveman 1997; Alba 2005; Tilly 2006). 
This is particularly relevant to this research as it forms part of the foundation for arguing that 
the ways in which boundaries between groups are drawn—particularly by state officials and 
elites—are crucial to understanding conditions within that state. Memory is one of the most 
powerful tools of these actors who, by emphasizing or deemphasizing particular aspects of a 
(presumed to be) shared history, can change who is or is not included in conceptions of 
communal belonging, the values and aims of the group, and what group membership entails 
and signifies. 
 
     Collective Memory in Identity Construction 
 Collective memory is crucial to identity formation, serving as the foundation of 
tradition, language, religion, and kinship, among others, and emphasizing one aspect of 
collective memory over another can shift the ways in which membership is understood. 
Remembering is a powerful creating force as it contributes substantially to identity 
construction and feelings of belonging; culture is a learned behavior and conceptions of identity, 
belonging, and the boundaries of 'us' and 'them' are equally learned (Nora 2001, 10-11). 
Forgetting, too, is a central element of the construction of communal identity; Renan writes, 
“The essential element of a nation is that all its individuals must have many things in common 
but it must also have forgotten many things” (Renan 1822 quoted in Buckley-Zistel 2006a, 
132). It is through a balance of strategic remembering and strategic forgetting that one can shift 
the salience of particular identities or their elements within a societal context. 
 Some of the most influential conversations about memory and the utility of forgetting 
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were begun by Nietzsche, who argued in favor of a forgetting that entailed the outright 
cleansing or removal of certain experiences from collective and individual memory. Buckley-
Zistel sees a sizable problem with this approach to memory and the past, especially within the 
context of post-conflict states; she argues that “forgetting, deleting or obliterating [memories 
of atrocity and pain] takes away people's legitimate urge to articulate grievance and to have 
their traumas recognised” (2006c, 19). Beyond this, by removing means through which to 
express and work through this pain can increase the impact of wounds and perpetuate feelings 
of victimization or marginalization. In the words of French philosopher Jean Baudrillard, 
“forgetting the extermination is part of the extermination itself” (quoted in Minow 2002). 
 Gadamer (1975) suggests, as a response to this criticism, that one should not abandon 
memories of the past but rather reevaluate the way in which these events are remembered. 
Through the application of the hermeneutic process of understanding  (discussed in greater 
detail in the next section), Gadamer argues that it is possible to change the way in which certain 
events are remembered, and in turn shift the ways in which these memories are interpreted. 
When comparing the frameworks of Nietzsche and Gadamer, “one could paraphrase Nietzsche 
as suggesting 'forget the past, it did not happen', and Gadamer to say, 'look at your past, are 
there not different ways of interpreting it?'” (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 19). 
 This concept of a flexible history is incredibly important when one remembers that 
communal identity and feelings of shared belonging are often shaped or encouraged by 
historical commonalities, shared traumas, and mutual antagonists. When, as previously 
mentioned, particular actors use their positions of authority or influence to shift the ways in 
which this history is remembered, they can alter the narratives used to construct both the group 
identity as well as the identity of the 'others'. These narratives can, in many cases, take the form 
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of a “cognitive frame,” defined as “a mental structure which situates and connects events, 
people and groups into a meaningful narrative in which the social world that one inhabits 
makes sense and can be communicated and shared with others” (Oberschall 2000, 989). This 
is not an inevitably negative or violent process: while it is possible that this “redefinition of the 
collective identity” could be based on feelings of antagonism or victimhood at the hands of an 
(former) enemy, it could alternatively allow for the weakening or increased permeability of 
boundaries to allow increased opportunities “for a more peaceful co-existence” (Buckley-
Zistel 2006b, 20). Oberschall argues, however, that there are two frames that already exist in 
the minds of a population: a normal frame and a crisis frame. He argues that both frames are 
based in private and family experiences, history, culture, and public life and that the level of 
conflict and crisis determines which frame is dominant and which is suppressed. Ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs utilize fear and hate to shift the public into the crisis frame, primarily through 
the use of news, political discourse, education, history, literature, popular culture, and the arts 
(Oberschall 2000, 990). It is thus crucial for attempts to mediate potentially violent identities 
to address both frames in a meaningful way. 
 
Identity in Post-Conflict States 
 Conflict—another rather pervasive term—is used to refer to circumstances in which 
two actors in contact with one another “pursue incompatible goals, are aware of this 
incompatibility, and claim to be justified in the pursuit of their particular course of action” 
(Wolff 2004, 1). 'Ethnic conflict', therefore, is operationalized as a conflict in which the goals 
of at least one of the parties to the conflict and the distinction between the parties are defined—
in whole or in part—using ethnic terms. “Resolving” ethnic conflict, then, requires addressing 
the ways in which at least one party felt that their rights to expression, representation, and 
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recognition as members of this community were infringed upon, due to the fact that once this 
ethnic lens or 'frame' has been applied to the conflict, at least one party “interprets the conflict, 
its causes, and potential remedies, along an actually existing or perceived discriminating ethnic 
divide” (Wolff 2004, 1). Failure to address this frame and its influences in the post-conflict 
state can breed future conflict aimed at addressing similarly framed grievances, and a focus on 
war and security alone obstructs considerations of the socially constructed nature of boundaries 
and how they facilitate or discourage violence. 
 So then, what precisely are 'post-conflict' recovery, transition, and reconciliation, and 
why are they important? 
 
     The Opportunity of Post-Conflict 
 Post-conflict periods are volatile episodes during which identities are in a state of flux. 
Often “antagonism prevails since the experience of bloodshed and loss has marked people for 
life, rendering group identity even more relevant than at the beginning of the hostilities” 
(Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 8). While this is a period of changeability, often times both or all sides 
of the conflict end up trapped in narrow, rigid collective identities. This does not mean, 
however, that there is no opportunity for positive change towards a more stable and peaceful 
society (Ignatieff 1998; Lederach 1999; Bloomfield et al. 2003). Ultimately, the post-conflict 
period is laden with the creation of new identities as well as the renegotiation of identities that 
were central to the conflict, and the task facing legislators, international actors, and scholars is 
understanding which forms of identity construction perpetuate the potential for future violence 
and which ones have the capacity to reducing it. 
 There are risks associated with this volatile period. First and foremost, as was 
demonstrated by the list and analysis of impact of various actors capable of affecting identity 
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construction, it is necessary to be cognizant of the power hierarchies at play and which 
determine the outcome (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 21). It is not enough to simply look at the type 
of actors that are involved in this renegotiation of communal boundaries, but one must also 
take into account the political, social, and economic forces that are at play which advantage or 
disadvantage certain actors or narratives. In relation to this research, this issue is—
unsurprisingly—incredibly relevant as it begins to parse out the ways in which approaches to 
post-conflict circumstances can influence social realities and result in long-term repercussions 
for political, social, and economic progress. For example, certain approaches to post-conflict 
transformation approach it as 'closure', which can “put a lid on the constant interpretation of 
past, present and future;” this can ultimately prevent the “continuous negotiation of self and 
other necessary conditions for a diverse and vibrant society with space for contestation and 
dissent” (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 16). Lacking this open space, Buckley-Zistel argues, conflict, 
contestation, and exclusion are inevitable. The more rigid the boundaries enforced by the elite 
and political system are, the more likely it is that these boundaries will fail to align with 
personal and individual feelings of belonging, particularly as this closing of the discussion on 
boundaries leads to a homogenization and narrowing of the 'acceptable' groups (Touquet 2011, 
160). 
 
     Towards a Post-ethnic Understanding 
 There is considerable debate as to whether the space dividing 'official' categorizations 
and individuals' self-identifications is widening or shrinking on a global scale. Given that 
during most of human history individuals' identification was wholly self-dependent and 
communal only on the local level, the divide could be said to be narrowing as people become 
more and more used to and comfortable with the categories that are being imposed on them. 
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Simultaneously, however, there is considerable opportunity for official categorizations to fail 
to align or encompass the categories with which individuals identify, as is suggested by 
Touquet (2011), or for the state to overlook the intersectionality of a variety of identifications 
as the foundation of the 'self'. This space, whatever size it may be, can prove to be fertile ground 
for the development of 'alternative' identities, or identities that are excluded from the official 
categorizations. Social movement research has shown that “collective identities are often 
formed in opposition to the dominant views and discourses” (Touquet 2011, 160). This reveals 
an opportunity for bringing state sanctioned categorizations into closer correspondence with 
the categories that individuals use for self-representation. While ethno-national politicians, 
ethnopolitical entrepreneurs, and other elites maintain an essentialized, fundamentalist 
understanding of identification, their opposition has fallen into the trap of the other extreme of 
the spectrum, creating a good/bad dichotomy with civic identity as inherently good and ethnic 
identity as inherently bad (Armakolas 2011, 127). 
 A number of scholars and academics stand in opposition to this black and white division, 
arguing that not only is this a false dichotomy, but also a dangerous one. Both of these 
perspectives fail to recognized the complex matrix of fluid and crystallized identifications, 
built in innumerable layers, that comprise the sense of self (Phillips 2002). Phillips notes 
further that “important questions concerning the comparative significance of different tiers of 
imagined community for self-identity have been little explored” (2002, 598). 
 A 'postethnic' understanding may be a useful approach for the study of identification 
and the forces that have varying levels of influence on their manifestation, extending beyond 
the simple, dualistic understandings of self-identification. 'Postethnic' theory acknowledges the 
'real' foundations for many identifications, while also remaining cognizant of the fact that 
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identifications are fluid and changeable under particular conditions (Touquet 2011, 157). It is 
more applicable than many other theories to this research because “a postethnic perspective 
recognizes the psychological value and political function of bounded groups of affiliation, but 
it resists a rigidification of the ascribed distinctions between persons that universalists and 
cosmopolitans have so long sought to diminish” (Hollinger 1995, 107). In the context of this 
research, a post-ethnic perspective allows for analysis of ethnopolitical systems without 
discounting the importance of ethnic belonging to individuals and its historical foundations, 
while also recognizing that communal identification and boundaries can be influenced and 
shaped by political elites and other actors so as to garner them greater power and influence. 
 
     Utility of Deconstruction and Hermeneutics in Post-Conflict Studies 
 The term 'deconstruction' is inherently associated with such things as demolition, 
dismantling, or criticism of everything from buildings to existing paradigms of thought. 
Deconstruction as a philosophical concept strongly argued by the French philosopher Jacques 
Derrida, however, aims to increase awareness of the gaps and missteps of dominant discourses 
and paradigms (Critchley 1999, 23). Put into other words, it works to reveal that everything—
including “texts, institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs, and practices of whatever size and 
sort you need—do not have definable meanings and determinable missions,... that they exceed 
the boundaries they currently occupy” (Caputo 1997, 31). This theory simultaneously reveal 
the ways in which understanding of such 'texts' as ethnicity, tradition, etc. are constructed and 
understood through particular lenses and challenges the propagation of these theories as 
singular or ultimate truths. Deconstruction is of particular utility in post-conflict scholarship 
and policy as it challenges “the relations of power which, in dealing with difference, move 
from disturbance to oppression, from irritation to repression, and … from contestation to 
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eradication” (Campbell 1998, 514). Campbell continues, arguing for the necessity of the 
“struggle for alterity,” or a society or system in which diversity is not only tolerated but 
encouraged and valued as a source of additional perspectives and approaches for addressing 
the challenges of the modern world (Campbell 1998, 514; 1992, 5). And in so doing, 
deconstruction can revive the voices of the silenced, oppressed, and eradicated (Buckley-Zistel 
2006b, 7). 
 But deconstruction does not stand alone as a theory of understanding influential in 
considerations of identification, particularly in post-conflict circumstances. 'Hermeneutics' is 
translated directly as 'understanding' or 'interpretation', and can be used in the context of this 
paper to refer to “how identities change in the process of understanding between self and other, 
or between parties to a conflict” (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 4). This begins to illustrate the 
connection of hermeneutics to constructivist theories, expanded by Caputo's deceivingly 
simplistic statement that “we understand as we do because we exist as we do” (Caputo 1987, 
61).  As it pertains particularly to the 'in-between' according to German philosopher Hans-
Georg Gadamer—between war and peace, friend and enemy, the parties to the conflict, and 
territorial boundaries—considerations of hermeneutics enable engaging with the boundaries 
and identification, how they change, and how they normatively should be (Gadamer 1975, 295). 
This normative dimension brings into consideration the ways in which changing identities and 
boundaries could be directed so as to be 'successful'; Buckley-Zistel (2006c) defines this 
success as being able to prevent the outbreak of subsequent violence moving forward in the 
future. This research hopes to recognize the various elements of this somewhat simplistic 
definition of success. To this end, it argues that a successful conflict resolution and post-
conflict transformation is one which not only stops immediate violence, but allows for 
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representation of all sectors of the society, is economically and environmentally sustainable, 
and promotes understanding and communication across social divisions and demarcations. 
 While differing in approach, hermeneutics and deconstruction do not stand in 
opposition to one another, but rather hand in hand: “in contrast to deconstruction, which seeks 
to liberate difference, hermeneutics... calls for an engagement with difference” (Buckley-Zistel 
2006c, 17). These approaches are certainly compatible and arguably work together to enrich 
efforts to problematize dominant discourses of identity and boundaries between groups as well 
as address the ways in which these understandings can change. It is equally important to this 
research to have both an “opening of space for the other,” as is at the forefront of deconstruction, 
in addition to “conceptualizing a process of post-conflict transformation” that “ends” the 
conversation (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 17). This “ending” of conversation is not to say that new, 
fixed boundaries are established; quite the opposite, the focus of hermeneutics is to challenge 
existing structures in a way that demonstrates the ineffectiveness of fixed boundaries, 
particularly as they can be used as fodder or motivation for dissent and eventual conflict. 
Through opening a space for disagreement and alternative discourses in a post-conflict space, 
the risk of renewed conflict is mitigated considerably. 
 
     Conflict and Its Memories 
 The ways in which ethnicity is conceptualized and framed within post-conflict states is 
a crucial aspect of reconciliation, reconstruction, and transformation processes. As was 
previously discussed, memory—especially in post-conflict contexts—is crucial to 
understanding what constitutes membership in a particular group and where precisely the line 
is between 'us' and 'them'. The memory of conflict can be negotiated through a variety of means, 
though amongst the most common are 'chosen trauma' and 'chosen amnesia'. 'Chosen trauma' 
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refers to when “a group draws a traumatic event into its very identity in order to reproduce its 
collective identity,” or, rather, when a group feels victimized and uses that shared sense of 
persecution as the foundation for a unifying identity in opposition to a particular 'other', which 
is most often the group they frame as the aggressor of the past trauma (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 
8; see also Volkan 1991, Buckley-Zistel 2006a, 134). Alternatively, 'chosen amnesia' refers to 
when “a traumatic event is deliberately excluded from the discourse in order to prevent a sense 
of closure and to undermine the drawing of fixed boundaries of who is inside and who is 
outside a particular we-group” (Buckley-Zistel 2006a, 134). This approach is not inherently 
negative, as it can open a space for the formation of new groups or less homogenized 
understandings of groups, but it can also perpetuate feelings of victimization and, in allowing 
the divisions that fueled the initial conflict to persist, leave the door open to future conflict. 
 It is, however, a central focus of states in the aftermath of violent internal conflict to 
address and resolve the antagonisms that fueled the initial conflicts. Many scholars and 
politicians alike view the extension of forgiveness in some as a necessary step in this process 
toward recovery. Derrida (2001[1997]) contemplates the concept of 'pure forgiveness', 
asserting that forgiveness can only be offered by the victim or on behalf of the victim, and does 
not necessarily have to correspond with judicial or political action or outcomes. Additionally, 
absolute, pure forgiveness can only be offered when the two parties—the victim and the 
perpetrator—are involved; with third party involvement, interests in amnesty, reparation, 
reconciliation, etc. cloud the process and make the offering of pure, unbiased, uninfluenced 
forgiveness impossible. 
 Derrida struggles, however, with the division between “pure forgiveness in its 
impossibility and the practical, political demand for peace that forgiveness, however 
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illegitimately, satisfies” (Guyer 2001:1115). He challenges the necessity, and perhaps even the 
validity, of extensions of a 'finalized forgiveness', believing that it is “only a political strategy 
or a psycho-therapeutic economy” (Derrida 2001[1997]:50). His questions of whether 
forgiveness is necessary for reconciliation and whether a 'finalized forgiveness' is anything 
more than a political strategy are of particular relevance to this research. He proposes that 
“according to the situation and according to the moments, the responsibilities to be taken are 
different” (Derrida 2001:56). In other words, under some conditions it is necessary to bring to 
light the particulars of conflict, to fully investigate the human rights abuses, and to never forget 
the details of the violations and the violators; in others, however, a degree of pushing aside 
memories is crucial for making progress toward reconciliation. This provides a nuanced 
understanding otherwise lacking in a field that commonly looks to broadly applicable solutions 
or a sort of 'copy/paste' policy. Nietzsche and Gadamer's debate is reflected in this nuance, 
taking a position closer to Gadamer's: memory should not be obliterated as Nietzsche suggests, 
but rather one must recognize that there are degrees to which forgetting can be used as a means 
of moving past trauma and not using it as a means to perpetuate antagonistic relationships 
(Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 19). In addition, Derrida's postmodernist focus on language is 
informative when researching the tactics employed by different governments towards post-
conflict reconciliation, as is the purpose of this research. 
 Ultimately, memory and memorialization lie at the heart of post-conflict and recovery 
processes, as the ways in which we understand the past undeniably inform the way we perceive 
the present and move forward into the future. In the words of Buckley-Zistel, “Today's tales of 
enemies and friends derive at the same time from the parties' visions of their past and their 
future, from where they think they come from as well as where they want to go to. Identity is 
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therefore negotiated in the constant backwards and forwards movement of past, present and 
future” (2006c, 15). Thus, the question this research raises is, how does the way in which 
memories of the past and what this means for identification in the modern state influence the 
ways in which states move forward, their stability and security, and the communal and social 
relations between different groups within a state? In this way, 'peace'—or simply the official 
cessation of violent conflict—is only the beginning of the process towards a peaceful state and 
society, and understanding the mechanisms detailed in this section is crucial for building a 
sustainable peace, using the fullest definition of the term. 
 
Governance and Governing Identity 
 As Wimmer writes: 
Obviously enough, only those in control of the state apparatus can use the census 
and the law to enforce a certain boundary. Only those in control of the means of 
violence will be able to force their ethnic scheme of interpretation onto reality by 
killing... or resettling... Discrimination by those who control decisions over whom 
to hire, where to build roads, and whom to give credit is much more consequential 
than the discriminatory practices of subordinate individuals and groups (2008, 
994). 
 
Wimmer is speaking to the considerable influence of political elites and official policies in the 
construction of identity and how the degree of influence aligns with power distributions. From 
this, it should come as no surprise that regime type and governance structure have considerable 
influence over the development of identifications within the state, in addition to the expected 
control or influence over the policies and aims of the state as well as the means deemed 
reasonable or desirable for pursuing these goals. First and foremost, states take control of 
policies towards identity through such means as 'identity politics' in order to solidify their own 
bases of power, justify actions being taken or state structures, or direct the policy focus of the 
- 27 - 
 
 
state moving forward. The governance systems advocated by these groups then dictate the 
means through which representation is possible and the boundaries of officially acceptable 
identification. In post-conflict states, particularly those where the violence was ethnicized, 
these structures become all the more vital particularly in regards to the ways in which they 
influence the structure and tone of communal relations in the state moving forward. 
 
     Identity Politics 
 Identity politics is defined as “the belief that identity itself—its elaboration, expression, 
or affirmation—is and should be a fundamental focus of political work” (Kauffman 1990, 67). 
Ethnopoliticians use identity politics to perpetuate the identification along ethnic lines that 
initially led them into positions of power. Ethnopolitics differs significantly from nationalism, 
however, despite nationalist leaders and ethnopoliticians coming into power under similar 
circumstances. Ethnopolitics, like nationalism, relies on cultural, racial, or ethnic 
understandings of communal belonging and it is nationalism that provides it with the tools to 
“shape and reflect upon political reality, including notions of identity, community and territory” 
(Sarajlić 2011, 62). Ethnopolitics appears to be more 'democratic' or pluralistic than 
nationalism, however, as nationalism most frequently aims for the establishment of a 
'hierarchy' among the nations within the state, wherein all other nations are subjugated under 
the domination of a single nation. Conversely, ethnopolitics aims to establish symmetry 
between the groups through granting considerable autonomy to each ethnic, racial, or cultural 
group. Ethnopolitics is not truly democratic or egalitarian, instead employing ethnic-based 
exclusion: this exclusion manifests as the creation of completely separate ethnic spheres (or 
polities), wherein “a group excludes others from participation in its social and political affairs, 
but at the same time restrains from participating in common affairs and activities that bring 
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different groups together, preventing even its own members to participate in the affairs of other 
groups” (Saraljić 2011, 65). Thus, the ethnopolitical system is inherently based around 
segregation and division, a perfect example of 'separate but equal', at least in its most idealized 
form. 
 Ethnopolitics has come under fire in recent years, as opponents critique its 
essentialization of identification, classifying and restricting an individual in society based 
solely on their membership to a particular community or  group; this is seen as not only 
perpetuating and even deepening pre-existing divisions, but also as discouraging “every civic 
initiative and in a legitimate way... dismisses individual (or citizen) from any political power,” 
(Mujkić et al. 2008, 18;  see also Maalouf 2003, 149). In addition, the identity politics 
frequently employed for the purpose of perpetuating existing ethnopolitical systems has been 
faulted for failing to challenge the ways in which categories are socially constructed, for 
ignoring the intersectionality of identities, for forcing individuals to “privilege some aspects 
of identity over others,” for disregarding inter-group diversity and, in so doing, imposing a 
homogenized identity on undoubtedly diverse groups (Bernstein 2005, 57; see also Ryan, 1997; 
Phelan, 1989; and Alexander, 1999). 
 Framing and rhetoric are crucial to the process of identity politics. The Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis argues that “we see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do 
because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation” 
(Sapir 1958 [1929], 69). It follows that changes to the language used to refer to certain groups, 
policies, histories, or actions would be relevant to understanding and predicting how behavior, 
perceptions, and actions are likely to change. Through the application of this hypothesis and 
its implications, research into the influence of identity construction and government structure 
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on post-conflict recovery will be expanded and enriched. 
 Rhetoric, as defined by Raymond and Olive, is “the 'art of using language so as to 
persuade or influence others'; it emphasizes the choice of specific words and phrases for 
purposes of persuasion'” (2009, 191). Indeed, numerous scholars maintain that analysis of 
language and rhetoric, paying particular focus to the words, phrases, and metaphors employed 
by elites, is vital to its recognition as a crucial instrument of political persuasion and causation 
(Raymond & Olive 2009; McLeod 1999; Benesch 2004; Gamson 1995). Language used in 
official discourses can institutionalize particular distinctions, such as  'class enemies', 
'counterrevolutionaries', and 'heretics', through the creation of 'frames' that direct “beliefs, ideas, 
and perceptions of what constitutes 'reality'” (Harff 2003, 61, Raymond & Olive 2009, 196). A 
frame, then, is “a set of cognitive and moral maps that orients an actor within a policy sphere... 
[that] encompass definitions, analogies, metaphors, and symbols that help actors to 
conceptualize a political or social situation, identify problems and goals, and chart courses of 
action” (Bleich 2002, 1063-64). The question then becomes, how can and do these frames 
change, how do these discourse frameworks become institutionalized through state structure, 
and what is the impact of these approaches? 
 Bleich studied how the “relatively consistent frames” of race and ethnicity that France 
and Britain maintained in the aftermath of WWII directly impacted their policies and 
legislation moving forward (2002, 1055). All legislation, unsurprisingly, is dictated by a 
particular vision of both how the future of the government/society is envisioned as well as what 
are seen as the politically viable options, given pre-existing structure, history, and frame of 
understood reality.  The differences in legislation in each of these two states with largely similar 
historical experiences is directly tied to these frames for interpreting reality. Britain acted upon 
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the belief that ethnic groups are endowed with an inherent reality that cannot be ignored, and 
that, if attempted, such action would perpetuate inequality and repress minority groups even 
further (Bleich 2002). Essentially, Britain operated under a 'hard'-er conceptualization of 
identity, and believed that one must first recognize the realities of ethnicity and difference if 
one is to mediate discrimination and inequality within society. Thus, British policy used “civil 
law to penalize acts of discrimination in employment, housing, and provision of goods and 
services,” which makes conviction significantly easier as standards of proof are lower than 
required by criminal law; utilized affirmative action; outlawed “indirect discrimination;” and 
“has begun to collect extensive ethnic statistics, even incorporating an ethnic question into its 
census” in order to facilitate the acquisition of more accurate data to be used in informing race 
policy moving forward (Bleich 2002, 1057-58). In many ways Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted a 
similar perspective in its approach to ethnicity following the cessation of violence. 
 France, on the other, acted upon the belief that ethnicity and race were not only arbitrary 
but highly dangerous and divisive categories perpetuated by official recognition and 
conceptual division—by continuing to use the categories, they believed, you add credence to 
them and perpetuate their relevance in society. This belief is built upon a 'soft'-er 
conceptualization of identity and ethnicity, as they believe that the mere utilization or 
disavowal of ethnic categorizations can dictate their salience and influence within the state. 
Thus, the French implemented policies such as favoring “the punishment of... racist acts by the 
criminal law” which makes it much more difficult to reach the standards of proof necessary 
for prosecution; implementing “the French antiracism law of 1990 [which] rendered it illegal 
to contest the existence of crimes against humanity committed during [WWII];” stopping all 
use of affirmative action programs and initiatives; and passing “a law in 1978 that virtually 
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prohibits collection of ethnic data” (Bleich 2002, 1056-58). Rwanda, similarly, chose to 
eliminate ethnic forms of identification so as to not further validate them. 
 Clearly, the different ways in which they discuss, conceptualize, and analyze race led 
to different understandings of their societal problems relating to race, their policy goals, and 
ultimately the race policies they implemented (Bleich 2002, 1065). A similar process can be 
seen in post-conflict governance design: the system implemented—though influenced by 
external actors with their own concepts of what constituted the most effective—is primarily 
directed by understandings of the past and future of the state and what is considered politically 
viable. By looking at the mutually influential relationship between individuals and the state 
system one can understand the ways in which understanding of identity impacts and is 
impacted by governance structure. 
 
     Structuring the State and Designing the System 
 The system of governance instituted following ethnicized conflict is heavily influenced 
by existing conceptions of ethnicity: power hungry ethnonational politicians eagerly 
advocating for system reforms that will both keep them in their positions of power and increase 
that power; well-intentioned if idealistic attempts at forcing a move into pure democratic 
systems of equality based on a belief that not talking about ethnicity removes its cultural or 
societal salience and relevance; and those that believe ethnic differences can simply be 
repressed (Horowitz 1985). But post-conflict governance systems are not only influenced by 
existing conceptions of ethnicity, but have the power to influence the ways in which connection, 
community, and identity are understood, defined, and divided. There are a variety of ways in 
which these systems are often structured, each with their own basket of strengths, weaknesses, 
and mid- to long-term impacts. 
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 The main aim of any post-conflict governance regime is (or, at least, should be) to build 
sustainable stability and peace; most frequently this is done through the implementation of new 
structures and legislation based on inclusion, “understood in this case as fair representation of 
categories of citizens defined by societal cleavages” (Simonsen 2005, 302). This is particularly 
challenging and crucial in societies where the conflict itself was ethnicized—in the eyes of 
many, ethnicity is an intractable categorization that cannot be chosen or changed, and thus a 
conflict based around this societal cleavage would threaten the core of one's identity and the 
elimination of an entire categorization of the citizenry. As has been discussed previously, 
ethnicity is not so rigid, and therefore particular care must be taken when addressing identity 
and ethnicity in post-conflict states. 
 There are three central elements to governance systems: “constitutional design, 
electoral system design, and (de)centralization/federalism” (Simonsen 2005, 307). A variation 
of these three elements can be used to develop a kind of design matrix of potential systems that 
could be implemented in states according to what is best suited for that state's particular 
circumstances, history, aims, and challenges. These systems are typically approached from a 
dichotomous spectrum of options of each element: presidential vs. parliamentarian, 
proportional vs. majoritarian representation, and federalism vs. unitarianism. Existing 
literature on the implementation of governance systems in post-ethnicized conflict states is 
inconclusive, though there are some aspects where there appears to be agreement. For example, 
there appears to be “compelling evidence that a presidential system is far from what a divided 
society might need” (Simonsen 2005, 308). It is believed that such a system may result in 
domination of the system by a single ethnic group and limit the representation of minorities 
within the political sphere, whereas a parliamentary system requires cooperation and a more 
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consensual approach. On the spectrum of federalism vs. unitarianism, it has been found that 
federalism based around ethnically divided territorial regions has the effect of entrenching 
ethnic divisions and increasing their already elevated salience (Simonsen 2005, 309). 
Alternatively, though, it has been found that territorial, rather than ethnic, federalism has the 
opposite effect and encourages cooperation and moderate politics similar to that seen in 
parliamentary systems. There is the least conclusiveness on the effects of different voting 
systems, though most of the literature agrees that simple majoritarian electoral systems in 
'divided societies' are deleterious and dangerous for the long-term stability of the state. 
 
     Existing Systems 
 Despite the matrix of possibilities of system design, most post-conflict governance 
systems fall within two categorizations—consociationalism and assimilative/integrative 
governance—with more categorized as the former rather than the latter. Much of the academic 
literature views these two forms as being in dichotomous opposition, a claim which—despite 
overlooking the similar logic underlying each system—useful in the ways in which it parallels 
other broadly accepted dichotomies. Consociationalism draws on hard, primordialist 
understandings of ethnicity as well as a view of identity as singular; assimilative/integrative 
governance, on the other hand, relies on extreme constructivist, soft understandings of ethnicity 
built upon an idea of identity as almost endlessly flexible. Often, these dichotomies are framed 
in such terms as “consociational democracy vs. authoritarianism,” “consociationalists vs. 
assimilation,” “(consociationalism = accommodation/ [power-sharing]) vs. civil-society” 
(Dixon 2012, 101; Nagel & Clancy 2012). 
 
 
        Consociational Structure 
 Consociational 'power-sharing', as it is widely referred to, was admittedly founded on 
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primordialist principles of national identity, viewing it as historical, essential, and unyielding 
(Fearon & Laitin 2000, 848). It comes as no surprise, then, that consociational theory promotes 
power-sharing between otherwise autonomous groups and champions policies “for the 
segregation of the 'ethnic' or communal pillars and domination of those pillars by the 
communal elites” (Dixon 2011, 310; see also Samuels 2005, 10). Believing that it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to reduce ethnicity's salience in divided societies, consociationalists 
believe that the only way to prevent the resurgence of violence within the state is to engage 
society in a “voluntary” or “benign apartheid” (Lijphart 1977). To support this division, the 
consociational system utilizes 1) grand coalitions, 2) segmental autonomy, 3) power-sharing, 
4) minority veto, and 5) proportionality in political representation (Lijphart 1977; Lijphart 
2001, 172; Simonsen 2005, 310; Nagel & Clancy 2012, 82). 
 Proponents of consociationalism turn to literature on such things as proportional 
representation and minority rights to bolster their arguments. For example, at the heart of 
consociationalism is a belief that “proportional representation (PR) [electoral] systems are 
preferable for divided societies, given that majoritarian solutions may lead to the permanent 
exclusion of minorities” (Simonsen 2005, 301; Dixon 2011, 316). Having begun to distance 
themselves from the theory's primordialist origins, consociationalism no longer claims that 
ethnicity is essential. Instead, claims are based around an understanding that these divisions 
are more resilient than constructivist theories would lead one to believe, and that “they must 
be recognised rather than wished away” (McGarry & O'Leary 1995, 338). By allowing each 
ethnic group to act in their own 'vital national interest' and ensure their continued recognition 
by the state, issues of ethnicity become less important. In so doing, a consociational system 
develops an environment in which the erosion of these identifications can take place naturally 
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and more easily (Coakley 2009, 145; O'Leary 2005, 19). Kaufmann goes so far as to claim that 
“certainly ethnic hostility cannot be reduced without separation” (1996, 174). 
 There have been numerous critiques of consociationalism in recent years, particularly 
in relation to its sizable failure in Iraq. Ultimately, research into the effectiveness of governance 
systems of this type have found that “formal executive power-sharing leads to a fragile peace, 
often without violence but also without reconciling the parties or addressing the underlying 
tensions” (Samuels 2005, 11). More distressing than this, however, is that rather than 
contributing to the conditions necessary for the gradual dissolution of ethnic divides as 
proponents of the theory claim, it has the opposite effect, in many cases not only perpetuating 
ethnic divisions but entrenching and radicalizing them, freezing the patterns of conflict that led 
to violence (Samules 2005, 12; Simonsen 2005, 316; Dixon 2011, 311). This takes place 
significantly through providing no incentives for cooperation and collaboration amongst elites 
and politicians from the various ethnic groups and even going so far as incentivizing the 
opposite. The system in many cases enables the focus to remain on fixed percentages and 
defending solely the interests of their ethnic group rather than pressing national issues, and do 
little more than transform the government into a new battlefield (Nagel & Clancy 2012, 84). 
Similar incentives are given to citizens, who can easily fall into a pattern of 'ethnic census' 
wherein members of a group vote along ethnic lines rather than based on issues. This can be 
highly unstable as well as discriminatory—when there is a clear majority of one ethnic group 
over another, “minorities may have representation but little or no real political influence” 
(Simonsen 2005, 300). With separate polities and the only real voice of the citizens being 
through membership to an ethnic group, it is difficult if not impossible to consider any issues 
outside of an ethnic framework. 




        Assimilative/Integrative Governance 
 There is little to no agreement in the literature on what this type of approach should be 
termed, ranging from 'assimilationism' to 'integrative governance,' the 'civil-society approach' 
to 'social-transformationist approaches'. With this discrepancy in the terminology used to even 
describe this policy choice, it comes as little shock that there is strikingly little written on this 
topic, and that which has been written can at best be used to form a patchwork analysis of a 
governance system consisting of a variety of policy options. Integrative governance, for 
example, “aims to transcend group differences by encouraging groups to cooperate around 
common political goals” (Samuels 2005, 11); the aim of assimilationism, however, “is to 
relegate ethnic identities to the private sphere” so that the public sphere can be “a place where 
a common civic, non-ethnic realm is developed” (Nagel & Clancy 2012, 102). The civil society 
approach, on the other hand, is classified as “radical instrumentalism” and “emphasises the 
manipulation of the people by political elites” (Dixon 2012, 102), while social-
transformationist approaches “aim to forge a single all-embracing public identity through 
integration” (Nagel & Clancy 2012, 80).  These approaches are clearly compatible, and there 
are even some clear overlaps: the aim is typically to, either through outright abolition or 
relegation out of the public sphere, remove ethnicity from politics, a charge typically led by 
(political) elites. Missing, however, is a clear policy prescription or a definition that could be 
used to determine if a governance system could be classified as a variation of assimilationist 
design, and, if so, which one it is most similar to. 
 Even without a clear means by which to categorize or operationalize the utilization of 
this branch of systems, there are a number of supporters of the general approach, their 
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arguments based on a belief that “an undifferentiated and singular concept of citizenship 
facilitates peaceful coexistence between potentially conflicting groups” (Nagel & Clancy 2012, 
90). This belief is based on a more fluid understanding of identity construction, evidenced by 
the basing of state policy on the expectation that it could contribute to the reduction of 
ethnicity's societal salience and relevance. There are, however, critiques to these approaches 
as well. Most striking is its assumption that the state is capable of a 'civic' identification that 
can truthfully be described as nonpartisan, secular, etc.—as stated by Nagel and Clancy, “no 
state is ethnically neutral. … The formal promotion of a state language, symbols and rituals 
reflects the hegemonic dominance of one ethno national group over any number of other 
minority groups” (2012, 90). Bearing this in mind, it becomes clear that despite even the best 
intentions at achieving this idealistic and clean division between ethnic and civic 
identifications, between private and public life, such a division is all but impossible; attempts 
at doing so risk implementing a system of majoritarian politics where minority voices go 
unheard as the majority group maintains unofficial control over the political system. 
Additionally, this simplified, uniform approach ignores the intersectionality of identities that 
can contribute to conflict between groups as well as the interplay of multiple identifications 
that influences conceptions of the individual and the group. 
 
     Impacts of International Action on Governance 
 In many cases of conflict—including those that have been ethnicized—the international 
community becomes involved, particularly by means of peacebuilding and reconstruction. The 
United Nations, for example, has increasingly focused on “promoting democracy and 
strengthening good governance... [as] core components of post-conflict peace-building 
initiatives” (Santiso 2002, 555). But these ventures are not always successful, despite their 
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most idealistic intentions. For example, Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake's (2009) article 
focuses on Aceh, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, analyzing the role of the international community 
in these endeavors; she concludes that their failure to look beyond ethnic framing prevented 
the creation of a sustainable peace project. She proposes and advocates for an alternative form 
of inclusive peacebuilding that engages with civil society actors and local communities 
(Rajasingham-Senanayake 2009:232-233). This is of particular importance to this research as 
it begins to address questions of how the international community can engage in post-conflict 
state reconstruction most effectively. 
 There is a considerable risk during the structuring of post-conflict governance systems 
of overemphasizing ethnicity during both 'first generation' and 'second generation' engagement, 
which can ultimately perpetuate the dynamics that initially spurred conflict (Santiso 2002, 562). 
Rajasingham-Senanayake (2009) problematizes the primordialist currents which frequently 
run beneath the surface of these policies, challenging domestic and international elites and 
policy makers to consider the complex causes that lead to the conflict and the multifaceted and 
sometimes fluid, sometimes crystallized nature of identity when developing goals and policies 
for the post-conflict state. Given that, “external international forces have a leverage that makes 
it possible to break the pattern of zero-sum games, sanction extremist behavior, and enforce a 
level of accommodation that might not otherwise have occurred,” this is particularly important 
for  international organizations who become involved with the process of post-conflict 
recovery (Simonsen 2005, 301). Bearing this knowledge in mind, efforts for redesigning the 
governments and institutions of post-genocidal states and international actors involved in this 
post-conflict process should be increasingly cognizant of the ways in which electoral systems 
and political structure can shape identification. The United Nations Development Programme 
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(UNDP), for example, view democratization and the promotion of good governance “as a tool 
for the recognition, prevention, and management of conflicts, especially in ethnically divided 
countries” (Santiso 2002, 568). The question has now become how well do the policies and 
strategies employed by UNDP achieve their aims of “forging consensus, protecting human 
rights, increasing political participation and broadening inclusion, reforming the judiciary, 
enhancing public security, reforming electoral systems, modernising public administration, and 
decentralising the state” (Santiso 2002, 573). Relating this back to post-conflict governance 
structure, is there an operational strategy that could be presented by UNDP as a more effective 
means of establish a stable system and sustainable peace? 
 
     Alternative Structures 
 Despite the dichotomous presentation of the policies of consociationalism and 
assimilationism/integrative governance, there do exist alternative means and frames from 
which to approach the structuring of post-conflict governance system. Indeed, even Kauffman, 
with his starkly pessimistic outlook on the likelihood of peace without the separation of ethnic 
groups, stated that as an alternative the “thorough re-engineering of the involved group's 
political and social systems” (though this research does not support his drastic assertion that 
this can only be accomplished through “conquering the country and occupying it for a long 
time, possibly decades”) (1996, 174). Given the earlier discussion of conceptualizations of 
identity and that consociationalism is associated with hard/crystallized understandings of 
identification while assimilationsim/integrative governance is associated with soft/fluid 
understandings, it logically follows that there must exist a policy which abandons this 
dichotomous division. Surely there must exist a framework that acknowledges that the 
crystallization and fluidity of identifications varies over time and circumstance, and that the 
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'reality' is much grayer than the classic dichotomy would have one believe. 
 At its simplest, Horowitz's (1985) theories revolve around concepts of ethnicity as 
flexible in their salience and the transformative capacity of state policies and structures to alter 
this salience and shape the ways in which ethnicity and identity are conceptualized within the 
state. But not all conflict management methods possess the same capacity to alleviate ethnic 
tensions and prevent a return to violence. He writes: 
Between the naivete of those who would abolish ethnic differences in short order 
through 'nation-building', the cynicism of those who would simply suppress those 
differences, and the pessimism of those who would counsel costly and disruptive 
partition as the only way out—between these goals, there lurk passages that are at 
once less dramatic, less visionary, and more realistic (1985:599). 
 
He sees five means by which to reduce ethnic tensions in post-conflict states: (1) dispersing 
political power through federalism; (2) emphasizing intraethnic competition and conflict; (3) 
incentivizing interethnic cooperation through policies on elections and territorial disputes; (4) 
encouraging interests-based alignments; and (5) reducing inequalities between groups through 
redistribution measures. Critical importance is therefore placed on the use of structural 
incentives to promote conciliatory relations. To this end, Horowitz believes measures that aim 
to “contain, limit, channel, and manage ethnic conflict rather than to eradicate it or to aim at 
either a massive transfer of loyalties or the achievement of some consensus,” that “involve 
living with ethnic differences and not moving beyond them” are the most effective in post-
ethnicized conflict situations (Horowitz 1985:600). 
 This approach has been dubbed 'complexity theory' by other scholars as it “recognises 
that components are constantly changing [and] challenges the view that a complex item can be 
understood by reducing it to its constituent parts” (Little 2008, 24). Given that the elements 
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comprising society vary not only across contexts but over time as well, this approach demands 
'deep contextualization' and “acknowledges the inevitability of a multiplicity of rational 
viewpoints” when approaching construction of an effective post-conflict system (Dixon 2011, 
320). In this way, complexity theory more thoroughly connects with constructivist theory that 
understands that identities may be 'sticky' and hard to change or 'fluid' and readily changeable 
depending on time and circumstance. The aim is not to come to a final, fixed solution, but 
rather to develop a flexible system that empowers all facets of society, acknowledges the 
importance and salience of existing societal divisions, and fosters the development of a uniting 
identity on its own terms (Simonsen 2005, 207; Dixon 2012, 107-8). The focus must be on 
accommodating and honoring difference, not subverting it, as “people from different national 
groups will only share an allegiance to the larger polity if they see it as the context within 
which their national identity is nurtured, rather than subordinated” (Kymilcka 1995, 189). 
 Horowitz is extremely critical of Arend Lijphart's consociational theory. Broadly, he 
faults it for failing to adequately account for why any majority-group leader would willingly 
engage in the 'grand coalitions' that are central to consociational organization; for overlooking 
the impact of compromise across ethnic lines on political elites, as counter-elites frame it as 
selling-out, making it undesirable for incumbents hoping to remain in power; and for ignoring 
the ways in which institutionalizing cultural autonomy reduces the unity, stability, and 
effectiveness of the state. He proposes instead that incentives for accommodative and 
cooperative behavior are key, particularly when offered by the structure of the system itself, 
such as through electoral rewards that disincentivize ethnocentrism and radicalism and 
incentivize concessions and moderation (Horowitz 2002:23). An example of such electoral 
rewards are vote-pooling arrangements—wherein votes by ethnically-based parties are 
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exchanged so that parties must behave moderately on the issues in conflict in order to receive 
those votes—or in what Simonsen (2005) proposes as 'centripitalism'. In this system of 
alternative voting, “voters not only pick their favorite but also rank-order other candidates. 
And the centripetal spin emerges when candidates moderate their policies in order to be ranked 
higher by voters outside their ethnic electorate” (Simonsen 2005:311; see also Horowitz 2004, 
Wilford and Wilson 2006, Nagel & Clancy 2012). There have been, however, disparate 
outcomes and effectiveness—particularly in the case of Fiji—that have led leading scholars, 
including Horowitz, to qualify that alternative voting “can, but does not necessarily, promote 
moderation” (Nagel & Clancy 2012, 92; emphasis added). Ultimately, in spite of the rather 
dismal image he provides of ethnic disintegration of democracy in innumerable states, 
Horowitz ends with the optimistic note that “there is no case to be made for the futility of 
democracy or the inevitability of uncontrolled conflict. Even in the most severely divided 
society, ties of blood do not lead ineluctably to rivers of blood” (Horowitz 1985:684). 
 Post-conflict transformation then must, rather than trying to “introduce a new sense of 
closure which eradicates diversity, potentially leading to a new conflict,” work to foster 
suppressed voices and encourage diversity over homogenization (Buckley-Zistel 2006b, 21). 
Indeed, it must account for the complexities of inter-ethnic dynamics and keep a ready eye on 
the long-term impacts of the implemented structure. It is probable that there will be more than 
one system which will accomplish the aims of complexity theory, given the variety of contexts 
of societal divisions; it is absolutely certain, however, that there is no single governance design 
that will work in all states, and attempts to implement a uniform solution across all post-conflict 
states will almost inevitably end in failure. Timothy Sisk (1998) advocates that mediators 
conduct analyses of the existing societal divisions and how different governance systems 
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would relate to and impact those cleavages so as to find a system best suited for that context. 
Thus, in order to implement a sustainable and effective post-conflict regime, institutional 
design must “be context-sensitive in a strong sense, that is, sensitive not only to the gross 
features of differing contexts but to finer details as well,” utilizing “relatively 'thick' 
understandings of the local contexts in which it is to apply” (Brubaker 1998, 280). 
 
     Evaluating Governance Approaches 
 Despite research on governance systems, there is still uncertainty over the impact of 
governance choices on post-conflict recovery, in no small part due to the complex interactions 
of differing institutions, processes, historical heritages, and cultural environments. Research 
conducted by Benjamin Reilly, however, found a relationship between “ethnic fragmentation 
and democratic sustainability, with both very low (i.e., highly homogeneous) and very high 
(i.e., highly heterogeneous) levels of ethnic fragmentation more conducive to democracy than 
those in between” (2000, 184). If 'democratic' sustainability is equated with 'peace' (a risky and 
oversimplifying action), then these findings support policy recommendations for both 
consociational and assimilative/integrative governance and refute or render irrelevant 
arguments for the emerging complexity theory. Additional studies on the impact multiethnicity 
and heterogeneity on the likelihood of internal conflict (defined as a conflict in which “the 
national government is one of the active parties”) is overshadowed by the influence of political 
regime and socioeconomic development (Ellingsen 2000, 229). This research subscribes to the 
argument that ethnopoliticians utilize narratives of conflicting identifications as useful frames 
to draw support for themselves while they (claim to) work towards reforms of the existing 
system to better address the presumed interests of the ethnic group or to distract the group from 
the larger systemic problems using ethnic histories. In support of this argument, Mousseau's 
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research found that “in none of [its] analyses was the variable for ethnic heterogeneity 
significantly related to higher levels of political violence;” in response to these findings, the 
research asserted that the impact of ethnicity on likelihood and degree of political violence 
must be understood through the analysis of the political and economic context of the state 
(Mousseau 2001, 564-65). It is therefore not an intellectual leap to assert that presence or 
absence of ethnicity (or the salience of ethnic identity) does not predict stability in post-conflict 
states and similar forces must be placed on the political and economic context. 
 This research hopes to shed additional light on the impacts of governance structure—
specifically the institutional approach to ethnicity—on the likelihood of stable peace, referring 
not only to the cessation of outright war, but to improved intergroup relations, economic 
development with reduced inequality, respect of human rights, etc., in post-genocidal states. 
To this end, this research will test two hypotheses proposed by the literature: 
H1: If the degree of institutionalized heterogeneity is high, then the degree of peace 
will be high. 
H2: If the degree of institutionalized homogeneity is high, then the degree of peace 
will be high. 
 
The first hypothesis aims to test the utility of consociational governance systems, while the 
second hypothesis tests assimilative/integrative governance systems; if both of these 
hypotheses can be rejected, this will serve as support for the alternative—complexity theory—
and the associated hypothesis: 
HA: If the degree of institutionalization identification is high, then the degree of peace 
will be low. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Comparative Case Study Methodology 
 Comparative case study was determined to be the most effective means of testing the 
research question and hypotheses proposed by this research. Comparative case studies 
methodologically consist of an “empirical investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within 
its natural context using multiple sources of evidence” (Hancock & Algozzine 2006, 15). In 
other words, a specific phenomenon, program, activity, etc. is studied within the spatial and 
temporal context in which it exists normally, drawing upon such varied sources of data as 
interviews, existing research, and observation. The approach most frequently suggested as an 
alternative to this method is large-n comparative analysis: many regard this method as superior 
because of its capacity to control (more) effectively for additional variables. There is a sizable 
limitation to the utility of large-n analysis for this research, however: the population of interest 
to this study—states that have experienced genocide—is rather small. Even if the entire 
population was utilized in the study, there may not be enough cases (depending on how 
genocide is defined) to have the statistically robust number of 30 or more data points. 
 Comparative case study's usage of a variety of sources of information—both 
quantitative and qualitative—makes this method particularly well positioned to gather the 
highly detailed, micro-level data as well as the macro-level data available through larger 
analyses necessary to account for the nuanced impacts of identity institutionalization in post-
genocidal states. This can then be combined with analysis of macro-level data to contextualize 
and deepen the analysis. In addition, case studies yield strong results, both “inferring and 
testing explanations that define how the independent causes the dependent variable,” which is 
more difficult when using large-n methods (Van Evera 1997, 54). Ultimately, Van Evera states, 
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there are benefits and drawbacks to both comparative case study and large-n, one only superior 
to the other insofar as it is better equipped to answer a specific question; for example, case 
studies are more useful when there is a single, dominant hypothesis that can be tested or there 
are only a few cases but they have been studied in detail (1997, 55). 
 
     Model 
 There are a variety of ways in which case study analyses can vary—as (1) ethnographic, 
historical, psychological, or sociological; as (2) intrinsic, instrumental, or collective; or as (3) 
exploratory, explanatory, or descriptive. The method design used by this research would be 
classified as based in sociology, collective in nature, and explanatory in aim (Hancock & 
Algozzine 2006, 31). The focus of this study is on social institutions and relationships with 
particular focus paid to the “structure, development, interaction, and collective behavior of 
organized groups of individuals” (Hancock & Algozzine 2006, 32). It is collective and 
explanatory because it not only aims to create a clear theory of the issue, but to go so far as to 
document a cause-and-effect relationship to better understand what outcomes can be expected 
from particular actions—in this case, the impact of governance structure and policy choices. 
 The general model of this research is relatively parsimonious, with the independent 
variable being the degree of institutionalized identity (heterogeneous to homogeneous), and 
the dependent variable being 'peace'. This study is structured as a method of difference 
comparative case study—this means the two cases chosen for analysis will be similar in as 
many ways as possible, differing solely or most significantly in their values of the 'study 
variable' (the variable whose causes or effects we seek to establish): the degree of 
institutionalized identity (Van Evera 1997, 57). 
 




     Variable Conceptualization and Operationalization 
 Institutionalized identity is without a doubt the term most in need of clear definition for 
effective testing of this research's hypotheses. Identity is understood to be 'institutionalized' 
when state structures, laws, and policies use strictly defined and delineated categories for 
identification of the population, and there are disincentives integral to the system against 
identifying outside of these definitions. The institutionalization of identity ranges between the 
two extremes of 'homogeneity' and 'heterogeneity'. Homogeneous institutionalized identity is 
measured through the existence of official state structures that emphasize a single, unitary 
identification. This can manifest in some cases as such extreme measures as outlawing the 
usage of particular identifying categories (e.g., 'Hutu', 'Tutsi', and 'Twa' in Rwanda following 
the 1994 genocide) or limiting religious, cultural, or ethnic freedoms in the name of protecting 
a concept of shared identity (e.g., the banning of hijabs and other obvious forms of religious 
expression in state buildings in France in the name of laïcité). Heterogeneous institutionalized 
identity, similarly, is measured through the existence of official state structures that base 
themselves around the division of identities that are presumed to be intractable, historical, and 
internally uniform. This manifests most clearly as systems that incorporate ethnic quotas in 
government positions, sometimes taking extreme forms through the division of the state into 
federal units divided based on ethnic/religious/national differences (e.g., Bosnia-Herzegovina's 
Republika Srpska and Federation, and Ethiopia since 1991). 
 The conception of 'peace' is also of vital importance to this research: it is the ultimate 
aim of all conflict settlements and a conceptually complex variable, as there exist both 'positive' 
and 'negative' definitions of peace. Negative definitions of peace are more traditional, referring 
simply to the absence of war, and termed 'negative' insofar as they speak to the absence of 
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certain non-peaceful actions, rights violations, etc. This includes the absence of or freedom 
from such things as political imprisonment, discrimination, forced disappearances, torture, and 
sexual violence. Positive definitions, however, incorporate ideas of 'rights to': positive peace 
is conceptualized as “both the absence of war (direct violence) and the absence of social 
injustice (indirect violence)” (Roberts 2008, 538). This refers to such elements as political 
representation, access to education, and freedom of expression. This research looks at the 
presence or absence of positive peace as a more meaningful measure of the degree of peace in 
post-conflict states and therefore of the success of post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery 
efforts that have taken place there. To have positive peace, states must have cultivated 'societal 
legitimacy' which is “central to the creation of state-societal stability” (Roberts 2008, 546). 
 This research proposes that it is difficult if not impossible to achieve 'societal 
legitimacy' through an identity institutionalizing system. For the purposes of this research, 
positive peace will be measured through improvement to such measures as economic 
development and opportunity, societal cohesion, levels of corruption, political representation, 
and effective transitional justice as crucial elements towards societal legitimacy. Societal 
cohesion, for the purposes of this research, refers to the degree to which individuals within the 
society are living together harmoniously, evidenced by mixed-marriage rates, the integration 
of communities, and the absence of divided schools. 
 
     Case Selection 
 With the unit of analysis the state-level as this research questions government 
institutionalization of identity, the population of interest is limited to post-genocidal states. The 
cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and Rwanda—two of the relatively limited number of 
countries that have experienced large scale, communal based violence that escalated into 
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genocide as defined by international law—were chosen for this research for a number of 
reasons. Most important to answering my research question, however, is that the governance 
systems implemented in these two cases correspond with the two extremes of institutionalized 
identity—one being fully heterogeneous, the other fully homogeneous. This is particularly 
useful in testing each hypothesis proposed by the literature, and to potentially add support to 
the alternative hypothesis. 
 In addition to this, the states fit into the method of difference model. The violence took 
place in both states around similar time frames—BiH, 1992-95, Rwanda, 1994—which allows 
for easier comparison, as the international context in which they took place, were ended, and 
worked towards recovery are the same. Indeed, both had international interventions into the 
country aimed at protecting citizens, often in UN-secured enclaves intended to be safe zones, 
and these efforts failed to a considerable extent. In addition, both genocides took place during 
civil wars that had ethnicized elements, as the forces engaged in the conflict were most 
prominently divided along ethnic lines. From a more practical perspective, these cases were 
chosen because they are, arguably, the most thoroughly studied of all contemporary cases of 
genocide. Having the ability to draw upon already collected data will greatly assist in 
compiling a valid set of data from which to draw conclusions. 
 There are, however, sizable limitations that prevent these cases from being used in a 
classic method of difference comparison. Primarily, prior political and historical experiences 
undoubtedly influenced the design of the political systems implemented as part of post-conflict 
reconstruction, as one system could be more familiar than another. The geography of the 
states—particularly the characteristics of the states' neighbors, including their ethnic 
composition and governance structure—influences what policies are deemed feasible or 
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desirable. For example, BiH's proximity to and desire to eventually join the European Union 
influenced what system was believed more desirable. Additionally, differences in the duration 
and scale of the genocides impacted the rationale behind the different policies instituted in the 
post-conflict period and their ultimate failure or success, as the degree to which trust between 
groups and trust in the government had diminished would vary. It would be foolish for this 
research to imply that there is any single governance system that could be offered as a “fix-all” 
for any past or future post-genocidal states. 
 
Data Collection in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 The mixed method approach of this research will draw on a variety of macro and micro 
data sources. Six macro sources, which are predominantly quantitative in nature, are used in this 
research: 1) Political Terror Scale, 2) CIRI Human Rights Data Project, 3) Freedom House Index, 
4) Corruption Perception Index, 5) Human Development Index and GINI Coefficient, and 6) World 
Happiness Report. Public opinion data gathered by the World Values Survey during Wave 5 (2007) 
and Wave 6 (2012) will also be employed, but solely for the case analysis of Rwanda as BiH 
was only surveyed in one wave (Wave 3 in 1998). Data will be gathered from these sources as 
available for the last year of violent conflict in each case and for every year following, from the 
official peace agreements up to the present. This data informs analysis of the degree of progress 
that has been made in each state on critical indicators for stable peace, including government 
legitimacy, social cohesion, economic growth, and low discrimination. While the quantitative 
sources of data will be largely the same for both cases, the sources of qualitative data will differ 
for each: interviews, formal presentations, and informal conversations were conducted in BiH, 
while content analysis was performed on blog posts from Rwandan bloggers as well as 
journalists, activists, professors, etc. who study Rwanda. This population was chosen because 
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this population typically has higher levels of access to information on the system and a broader 
outlook that includes the society as a whole as well as local experiences. Such an approach  is 
beneficial to this study as it allows for a systemic analysis that captures not only individual 
level experiences, but the perspectives of those directly influencing state policy (politicians 
and employees of the government) as well as those who are most critical of these policies 
(activists, journalists, academics, etc.). 
 The choice to use divergent methods leads to limitations on what this research can ask 
as well as the conclusions that can be drawn from it. For example, because identical interviews 
were not conducted in both states, there can be no direct comparison between the responses of 
individuals in each of the states to an identical set of questions. This points to the larger 
challenge in analysis and comparison: the indirect method of data collection that dominates the 
Rwandan case analysis. This method of data collection has clear limitations, such as the lack 
of focus on particular topics or issues that would otherwise be provided by the framework of 
an interview. However, given the methodological difficulties associated with conducting 
research in Rwanda, the indirect method may not only be a satisfactory substitute for 
conducting interviews, but may indeed be better suited to this context (one in which access to 
participants is low and risk for participants is high). Indeed, the infeasibility of conducting 
interviews in Rwanda was a driving factor in the decision to use divergent methods, despite 
the potential limits on the conclusions of this research. As Hintjens addressed in her research, 
“open criticism of authority remains a taboo,” and therefore there is sizable resistance to 
discuss the past, politics, or identities (both political and ethnic), and attempt to do so may 
bring unwanted attention from the Rwandan authorities to the researcher (2008, 7). These 
conditions have worsened considerably since October 2014, when the British Broadcasting 
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Corporation (BBC) documentary film entitled “Rwanda's Untold Story” was released. This 
documentary brought into question the Kagame regime's narrative of the events of the 1994 
genocide. As the BBC has been ejected from Rwanda and the government is pursuing legal 
action against the corporation, it is a particularly unsafe time for conducting research on the 
institutionalization of identity and historical framing, not only for the researcher, but for the 
collaborators as well. 
 The collection of the qualitative data will primarily be done through ethnography, a 
method integral to anthropological inquiry. Ethnographic methods most often depend on 
“immersion in the place and lives of people under study” and include participant observation, 
formal and informal interviewing, open-ended surveying, and content analysis, which are all 
then placed “in conversation with prevailing scholarly themes, problems, and concepts” 
(Wedeen 2010, 257). Of these methods, all but open-ended surveying played a role in this 
research. Schatz (2009) describes two types of ethnography: noninterpretive and interpretive. 
Noninterpretive ethnography “focuses on presumed values and then looks for structure and 
system,” while interpretive “centers on meaning and, at least in many instances, on process 
and history” (Schatz 2009, cited in Wedeen 2010, 258). This research very clearly takes the 
interpretivist path, particularly as it aligns quite clearly with international relations theories of 
constructivism: both perspectives are based around the belief that the world is socially 
constructed (see Klotz & Lync 2007). 
 Uniting methods of anthropologists and political scientists does not always proceed 
smoothly, the greatest sticking point being the naturalist assumptions and avowed objectivity 
that have long been at the core of political science but have been abandoned by anthropology. 
Indeed, anthropologists not only challenge the possibility and desirability of objectivity, but 
- 53 - 
 
 
avoid the use of models and hypotheses, are attentive to the ways in which their research can 
reinforce existing paradigms and inequalities of power, and are wary of the existence of a clear 
division of the social world into valid data (often so defined because of its replicability) versus 
invalid (Wedeen 2010, 258). This research tests hypotheses, but applies interpretivism in order 
to gain the context and meaning necessary to better understand the cases, and maintains a 
critical perspective of the data received, knowing that it must be interpreted through a lens that 
takes into account the source and context through which it was collected. Ultimately, this 
research operates on the belief that ethnography can add immense value and validity to political 
science research by “providing insight into actors' lived experience (Wedeen 2010, 261). 
 
     Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) 
 Twenty-two semi-structured interviews were conducted to collect data on the BiH case 
study, conducted across BiH during two different trips to the country for a total of just over 
four months, first in November to December 2013 and then from May to August 2014. Prior 
experience with the language, culture, and conducting research within the BiH cultural context 
as well as access through connections with prominent local NGOs, made it far more feasible 
to gather information on this case through these means. These interviews were primarily 
conducted with a range of academics, public officials, museum curators, non-governmental 
organization workers, activists, artists, and local business people. Initial contact was made 
through email and by phone, and was most successful when connections to an organization—
SIT Balkans, the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), and the Post-Conflict 
Research Center (PCRC)—were utilized. Notes were taken on encounters with an additional 
twenty-seven individuals, the informal conversations taking place over dinner or an afternoon 
coffee, during a formal presentation at an organization's office, or during the long bus rides 
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through twisting mountain roads. The interviews and informal conversations were conducted 
in multiple cities around the country, including Sarajevo, Mostar, Ilidža, Banja Luka, 
Srebrenica, and Vareš, so as to have greater representativeness in the sample. The majority of 
these interviews and conversations took place in English, but a professional interpreter was 
utilized when necessary—specifically in Srebrenica—to provide on-the-spot interpretations 
and written translations of the recorded interview for a more precise transcript. 
 
     Rwanda 
 The primary source of information for the Rwandan case study was blog posts and 
entries that we posted by Rwandan citizens as well as journalists, scholars, activists, etc. 
working outside of the state, as this was considerably safer for both the research and the 
collaborators. Cry for Freedom in Rwanda, African Arguments, and Democracy Watch: 
Rwanda were the three most used platforms for posts to be analyzed for this research. Content 
analysis can be defined as a “procedure [which] operate[s] directly on text or transcripts of 
human communications. …many words of the text are classified into much fewer content 
categories... Words, phrases, or other units of text classified in the same category are presumed 
to have similar meanings” (Weber 1990, 10, 12, & 53). These posts were then coded by every 
second paragraph—unless the piece was five or less paragraphs long—with each noun being 
circled and each adjective modifying it underlined. The reasoning behind always coding the 
first paragraph of a piece is that it frequently contains the context, main points, and arguments, 
made in the bulk of the piece. The coding scheme employed kept phrases that referred to a 
single concept together (e.g., 'ballot box', 'human being', 'service sector'); did not code for 
possessive pronouns; and did not include proper nouns, instead making a list of them included 
at the end of the master count sheet. In analyzing these posts, the focus was placed on the 
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frequency of terms in order to build an understanding of the manifest themes present in the 
pieces and then draw a conclusion about the latent themes. Comments posted in response to 
the posts were also used; while potentially risky—as it has been well documented that typically 
only extremely negative and extremely positive responses are posted in the comments—they 
were included in this research to, if nothing else, present the extremes within the discourse. 
 
Analysis of and Reflections on the Data 
     Post-Conflict Anthropology: Methods and Ethics 
 Of great concern to this research is the impact that interviews regarding these topics 
may have on the individuals willing to participate. To protect the participants in this study from 
unnecessarily painful recollections, the nature of the interviews was fully disclosed prior to 
starting, and the focus of the questions remained on experiences since the end of the war. 
Additionally, it was made clear that—if they chose to participate—they could decline to answer 
any question as well as end the interview whenever they chose. A number of trauma researchers 
and therapists have suggested “engagement with rather than avoidance of painful, traumatizing 
experiences as one process in healing” (Staub 2006, 873; see also Herman, 1992, and Field 
2006). They argue that, when conducted under emotionally supportive conditions and 
involving reconnecting and building trust with people, talking about traumatic experiences can 
be beneficial. While this lends itself to a positive view on the potential impacts of this study's 
interviews, it fails to take into account the risks that could face individuals who still live in 
repressive or divided states and communities: the very act of speaking out about, let alone 
against, the government could put them and their families in danger or lead to sanctioning from 
the state. 
 Anthropology in war-torn, repressive, and post-conflict communities is undeniably 
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infrequent, not in small part to the ethical and methodological challenges that it adds to those 
already intrinsic to ethnographic field work. Anthropologist Kimberly Theidon (2001) 
conducted her research in the highland villages of Ayacucho, a region of Peru ravaged by the 
war between forces of the Shining Path, armed peasants, and the Peruvian armed forces. 
Having chosen to live amongst the peasants she was studying, she conducted interviews and 
engaged in participant observation, and her research incorporated insightful considerations of 
how to conduct ethnographic research during and about times of war. She asserts that 
“knowledge is not neutral and insisting that one is simply there to ‘study’ keeps people 
guessing what purpose lies behind wanting to know” and that there “is no neutral position with 
spoken words” (Theidon 2001, 26). Operating within a “space of death,” words are not simply 
knowledge or information, but power; power that cannot be attained neutrally because there 
will come a point when you have to take a side or have one chosen for you. 
 Theidon argues that in contexts such as these, when social relationships are tense, 
dangerous, violent, and potentially lethal, it is the anthropologist’s ethical responsibility to 
“take a stand and make it explicit… to demonstrate that [they] would put the knowledge shared 
with [them] to a good use, or get out” (2001, 27). Nancy Scheper-Hughes' ideas of “barefoot 
anthropology” align with this argument. Ultimately, Scheper-Hughes believes that the field of 
anthropology must move beyond the passive act of observation to witnessing: this entails 
adopting an active voice, making judgments, and taking sides, thus becoming “accountable for 
what they see and what they fail to see, how they act and how they fail to act in critical 
situations” (1995, 419). Both Theidon and Scheper-Hughes agree that there is no way to 
conduct purely academic anthropology in the context of violence and war, only activist 
anthropology. While this research will not be focusing on dynamics of ongoing war, conflict is 
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ever present and manifests in a variety of forms in post-genocidal states. It is therefore essential 
that these ethical considerations of the obligations of the researcher direct the approach used 
in this research, that it recognizes how the lives of my contributors and the individuals living 
within the society can be affected by the conclusions drawn in my research. 
 
     Data Analysis 
 One of the elements most uniquely characteristic of case studies is the way in which 
the data analysis is performed. Namely—unlike with other research methods which examine 
data only once all the data has been collected—case studies “involve ongoing examination and 
interpretation of the data in order to reach tentative conclusions and to refine the research 
questions” (Hancock & Algozzine 2006, 56). This examination and interpretation most often 
involves summarizing and interpreting the information, and then using it to reexamine and 
reframe the research question as well as analyzing the new questions raised by the research as 
it is conducted. This is not to say, however, that the research question is abandoned, but rather 
that the context in which the research question is understood as well as what constitute the 
crucial aspects to understanding the question and answers to it can shift as new information is 
uncovered. This analysis—in most cases—takes the form of “repetitive, ongoing review of 
accumulated information in order to identify recurrent patterns, themes, or categories,” and it 
is this approach that will be used to analyze the data collected for this study (Hancock & 
Algozzine 2006, 61). 
 The challenge with the data analyses for these two cases is comparing them effectively, 
particularly given the divergent methods used for each of the two cases, while also paying due 
diligence to the cultural and historical differences of the states. Thus, the analysis undertaken 
by this research focused on the topics and issues of central importance to the participants (i.e., 
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topics that arose frequently in conversations, interviews, posts, comments, etc.), while also 
attempting to locate the points of overlap: the themes, trends, and contexts that exist in both 
cases. It is as important to acknowledge the ways in which the two cases differ, as this can 
reveal relationships between actors and the variables being measured, and ultimately can 
strengthen or weaken one or more of the hypotheses tested by this research. However, when 
utilizing macro data sources and comparing the cases, it must be acknowledged that challenges 
exist; primarily, the definitions used may vary between states, and those used in the collection 
of the macro data may not be aligned with those used in this research, potentially with variables 
being simplified in order to gain greater coherence, analytic utility, or parsimony. 
 A final concern of these case analyses is how to keep this research, given that it is being 
conducted by a Western, well-educated woman, from falling prey to the 'colonizing impulse'. 
This refers specifically to the belief that the practices, values, solutions that are privileged in 
one's society or that have been found to be successful in one context can be taken and applied 
to a problem in a different context. Additionally, it relates to the very belief that an outsider 
can determine what the largest problem facing a society is as well as how to address it, often 
better than those living within the society. For these cases in particular, a sizable concern is the 
imposition of Western values—such as individual over communal rights—on the analysis of 
the state. This would take the form, for example, of taking the degree to which capitalism has 
been implemented in the state as a measure of its post-conflict recovery 'success'. It is thus the 
aim of this analysis to present as objectively as possible the critiques of the state based on the 
issues and values that are shown to be of importance to the populations of each country. 
 
     Reflection on the Method 
 The strengths of this methodology largely come from its mixing of methods: each of 
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the various sources of information will yield new insights on the research question which will, 
in turn, lead to a more comprehensive and developed analysis. In addition, each method brings 
its individual strengths to the research. Interviews produce deep, detailed information; content 
analysis can be replicated; and analysis of public opinion surveys and quantitative data brings 
a degree of reliability. Yet, each also has its own limitations: all of these methods are quite time 
consuming; interviews cannot be perfectly replicated; and latent themes in content analysis are 
quite subjective. 
 There also exist ramifications—albeit both positive and negative—for the reliability 
and validity of the data gathered. Semi-structured interviews almost inevitably develop 
differences in the progression and wording of questions between interviews, which inherently 
limit or complicate the comparison of different cases. These interviews, with their utilization 
of scripted questions, do allow a degree of flexibility that is required in order to make 
participants comfortable and willing to share their true beliefs and impressions, therefore 
yielding the most accurate and valid information possible. It is important to keep in mind, 
however, that the data gleaned from interviews is filtered through these individual's personal 
experiences and, in many cases, through translation (either by the individual or by a 
professional translator). This is particularly the case when the interviews pertain to perceptions 
of the government, political atmosphere, etc., as is the focus of this research. While this may 
raise questions of reliability, the information gained from interviews can be regarded as 
replicable because “meanings are 'cultural or socially available'... Subsequent research can go 
to the field, and even if they do not talk to the same people, they can nevertheless be made 
aware of the range of meaning relevant to a particular phenomenon under study, because 
meanings are socially, not simply individually, accessible” (Wedeen 2010, 265). 
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 Despite the challenges of reliability in interviews, not to mention replicability, this does 
not mean that the data gathered from them is not valid. The lived experience of individuals is 
valid by virtue of them experiencing an event or occurrence in that particular way, as this is 
informed by the system in which they live and through which they interpret their circumstances 
and the world.  Indeed, as Sustin argues, there is “no one right way of saying what is seen,” 
because “there may be no one right way of seeing it” (1962, 101, cited in Wedeen 2010, 166-
67). This recalls the basic strength of ethnography: providing access to this multiplicity while 
simultaneously providing the tools by which to see the broader patterns and context. 
 There also exist limitations on the conclusions that can be drawn from this research. 
First, there are questions of the ability of case studies to adequately account for third variables 
that could impact the dependent variable, as is possible with other research designs (Van Evera 
1997, 51). This, in turn, connects to the general critique of this method, being that while it has 
considerable explanatory power, it lacks in generalizability and parsimony: the conclusions 
drawn from the results of one case study are only with great effort applicable to other cases, 
often limited by the same contextual details that provide this method its greatest strength. This 
research utilizes comparative analysis in order to counterbalance some of these limitations, 
though even this strategy is limited as “paired cases are never nearly identical (as the method 
of difference requires) … [or] paired cases usually deviate even further from having wholly 
different characteristics (as the method of agreement requires)” (Van Evera 1997, 58). 
 Ultimately, this methodological design draws considerable strength from the utilization 
of various sources of data, as the results from these analyses can be woven together in order to 
produce a more comprehensive understanding of the ramifications of each state's decision to 
institutionalize identity as a peace-building strategy. In the words of Lisa Wedeen: 
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By balancing concrete empirical examples with theoretically motivated 
discussions... anthropologists unsettle taken-for-granted assumptions and provide 
us with new language for tackling perennial issues. What makes these writings so 
compelling is not the ethnographic work per so... but their innovative theses and 
their attention to mechanisms that induce solidarity, community, prejudice, passion, 
envy, discipline, strategic choice, and dominance (Wedeen 2010, 268). 
 
This research works to understand the mechanisms through which post-genocidal systems 
create and define the bounds of the post-conflict society, how these systems are perpetuated 
by structure and elite aspiration, and how the population experiences and negotiates the 
population. It is through the incorporation of a variety of data types that the complexities of 
these ramifications can be understood. 
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Chapter 4.1: Bosnia-Herzegovina—Consociationalism in Action 
History and Context: Bosnia-Herzegovina and the DPA 
 The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) 1  of April 1995 ended the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH) between ethnic Bosniak, Croat, and Serb forces, which spanned from 1991-
95. 2 The DPA, specifically Annex 4 of the peace agreement, was institutionalized as the post-
war constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and froze the conflict by territorializing ethnicity and 
dividing the state into Republika Srpska and the Federation (Federacija) (Bieber 2004, 4; 
Robinson and Pobrić 2006, 238).3 Many regard BiH as a state stuck in a “frozen conflict” that 
simply preserves an “imperfect peace” and to a considerable extent the war continues in the 
form of ethnopolitics (Perry 2009, 1). 
 Indeed, the DPA ended the BiH war without the outright victory of any ethnic group, 
and not only incentivized identification along ethnicized lines, but created “a structural 
environment in which only particularistic ideologies based on ethnic identity could gain 
sufficient political power” (Sarajlić 2011, 64; see also Dimitrijević 1998, 152). The ethnic 
divisions of the war became the basis for the organization of the new government, as it was 
designed to function as a consociation—defined as “a system that guarantees all groups in a 
divided society a share of the power on a permanent basis”—between the three recognized 
                                                 
1 The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was brokered by the international community, with particular 
pressure being applied by the USA and Russia. The presidents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
and Serbia – Izetbegović, Tuđman, and Milošević, respectively – were gathered in Dayton, Ohio, 
and prevented from leaving until a peace agreement could be reached. 
2 Ethnic divisions are determined most significantly by religious differences; while the use of these 
essentialized divisions will be problematized later in this research, for introductory purposes 
Bosniaks are Muslim, Croats are Catholic, and Serbs are Orthodox. 
3 As an example of the language used within Annex 4: “1. House of Peoples. The House of Peoples 
shall comprise 15 Delegates, two-thirds from the Federation (including five Croats and five 
Bosniacs) and one-third from the Republika Srpska (five Serbs).” This section demonstrates how 
ethnicity was both institutionalized and territorialized in the post-conflict Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
state. 
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nations (Lijphart 1995, 275). Consociations are characterized by a grand coalition, segmental 
autonomy, proportional representation and resource allocation, and a minority veto. In BiH, 
many of the same ethno-nationalist parties elected into power in the early 1990s continue to be 
in power today, namely the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), Party of Democratic Action 
(SDA), and Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ BiH), 4 as “ethnic affiliation often 
matters more than economic or social platforms” (Bieber 2004, 2).  There are, however, 
political parties such as Naša Stranka (“Our Party”) that advocate in favor of broader civic 
interests and issues; indeed, these parties have experienced a measure of success in recent 
elections.5 
 The DPA defined 'official' ethnic categories by only constitutionally recognizing three 
constituent nations—Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs—and consequently grouping all individuals 
who did not or would not fit into these categorizations (e.g., Roma, Jews, Yugoslavs, etc.) as 
ostali or 'others'. This system is highly discriminatory, as it ties political identity to nationality, 
only granting political representation to the three constituent peoples (narod) of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Funk-Deckard 2011, 131). Political competition is between bounded ethnic 
groups, within this system which is dependent on each “group exclud[ing] others from 
participation in its social and political affairs, but at the same time restrain[ing] from 
participating in common affairs and activities that bring different groups together, preventing 
                                                 
4 In the 2012 municipal elections, the SDA won the highest number of votes, its candidates winning 
mayoral positions in 34 of a total of 138 municipalities; the SDS was second, with mayoral 
positions in 25 municipalities; and the HDZ BiH was third with mayoral positions in 13 
municipalities. 
5 Naša Stranka is regarded by some as “the only serious multi-etnic party in Bosnia-Herzegovina” 
(European Green Party, 2012). The party first emerged in 2008, and was very successful in the 
local elections, gaining 22 municipal councilors, three deputy council chairs, one mayor and one 
deputy mayor. The results of the 2010 general elections did not match this success, but reemerged 
onto the political map in 2012, retaining 14 councilors in Sarajevo, winning councilors in two new 
municipalities and retaining another three councillors from 2008. 
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even its own members to participate in the affairs of other groups” (Saraljić 2011, 65). The 
European Court for Human Rights declared with their ruling in 2009 on the Sejdić and Finci 
v. Bosnia-Herzegovina case6 that the limitations on who can stand for election into the House 
of Peoples and for the Presidency violate Article 14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Article 1 of Protocol 12,7 respectively. It is this ruling that spurred the beginning of 
debates for Constitutional reform in 2011, but no progress has been made towards an agreement 
(Human Rights Watch 2011). 
 The question driving this research asks how successful has post-conflict recovery, 
reconstruction, and reconciliation been in this country? And in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
one sentiment was expressed again and again in interviews and informal conversations: 
“Bosnians don't have peace, just absence of war.”8 (Mahir, professor of Political Science in 
Sarajevo). 
 
An Introduction to the Collaborators 
 A considerable number of individuals contributed to the data utilized in this case study, 
be it through in-depth interview, informal conversation, or formal presentation. All of the 
names used within this analysis are pseudonyms in order to protect the confidentiality and 
privacy of all the collaborators. In total, twenty-two individuals were interviewed, which 
                                                 
6 Sejdić and Finci are Roma and Jewish, respectively, citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina who brought 
separate cases to the court that were later combined. They filed cases contesting the Constitution 
provisions that limited who can run for election for particular positions in the government to 
members of the three constituent nations. 
7 Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
is a Council of Europe treaty against discrimination, adopted in Rome in November 2000 and was 
implemented in 2005 with the receipt of its tenth ratification (Council of Europe, 2000). It 
currently has 18 member states and 19 signatories. The Sejdić-Finci ruling was the first ruling 
finding violation of this protocol. 
8 Maihir; informal conversation; cafe in Sarajevo; 13, October 2014. 
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included politicians, academics, individuals involved with non-profit and non-governmental 
organizations, census enumerators, and BiH youths. The politicians represented four political 
parties: Karim and Ivan from SDA; Armin from Naša Stranka; Aleksandar from SDS; and 
Dževad from SDP. The census enumerators, who worked in and around Srebrenica in eastern 
BiH, are Lejla and Ensar. The three professors are Harun and Ana, who teach in Sarajevo, and 
Paul, an academic from abroad who works extensively in and on BiH. Three interviewees 
worked with non-profits—James, Emir, Zara, and Zuhra—and four worked with NGOs—
Jovana, Bram, Marija, and Hana. Zuhra works as a journalist. And the four youths living 
around the country are: Jasmina and Elma, who live in Sarajevo; Petar, who lives in Mostar; 
and Emilija, who lives in Brčko. In addition to these interviewees, notes from more than twenty 
informal conversations were used to supplement the data. The population whose insights 
informed this research was rather specific. The individuals interviewed and with whom most 
informal conversations took place are classifiable as 'elites' in that the population is comprised 
of academics, well-educated youths, politicians, activists, and journalists, all of whom are more 
inclined towards political awareness and involvement. Therefore, the conclusions that can be 
drawn from this research must be presented as a derivative of this specific frame and not that 
of a wider, general opinion of citizens of BiH. This is the same population that informs the data 
and conclusions for the Rwanda case study of this research, providing parallel structures 
between the case studies. Without the help and insight of all of these individuals, this research 
would not be possible. 
 
Political Design and Effectiveness 
 In measuring the impact of institutionalized identity on the post-conflict recovery of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, analysis of the constitutional structure itself and its impact is the most 
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effective place to begin. This “Frankenstein constitution,” as it is referred to by Zuhra, a 
journalist in Sarajevo, is heeded as the leading source of instability, discontent, and disorder in 
modern Bosnian-Herzegovinian society. 9  This structure, Harun—a professor of political 
science in Sarajevo—argues, has “not only encouraged but entrenched the ethnic divisions, 
and directed political elites of [BiH] not only to stick with ethnopolitics, but to use 
ethnopolitics in the achievement of their basic goals.”10 At its most simplified, the Dayton 
Peace Accords were instituted with the sole intention of bringing to an end the shocking levels 
of violence taking place on European soil, particularly after the world was shaken by the 
Srebrenica genocide. The intention behind the accords was to establish a transitional system 
that would ease the development and eventual implementation of more permanent structures 
to govern the state. The system was never reformed, however, and now—particularly with the 
end of the termination of the use of the Bonn Powers11 by the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR)—Dževad, a politician with SDP, is just one of many who believe that the Dayton 
Agreement is the reason why BiH “can't make any kind of progress.”12 
 Constitutional reform is now on the forefront of the political and social mind, having 
been mentioned in interviews with Harun13, Emilija14, Zuhra15, Ana—a professor in Sarajevo16, 
                                                 
9 Interview; organization office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2014. 
10 Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013. 
11 The Bonn Powers granted to the OHR by Peace Implementation Council in 1997 were so the body 
could: 1) implement binding political changes when BiH parties were unwilling or unable to enact 
solutions of their own; and 2) remove public officials from office who violated the principles of 
the Dayton Peace Accords or was an obstacle to the creation of a consensus within the body. These 
powers were heavily used from 1997 to 2008. 
12 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 28, November 2013. 
13 Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013. 
14 Interview; over Skype (interviewee in Brčko); 8, August 2014. 
15 Interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013. 
16 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014. 
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and Marija—who works with youth NGO in Sarajevo17, in no small part due to the 2009 ruling 
on the Sejdić-Finci case by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).18 Many view the 
constitution as flagrantly and unapologetically discriminatory, as not only national minorities 
(e.g., Roma, Jews, and Slovenians) but constitutional minorities (e.g., Muslims and Croats 
living in Republika Srpska) as well lack representation within many state institutions, 
explained Marija.19 In addition, Ana stated, with the visible absence of cooperation and the 
overwhelming presence of “intimidation that comes from top-down, fear, threat, … [and] the 
discourse they are using all of the time,” constitutional reform is appearing more important 
than ever before.20 Dževad expressed the beliefs of multiple interviewees when he stated that 
“changing of constitutional law, changing of the political system, will force [the] country to go 
through forward, to make steps in democracy, in economy, and everything will be much 
easier.”21 Progress in drafting these reforms has been limited, however, as there continue to be 
dramatically different visions for the future of the state, ranging from the deconstruction of the 
entity system paired with a single president in the executive position to increased autonomy 
for each of the entities that could smooth the path to Republika Srpska's aspirational 
independence. 
 Ultimately, the constitutional design of Bosnia-Herzegovina failed to specify not only 
how particular issues would be resolved, but developed the groundwork for the dramatization 
                                                 
17 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 22, July 2014. 
18 Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina was a case brought before the ECHR by a Roma and a 
Jew, respectively, that challenged the constitutional structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They 
claimed that the specification that the three presidential seats could only be filled by a Bosniak, a 
Croat, and a Serb was discriminatory and a violation of their human rights. The court ruled in their 
favor on December 22nd, 2009. 
19 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 22, July 2014. 
20 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014. 
21 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 28, November 2013. 
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of ethnic groups conflicting over their 'vital national interests'. These claims of protecting their 
ethnic group have served as a sanctioned facade for the misuse of the constitution by 
ethnonational politicians purely interested in remaining in power as long as possible, argues 
Armin 22 , a politician with Naša Stranka, and Zuhra 23 , a journalist. As Ana 24  succinctly 
expressed, the overwhelming majority of actions taken at the hands of these politicians have 
proven to be “against the spirit of restoring inter-group trust, or restoring inter-group relations,” 
and therefore counterproductive to efforts of reconstruction and reconciliation within the state. 
 Ethnonational extremism has long been rewarded in terms of votes, as radical voices 
are favored over those calling for consensus; Marko, a professor of political science in Banja 
Luka, explained that this is in large part because making concessions is seen as a sign of 
weakness and betrayal of the interests of the ethnic group.25 This is possible because the 
political system is structured wholly around the concept of ethnopolitics—what Paul26 , a 
scholar on BiH, refers to as “warlord politics”—wherein power is divided between groups 
based on ethnicity. Because political power is distributed in this way, Zuhra argues, it drives 
politicians to focus their efforts on fighting for the presumed interests of the group that they 
represent as well as maintaining identification with that group as it is the only thing keeping 
them in power.27 The ultimate impact of this focus on identity and ethnicity is perpetuating 
divisions prevalent in the war and, in some ways, creating new ones (Ana28 & Zuhra29). Indeed, 
the actions of political elites and institutional efforts at reconciliation have not only failed to 
                                                 
22 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 18, November 2013. 
23 Interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013. 
24 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014. 
25 Informal conversation; Faculty of Political Science; October 2013. 
26 Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014. 
27 Interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013. 
28 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014. 
29 Interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013. 
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foster improved relations but have contributed to greater instability. Ana argued: 
Everything that they have been doing in the last 20 years, or post-Dayton, has been 
going exactly against the spirit and the essence and the ultimate goal of 
reconciliation, which is to support more segregation, less contact, more 
homogenized communities, more fear and inter-group anxiety and mistrust. 30 
 
Their concern is not in “heal[ing] the wartime wounds,” states Zuhra, but in setting in stone 
“that there are three ethnic groups, and this one is this percent, and that one is that percent, and 
the 'others', we don't care what you do. Because you have ethnic parties which are in power 
now.”31 
 This ethnic divisioning strongly comes into play in the course of elections, which, 
Harun explains, function practically as ethnic voting, as the election law “directs, basically, 
political activity only within one, only within your ethnic group.”32 It is this characteristic that 
leads to the classification of the Bosnian-Herzegovinan political system as 'ethnopolitical'. 
Ethnopolitics, as a form of biopolitics, is dependent on “ethnic bodies: it needs ethnic masses. 
So it's very important to show how many of 'us' there are and how strong we are, explains 
Harun. “Ethnic mobilization and crystallization has been a vital part of every election process 
that we have had in the Dayton-Bosnia.”33 Ultimately this type of electoral and political system 
has been detrimental to peace and stability within BiH. The focus of election campaigns is 
consistently placed on issues that have been ethnicized—with particular focus placed on which 
ethnic group individuals belong to and where they are from—often with the intent to raise fear 
                                                 
30 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014. 
31 Interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013. 
32 Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013. 
33 Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013. 
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among the population (Hana34 & Zuhra35). Dževad reported that politicians say such things as, 
“If you don't vote for me, for Dževad, Samantha will come and she will take all your rights. 
She's different religion, she will take job from you, you will be forced to speak with her 
language.” 36 In Dževad's mind, if the political system were to be changed, fears about being 
outnumbered by the 'other' group and fears of being killed would lose all significance or 
meaning, a sentiment echoed by Lejla37 , who was a census enumerator in Srebrenica, and 
Karim38, a politician with SDA in Srebrenica. 
 Despite considerable dissatisfaction with the performance of current political leaders 
and their ability to bring about meaningful reform and change within BiH, James laments, 
these same politicians are voted into office again and again, many of them having been in 
office since the end of the war. 39 Reflecting on this circumstance, Emilija—a student from 
Brčko studying in Bijelina—stated that, “Even if they know [the politicians] are not right, [they 
think], 'But, you know it's my ethnicity, and then I will just go with, let's call them, my people'.” 
Somehow, she explains, citizens across BiH “still have, let's say, faith in those politicians and 
they still somehow trust their words and go by those words.” 40 For those who are no longer 
seduced or convinced by the rhetoric of the major political parties, many have found it easy to 
give up on politics and elections altogether. Jovana, director of a film and art center in Sarajevo, 
reflected: 
Yes, we have, I think that at some point we have been ignoring the politics, in terms 
of it being too complicated, it having so many levels, and people were just trying 
                                                 
34 Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014. 
35 Interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013. 
36 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 28, November 2013. 
37 Interview; cafe in Srebrenica; 2, December 2013. 
38 Interview; Government Office in Srebrenica, BiH; 2, December 2013. 
39 Interview; cafe in OSCE building; 10, June 2014. 
40 Interview; over Skype (interviewee in Brčko); 8, August 2014. 
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to... So we were ignoring the politics because it was too much to deal with: every 
time you deal with it you hit a wall. And then at some point it became very personal 
and now you see that, okay ten years of seeing rhetoric, seeing people leading, 
'leading', the country is not leading anywhere, and people are now, okay, we have 
elections again. But those elections don't really mean anything, because no matter 
how you vote, they're going to agree amongst themselves to divide the government 
and everything. 41 
 
Yet, voting is crucial in the eyes on many BiH activists, such as Jovana, because “if you don't 
vote, if you don't do anything, they can manipulate with your vote.” 42 The social obligation to 
vote balances the need for rights, both of which are crucial for being an active participant in 
society—rather than simply claiming “I know my rights,” Marija argues that citizens “need to 
know what [their] rights are, but also what their responsibilities towards society are.” 43 
 Manipulation of election results is but one of the ways in which the existing political 
system has allowed corruption to flourish. Ana described the systemic problem of corruption 
in BiH as “an embedded octopus.” 44  When it has become an integral part of so many 
institutions—from providing tips and gifts for the doctor who delivers your baby to calling on 
family connections to get a job in a government office—she questions, “Where do you start? … 
And who is going to reveal it?” 45 Political elites are more than willing to take advantage of 
the opportunities left open to them by the constitutional structure. Within Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bram—a foreign NGO worker in Sarajevo—notes, the fault lies exist with the system design 
itself provide “more places for corruption,” while at the same time failing to provide “enough 
                                                 
41 Jovana; interview; office of organization in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, June 2014. 
42 Jovana; interview; office of organization in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, June 2014. 
43 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 22, July 2014. 
44 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014. 
45 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014. 
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mechanisms for control, transparency, accountability, etc.” 46 Lejla states that the BiH political 
system is rife with opportunities for ethnopoliticians to exploit the fears of citizens in order to 
achieve their own ends, be it funneling money to corporations they have ties with or engaging 
in clientelism in order to prolong their time in power. 47 Ultimately, many citizens see the 
corruption of politicians and individuals in positions of power as unavoidable: as Djermina, a 
youth living and working in Sarajevo, translated from comments on an article from a BiH 
journal, “Is there anyone in this country who isn't corrupt?' one person wrote. And someone 
responded, 'Only those who haven't had the chance to be.'” 48 
 
Communal Relations 
 In the aftermath of atrocity—particularly when the violence was inter-ethnic in 
nature—it is vital that reconstruction and reconciliation efforts pay particular attention to the 
regeneration of stable, peaceful, and healthy communal relations. Dealing with the past is 
crucial for a “sustainable and peaceful future,” Ana argues, but is often avoided in post-conflict 
states: it “is not a really welcoming process because it brings about a lot of negativity of your 
own group and atrocities, and it's kind of a threat of who you are and your group. People will 
generally tend to avoid dealing with the knowledge that members of your own group harmed 
innocent people in the past, etc.” 49 When asked about the status of Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
society and the progress that had been made toward repairing relationships that were destroyed 
in the early 90s, the comments, though mixed, were largely negative. Legacy issues that remind 
people of their 'side's' perspective on the events of the war persist throughout BiH society, 
                                                 
46 Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014. 
47 Interview; cafe in Srebrenica, BiH; 2, December 2013. 
48 Interview; cafe in Srebrenica, BiH; 2, December 2013. 
49 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014. 
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largely perpetuated through historical framing, memorialization, and ethnic homogenization at 
the hands of politicians and enabled by the constitutional structure. As Karim described it, “The 
sad part of this country is that we have 3 peoples, 3 stories, 3 truths... Under such conditions, 
it's hard to find a common denominator.” 50 
 The problem, many interviewees identified, is that everything in BiH is ethnicized; an 
employee at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), James, noted, 
“You read the newspapers, it's often focused on ethnic-based issues; when you hear the 
politicians, it's often ethnic-related issues.” 51 Indeed, Jovana argues, ethnic divisions suit the 
government “because then everybody can steal and point the finger at the other one, because 
if you have too many layers you can't find who's not doing his job.” 52 Students at a faculty of 
Political Science in Banja Luka in the RS believe that de-ethnicizing politics and the creation 
of a civic identification is impossible because “[they] fought a war over that only a few years 
ago,” 53 and because declaring such an identity would be “dangerous” and seen as a “betrayal” 
of one's ethnic group. 54 SDS politician in Srebrenica, Aleksandar, agrees, stating, “It is very 
difficult, even taken from the perspective of history—at that point the real problems would 
start, if we could have one single civic identity.” 55 In addition, such an effort effectively 
ignores the influence of BiH's powerful neighbors—Croatia and Serbia—and the undeniable 
influence that they have on ethnic identification and political orientation within Bosnia-
Herzegovina.56 
                                                 
50 Interview; Government Office in Srebrenica, BiH; 2, December 2013. 
51 Interview; cafe in OSCE building; 10, June 2014. 
52 Interview; office of organization in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, June 2014. 
53 Stefan; informal conversation; Faculty of Political Science in Banja Luka, BiH; October 2013. 
54 Đorđe; informal conversation; Faculty of Political Science in Banja Luka, BiH; October 2013. 
55 Interview; cafe in Srebrenica, BiH; 2, December 2013. 
56 The desire of Croatian and Serbian politicians to have control over predominantly Croat and 
predominantly Serb territories of BiH was one of the main contributing factors to the war from 
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 Ava—a scholar from BiH now working in Beograd, Serbia—does not see much hope 
for reconciliation, certainly not in the near future. She reflected, “We are never going to get to 
a point where they're going to agree on what happened.” 57 Indeed, the lack of a single history, 
or even discussion of the different histories remains a considerable source of conflict in present 
day BiH. “My friend, she said one time, 'They have their own history, we have our own history. 
Until we have one history accepted by both sides there will not be reconciliation here',” Hana, 
a director of a youth NGO in Ilidža, told me. “And it's really that we're denying things they 
point out and they deny things we point out, and it's this did happen, this did not happen.” 58 
History books differ from canton to canton due to the existence of thirteen Ministries of 
Education who each have a degree of autonomous control, just one example of the layers of 
bureaucracy that exist in the BiH system. This has lent itself to considerably large differences 
between the histories told in each of the entities, and this inconsistency has a profound impact 
on youths, particularly those who are growing up in ethnically homogenized villages and have 
no independent memory of the war. For example, Jasna, a director of a human rights NGO in 
Sarajevo, spoke about she was scared “to see these young generations in Republika Srpska 
following the trial of Karadžic59 who have been so seduced by this media and believe, truly, 
that he is a hero.” 60 
 Just as significant as education to constructing memories of the past is the impact of 
                                                 
1992-95. Serbian politics and culture still have considerable clout in Republika Srpska, for 
example influencing their opinions on NATO membership, a major point of contention in BiH 
politics where questions of EU membership and integration into security networks including 
NATO are at the forefront of debate. 
57 Ava; informal conversation; Belgrade, Serbia; October 2013. 
58 Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014. 
59 Radovan Karadžic—President of Republika Srpska during the fall of Yugoslavia—is currently on  
trial at the ICTY in the Hague, charged with war crimes committed against Bosniaks and Croats 
during the Siege of Sarajevo as well as ordering the Srebrenica genocide. 
60 Informal conversation; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; June 2014. 
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knowledge gained from family, friends, and the media, which has been heavily informed by 
ethnic homogenization under the Dayton Accords. Alexsandar spoke about the ways in which 
today's youth are gaining information about the past through their families that inherently 
biases their perspective, as there is not opposing view or history to which they can compare 
this telling of events. He said: 
Many things I didn't know even in the secondary school, but now my child and 
children of all others they know who is who, who are Muslims, what were war 
events. They get quickly information within their families. And the different 
stances of our historical happenings in the war, it creates even bigger 
differentiation. For example, I tell to my child who was killed in our family but I 
don't say who was killed in other families, and that's the same thing, the same 
procedure that happens on the other side. They say who was killed in their family 
but not who was killed in Serb families. So our children are kind of very well 
informed into that to be Serbs, Bosniaks, or Croats. It's how grounds are prepared 
even for bigger differences and differentiation than there used to be before. It's a 
gradual process, was also shown throughout history and in post-history.61 
 
When entity-level narratives of the past contain similar levels of division—take, for example, 
the fact that the Srebrenica genocide62 is denied by most Serbs living in the RS and July 13th 
is only a day of mourning in the Federation—differentiation and conflict can become common. 
Marija, goes so far as to assert that “institutions just don't recognize historic facts as they were, 
                                                 
61 Aleksandar; interview; cafe in Srebrenica, BiH: 2, December 2013. 
62 Also known as the Srebrenica massacre, this event was described by the UN Secretary General as 
the worst crime on European soil since WWII. Srebrenica was declared a “safe area” under UN 
protection in April 1993.  However, in July 1995, units of the Army of Republika Srpska under the 
command of Ratko Mladić amongst others—including members of a Serbian paramilitary group 
known as the Scorpions—took over the twon. They proceeded to massacre more than 8,000 
Bosniaks, mainly men and boys, and forcibly displaced between 25,000 and 30,000 Bosniak 
women and children from in and around the town of Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
These atrocities were unanimously ruled an act of genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2004. 
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but just manipulate the numbers, the facts and events and people and everything.” 63 
 The RS is not alone in this ethnic framing, however. Emilija pointed out that while it is 
necessary to have people from Republika Srpska “come to Srebrenica and say, 'Yeah, this is 
where the genocide happened',” it is also necessary to have similar recognition of the suffering 
of Serbs from Bosniaks and Croats living in the Federation. 64 This is one way in which she 
sees Brčko as succeeding where the rest of the country has failed. Because of its unique 
design—being the only district in the entirety of the state where the statute of the city is 
designed around all three constitutionally recognized groups live together—emphasis was 
placed from its formation of the recognition of all people's voices. Reconciliation efforts have 
made considerable progress in Brčko, and it's the “only city that has a monument for all three 
ethnic groups for the victims from the war. In [the] center they are standing next to each other: 
one is for the Bosniak civilians, one is for the Croat civilians, and one is for the Serb 
civilians.”65 Memorialization in much of BiH is highly political. In building a commemoration 
park in Sarajevo for soldiers who died in the war, Hana—a director of a youth NGO in Ilidža—
offers as an example, politicians are willing spend millions of dollars “because they get more 
votes if they do because all veterans will vote for them.” 66  This sort of prioritized 
memorialization and remembering of the past is encouraged and institutionalized by the BiH 
constitutional structure wherein ethnopoliticians are given incentives to keep ethnic unity and 
identification at the forefront of the public mind. Considerable progress has been made, 
however, through the work of NGOs based in BiH such as the Post-Conflict Research Center 
and Humanity in Action, which often direct their efforts towards youths living in ethnically 
                                                 
63 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 22, July 2014. 
64 Interview; over Skype (interviewee in Brčko); 8, August 2014. 
65 Interview; over Skype (interviewee in Brčko); 8, August 2014. 
66 Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014. 
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homogeneous communities. These programs typically encourage youths to be critical of their 
own beliefs and interrogate the basis and reasoning behind why they believe what they do: 
whether it is grounded in what they have been told by their family, the media, politicians, or 
on information gained through careful consideration of the various 'truths' that exist within the 
state. 
 In many places around BiH, “ethnic identity dominates in the representations of reality,” 
explains Harun. “It has become... commonsensical thing to view the reality through the lenses 
of ethnic identity, so it's very hard. How do you, easy can you change the common sense of 
any people?” 6768  This “common sense” is unsurprisingly reinforced by news media, as 
newspapers and TVs are limited to the local area. Because of this, Ava states, news reports are 
often ethnically framed, employing “blaring headlines that fit the narrative that this or that 
ethnic group is bad,” 69 and catering to prejudices of the population that they believe will be 
reading their paper possess. 70 It is also not unheard of to have political parties or powerful 
politicians with ties to the ownership or management of news agencies. For example, the 
editor-in-chief of Nezavisne novine71 is the daughter of the Serb member of the Presidency of 
BiH (Hodžić 2013). 
 The perpetual ethnicization of the news and politics that these ties contribute to is but 
one way in which narratives of 'us' and 'them' persist in BiH, leading many, including Hana, to 
believe that there has been no work towards reconciliation at all, that it has simply been 
                                                 
67 Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014. 
68 Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013. 
69 Ava, informal conversation; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; October 2013. 
70 Zuhra; interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013. 
71 A newspaper based in Banja Luka (Republika Srpska), BiH. It was, however, the first Bosnian Serb 
paper to –in 1999—report on war crimes committed by Bosnian Serbs during the war. 
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“shoved under the carpet.” 72 The importance of ethnicity varies regionally, however, and there 
are considerable differences between larger cities such as Sarajevo and smaller, often times 
ethnically homogeneous, or divided, communities such as Mostar, Gornji Vakuf, and Vareš. 
Living in Sarajevo, Ana explains, youths have become a “product of a globalized society with 
different needs …different interests.” 73 Many interviewees—Jovana74 , Ana75 , Lejla76 , and 
James77—expressed that they and their peers place much less importance on ethnic identity, 
especially in their personal lives. 
 Conditions are considerably different in the smaller villages, however, as a result of the 
ethnic homogenization that was codified by the DPA. In many ways, the “leopard skin” of 
Bosnia is gone, as the creation of the two entities by the Dayton Accords finalized the ethnic 
                                                 
72 Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014. 
73 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014. 
74 Interview; office of organization in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, June 2014. 
75 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014. 
76 Interview; cafe in Srebrenica; 2, December 2013. 
77 Interview; cafe in OSCE building; 10, June 2014. 
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cleansing that was largely the intention of the war (Illustration 1). Marija has noted that “people 
who come from a mono-ethnic community, they have sometimes trouble grasping 'diversity' 
as a phenomena, because they're used to living... they don't really... they have trouble accepting 
the different and the diverse.” 78 These youths do not know how to interact with one another 
and often grapple with a fear of the 'other' which has been ingrained in them by their families, 
media, and politicians. Even in ethnically heterogeneous communities, all boundaries between 
groups have not been removed. In Brčko, explains Emilija, while boundaries preventing 
friendships between individuals of different ethnicities have been removed, “the question 
mainly is having relationships in means of emotional relationships or marriages between 
Bosniaks and Serbs and Croats and Serbs.” She continues, “To be honest I'm not sure, but I 
haven't heard of multi-ethnic wedding in Brčko in, like, I don't know, in the last three or four 
years I'm sure.” 79 And in Sarajevo, journalist Zuhra believes that while all cultures, religions, 
and ethnic groups are respected: 
when you look at the structure of Sarajevo—there are still no concrete data about 
the ethnical structure of the population—but I would say that it's more than 90 
something percent Bosniaks. So in fact you do have a multiethnical Sarajevo, but 
in numbers you don't have that. Croats and Serbs are respected here, and Jews and 
other minorities, but in fact the majority of population is not reflecting that feeling 
of multiculturality and ethnicity. 80 
 
Ultimately, having experience with the 'other' is important, argues social psychologist at the 
University of Sarajevo, Ana. While people who grow up in very homogeneous communities 
lack opportunities for contact with the 'other' and therefore have higher rates of prejudice and 
                                                 
78 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 22, July 2014. 
79 Interview; over Skype (interviewee in Brčko); 8, August 2014. 
80 Interview; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013. 
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misunderstanding against the 'other', Ana has found that those from more heterogeneous 
communities “have a different reality and have more positive effect in inter-group relation.”81 
An activist in Sarajevo, Emir, explained what he believes to constitute ethnicity and what that 
means in BiH: 
Okay, there are four pillars of ethnicity: culture, language, religion, and tradition, 
I think, or history. Okay, so the history/tradition is the same. Culture, I don't see a 
difference, maybe near Eid, but I don't see it. Language, obviously. Religion—so 
religion is what is left. But then you cannot only claim it for religion because 
religion is kind of, you know, it should be a unifying factor more than a 
differentiating factor. So what's left is hatred. It's not in these pillars, but it's always 
there. So how do you establish ethnicity in Bosnia? It is by hating the 'other', that's 
the only differentiation you get. What makes you a Bosniak? I hate Croats and 
Serbs. What makes you a Serb? I hate the others. What else is the sole component 
of your differentiation from the others? 82 
  
Ana argues, however, that the absence of differences in culture, tradition, and language has 
lent itself to the absence of “psychological, cultural, physical differences between 
communities,” and she believes that the people of BiH are “willing to cooperate ...willing to 
live together ...willing to work together.” 83 
 There exist NGOs, such as that run by Marija, that work to open the minds of youths 
from these homogenized communities through forcing them to interact with the 'other'; one 
such program places three kids—one from each ethnic group—together in a room for the 
duration of the program. She reflects, “It's very hard, but after just spending one night in the 
same room and after two days of being together, they just work as a group, you have no 
                                                 
81 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014. 
82 Emir; interview; organization office in Sarajevo, BiH; 25, June 2014. 
83 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014. 
- 81 - 
 
 
differences whatsoever. It's just amazing how they click, how they realize they have more in 
common than they have differences among them.” 84 Others, as Zašto ne? did in the run-up to 
the census in October 2013, are working towards the construction of a civic identity that would 
unite people in opposition to these ethnicized politics. They agree with Ana that moderating 
levels of nationalism and identification are important to building a stable and sustainable 
peace.85 Many, explains an NGO worker,86 see the protests of February 2014 as a sign that 
individuals are coming together across ethnic lines to raise their voice about issues that are of 
importance to all citizens: “issues such as unemployment, issues such as corruption, that are 
totally crosscutting—totally crosscutting in terms of covering the whole country and not really 
being with any ethnicity or nationality.” 87 It is therefore vital to understand the ways in which 
BiH politics have centred on ethnicity and have therefore played a role in the economics and 
transitional justice of the state. 
 
Economic Recovery 
 The reinvigoration of the economic system in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been strained at 
best. Existing economic conditions are defined by stagnation, high levels of unemployment, 
rampant corruption, and growing inequality. Hopes are turning to these poor economic 
conditions to act as the catalyst in sparking broader institutional reforms, explained Lejla who 
believes that the population of BiH can be united against “this bitter, awful economic situation... 
because they don't have other options.” 88 In the face of these systemic issues there is rising 
domestic pressure on politicians to shift their focus to the economy, most clearly manifesting 
                                                 
84 Marijia; interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 22, July 2014. 
85 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, August 2014 
86 Interviewee did not want to be identified. 
87 Interview; cafe in OSCE building; 10, June 2014. 
88 Interview; cafe in Srebrenica; 2, December 2013. 
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in the protests that took place in February 2014 across BiH.89 The design of the constitutional 
structure had and continues to have a profound impact on the economic system, as the 
stagnation that results from the ethnicized blockades and the ethnicization of all politics and 
policies has blocked almost all projects aimed at the common economic good. For example, 
Hana notes, in many issues of economic reform, the questions arise: “How much money will 
go in the Federation, how much money will go in Republika Srpska?”90 While ethnopoliticians 
adopt this vision for its utility in furthering their political aspirations, Melica—a student of 
political science in Banja Luka—points out that they would find an increased focus on 
economics “pleasing to all of the three groups.” 91  This, however, would diminish the 
importance of these ethnic distinctions: as Melica explained, “If we were all able to live better 
materially, these differences would be less important.” 92  When working within the 
ethnopolitical system has become the only way to “try to find a way around, to get by, just to 
find some kind of better conditions for your life,” Lejla told me over coffee, you are willing to 
accept the corruption and politicization. 93 Up to a point, that is. What will be the impact, for 
example, of the disastrous effects of the May flooding94 on the willingness of citizens to accept 
the poor economic conditions and restricted opportunities? As OSCE employee James 
                                                 
89 The protests were a series of demonstrations and riots that began in Tuzla, Federacija, on February 
4, 2014,  quickly spreading to cities around the Federation including Sarajevo, Zenica, Mostar , 
Jajce, and Brčko, though the same level of unrest was not seen in Republika Srpska. The protests 
began in reaction to the privatization and shutting down of a number of factories around Tuzla but 
grew into a reaction against the political inertia of the past 20 years. 
90 Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014. 
91 Informal conversation; Banja Luka, BiH; October 2013. 
92 Informal conversation; Banja Luka, BiH; October 2013. 
93 Interview; cafe in Srebrenica; 2, December 2013. 
94 Between 14 and 18 May, 2014, a low pressure cyclone brought heavy rainfall and the worst floods 
in over a century to BiH, Croatia, and Serbia. Approximately 1.5 million people in BiH—nearly 
39% of the population—were affected, with the worst damage taking place in the northeast of the 
state near Bosanski Šamac, Odžak, Orašje, Doboj, Bijeljina, Brčko, and Maglaj (Assessment 
Capacities Project 2014). 




Some of these places were still recovering from the consequences of the war when 
they were hit with a terrible natural disaster.  On top of infrastructure and industry 
being damaged, huge amounts of personal property were damaged or destroyed. 
It's going to be very difficult for people to recover because of the financial issues.  
With unemployment being so high, it's terribly difficult. I was up in Bijelina, up in 
the northeast, pretty much where the Sava and the Drina Rivers come together. 
There was flooding in the town center, but some of the rural communities were 
absolutely devastated. Many people live off what they can grow, and the agriculture 
sector was severely damaged along with many homes. In many ways, it's putting 
the country back many years, especially for the rural areas. Not to mention the 
landmine problem which will remain an issue for years and years to come due to 
the fact that some suspected mine areas inevitably shifted.95 
 
When taken in the context of high unemployment and growing income inequality—particularly 
between those who work for the government and those who do not—it is unsurprising that 
most of the demands made during the February protests and the subsequent plenums were 
focused on economic conditions and the failings of politicians to properly attend to the needs 
of the majority of the population. 
 Unemployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina has skyrocketed: more than 60% of youth are 
unemployed (World Bank 2013). This statistic is particularly relevant when taken in the context 
of the 2007 World Bank regional report that stated that unemployed youths are less likely to 
transition into the workforce leading to prolonged stagnation within the state. In addition to 
this, “initial spells of unemployment or joblessness appear to have lasting adverse effects on 
earnings and employment,” which is referred to in the report as “scarring” (World Bank 2007). 
In addition, Bram spoke to the additional fear that unemployed youth, at worst, are at risk of 
                                                 
95 Interview; cafe in OSCE building; 10, June 2014. 
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falling into crime or radical groups, while at best they do not contribute to prosperity or 
development. 96 Thus, extended periods of high youth unemployment pose sizable risks for 
long-term problems in the state. 
 The conditions of youth unemployment in BiH, Bram continued, are “linked with 
political situation, stability, corruption, [and] complicated bureaucratic procedures for new 
businesses or foreign investments.”97  First, the absence of employment opportunities has 
enabled corruption in myriad ways. For example, connections—particularly through 
membership in a political party—is often seen as necessary for finding employment as a youth 
living in BiH. Jasmina, a youth reflecting on her own experience of looking for a job in 
Sarajevo, said, “they have to go to political parties to get a job they have to have connections 
and without connections you, I think, it is just the luck that you get a job but without 
connections you’re are like 2% of a chance to get it.”98 As politics has been tied to ethnicity 
via the constitutional structure, employment has been ethnicized I addition to being politicized. 
While not the norm, Petar—a youth attending university in Mostar—explained, it is not 
uncommon to have “nationality [play] a big role in getting a job,” though, he clarified, 
connection remains more important than ethnicity in finding employment in BiH.99 Nowhere 
is the impact of ethnicization felt more than in divided cities, such as Mostar. Petar described 
the situation: 
in Mostar when you're catching up for a job and when you're searching a job on 
the west side, where the Croat is, and on the east side, where the Bosniak is, when 
they see you may be a Croat and searching for a job on the east side, yeah, that's 
going to be a problem. And it's the other way too, when you're a Bosniak searching 
                                                 
96 Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014. 
97 Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014. 
98 Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014. 
99 Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014. 
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for a job on the west side. For you say your name, you're not a Croat—that's a big 
minus to you. I think it's still a problem for the youth and for the employment of 
the youth in Mostar.100 
 
This practice of ethnicized hiring is simply another way in which the institutionalization of 
ethnicity by the Dayton Accords continues to impact the lived experiences of BiH residents. 
With ethnopolitics as the sole form of politics, allowing absolute domination by ethnonational 
politicians, and given the economic stagnation, politicians are able to play on the “economic 
stability” card, both in their campaigning and in securing support for their party. Thus, Lejla 
argues, what is one to do when “they promise you a job and you have no other option to get a 
job unless they allow you to have, because there is no opposition, no real opposition, to any of 
the ethnopolitical parties in Bosnia”?101 This is but one of the ways in which ethnopoliticians 
are able to exploit the constitutional structure, resulting political culture, and economic 
stagnation to serve their own interests. Thus, a “ruling class... composed of no more than 
10,000 people who own and run everything” now dominates BiH, explained Paul.102 Hana 
believes this upper echelon of BiH society controls the flow of resources, unaware of “how 
normal, ordinary citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina live and what [they have] to face.”103 Instead, 
they perform calculations in order to maximize the political and economic benefit, resulting in 
rising inequality in the state. Hana continues, “They are just doing politics—they're not doing 
public service. But they are public servants, or they should be.”104 Until the political structure, 
particularly the constitutional design, incentivizes or requires better social safety nets, 
decreases inequality, outlaws clientelism, and drives out corruption, the economic conditions 
                                                 
100 Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014. 
101 Interview; cafe in Srebrenica; 2, December 2013. 
102 Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014. 
103 Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014. 
104 Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014. 
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in BiH will remain stagnant. And stagnant waters breed dissent. 
 
Transitional Justice 
 “The political situation now is not only as bad as in 1992, but worse,” reflects Zenon, 
a professor of political science in Sarajevo. “If this generation were to wage a war now they 
would be even more violent than in the last one.”105 Many of those who contributed their 
perspectives to their research expressed that “things are the same as just before the war 
started,” 106  or that the war is still being waged, simply “without weapons.” 107  This is 
undoubtedly a concerning sentiment, given the fact that reconciliation and reconstruction 
efforts have been underway in the state for nearly twenty years. Much of the discourse remains 
the same: “What is my territory? What is my share? That's not your place, that's my place,” 
which has led many—like Hana—to regard the current conditions as an “artificial peace,” as 
at present, no one wins.108 But dissent is rising in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the summer of 
2013 protestors took to the streets over the JMBG—identity numbers assigned to children at 
birth—as a symbol of the political and social dysfunction of the state.109 However, the level of 
protesting escalated during the protests in February 2014, Jovana explained, because “people 
don't have anything to loose” which is “a very ugly situation for the government.”110 While 
politicians can ignore 5,000 people on the street, Jovana argues, they cannot ignore burnt 
                                                 
105 Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014. 
106 Informal conversation; organization office in Sarajevo, BiH; June 2014. 
107 Almir; informal conversation; organization office in Sarajevo, BiH; May 2014. 
108 Interview; organization office in Ilidža, BiH; 12, June 2014. 
109 Thousands took to the streets in June after the death of three-month-old Berina. Bickering between 
Bosnia's ethnoational politicians permitted the assignment of Unique Master Citizen Numbers 
(Jedinstveni matični broj građana—JMBG) to expire over a dispute on cantonal borders, not 
allowing children after February to receive the JMBG numbers necessary for obtaining medical 
cards and passports. Without these documents, young Berina could not leave the country to receive 
the medical treatment necessary to save her life. This was the first protest the united citizens across 
ethnic lines since the war. 
110 Interview; office of organization in Sarajevo, BiH; 6, June 2014. 
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government buildings, and that is precisely why protestors adopted such 'radical' tactics. Marija 
wants to see more of this type of action, stating: 
So I miss this rage within people, I just miss it. There needs to be a rage where we 
say, 'I'm fed up, I'm going to do what I can to change it.' But we don't really realize 
that the power lies within each of us, so we tend to think, What can I change? If 
30,000 people who think what can I change? actually do something, then you 
have 30,000 people who've actually done something. While on the other hand we 
have 30,000 people who just didn't do anything because they don't think they can. 
So it requires, really, a great shift in the way we think.111 
 
Petar believed he saw the beginning of this shift in the public psyche during the February 
protests, referring to it at its outset as a “social revolution.” 112 
 But, as these protests developed, politicians took advantage of the circumstance to 
redirect the blame for the current turmoil towards opposing politicians and political parties, 
typically those from the ethnonational parties of the other ethnicities. In so doing, politicians 
perpetuated narratives of having the interests of the national group in mind, narratives that 
place them as the sole protectors of the communal interests and values in the face of an 
oppositional and oppressive 'other'. But, Harun claims, their assertions that they “protect 
peoples in their identities and their existence” fell flat because “when concrete human beings—
members of these peoples—start to die, it's not a problem,” it's not a priority. 113 This tendency 
reveals a disheartening trend of ethnopolitics: 
What ethnopolitcal entrepreneurs and elites actually protect is their abstract 
notions of the people. So if I'm protecting abstract notion of people I don't have to 
protect you personally as a member of this or that group. These protests were very 
important because they show how ordinary citizens of this country—beyond all 
                                                 
111 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 22, July 2014. 
112 Interview conducted by PCRC, 2014. 
113 Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013. 
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these discourses of the ethnic rights—actually are literally thrown into what Hanna 
Arand says: “rightlessness.” You're nobody. You don't have rights. You cannot 
have rights. You cannot have freedoms. You don't belong, truly, to any organized 
political state, because, as you know, human rights and freedoms are protected by 
the state. This clearly shows that Bosnian citizens are much like, in essence, 
immigrants from Syria, or precarious workers, immigrant workers, who are 
thrown into rightlessness, as Hanna Arand says. And that is very scary. 114 
 
Thus, Harun is arguing, citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina have no rights outside of their 
membership in one of the three constitutionally recognized national groups, and even then only 
part of the time. This leaves most in BiH—particularly minorities—without protection or voice. 
Summarized succinctly by Armin, “the segment of the population that has been really 
discriminated by the Dayton Constitution and everything that derives from the Dayton 
constitution is basically we as individuals.” 115 
 Under these conditions fear flourishes. There exists an overarching mistrust in the state, 
and Ervin—a Sarajevan living in Belgrade—like many others, sees the “goals of the war [as 
being] accomplished—[they] live in separated areas living afraid of the 'other'.”116 With social 
trust having been destroyed by the war and the general failing of efforts towards reconstruction 
and reconciliation in the post-conflict period, it is unsurprising that mistrust persists. 
Ethnonational politicians frequently utilize “a card of security” to extend their power and the 
existing political system: by calling on people's existing fears that “they are preparing the final 
solution, final attack on us, we have to be aware, we have to beware of their hidden intentions 
and all that,” explains Harun, people are more likely to vote for their ethnonational party.117 
                                                 
114 Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013. 
115 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November, 2013. 
116 Informal conversation; cafe in Belgrade, Serbia; October 2013. 
117 Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013. 
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People are truly afraid that “somebody [is] going to attack their kid in the street because they 
have... a Serbian accent,” far more, stated Marija, than they worry about having friendships or 
even romantic relationships with the 'other'. 118 But for Emilija, the major point of worry is that 
youths who have no personal memory of the war, who've only heard stories of it from friends, 
family, the media, and politicians still think that way, which to her is exceedingly dangerous.119 
 This fearful mindset is perpetuated by a number of factors in the judicial system. First, 
while approximately 250 cases of war crimes have been completed in BiH since 2003, there 
continues to be a backlog of approximately 1,200 (Džidić 2014). The slow rate of prosecution 
has had myriad negative impacts, not only because evidence and memories fade as time passes, 
but also because it has inhibited, claimed an NGO worker, “coming to terms with the past, 
reconciliation, when perpetrators are wandering the streets.”120 It has been shown that war 
crime tribunals can be very valuable to the post-conflict recovery process. By knowing who is 
guilt for the acts of violence committed during the war, argues Ahmed—a reporter for an 
independent news source in BiH—it is easier to reconnect with neighbors of a different 
ethnicity.121 But, Jagoda—an activist whose work focuses on the monitoring of war crimes 
trials in BiH—believes that BiH has “put too much emphasis on judicial proceedings as just 
one of the mechanisms of transitional justice. … Just by investing so much emphasis on this, 
to place so much pressure and expectation on it, we may be keeping it from working.”122 
 In the rush to prosecute crimes of genocide, for example, the Court of BiH used the 
2003 criminal code rather than the 1976 Yugoslav code which was in place during the war; 
                                                 
118 Interview; cafe in Sarajevo; 22, July 2014. 
119 Interview; over Skype (interviewee in Brčko); 8, August 2014. 
120 Interviewee did not want to be identified. 
121 Informal conversation; media outlet office in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November 2013. 
122 Informal conversation; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; May 2014. 
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because of this, numerous convicted war criminals were released until they could be retried 
under the correct legal code. Worse than their release, however, was that many of these men 
returned to a hero's welcome. The blow of this is deepened by the fact that one of these 
receptions—that of Dario Kordić in Visovač—was attended by the chairman of the House of 
People of the State Parliament, the delegate in the House of Peoples in the State Parliament, 
and the Chairman of the Club of the Caucus in the Federation House of Representatives, as 
well as some military leaders, reported Emir.123 When acts such of this are permitted to take 
place under the constitutional structure without repercussion of any kind, Emir, stated, “they 
are glorifying a war criminal and not sending any peace or reconciliation messages.”124 In the 
face of this, it is unsurprising that many BiH citizens are still fearful, distrustful, and wary of 
the government and politicians. 
 
Conclusion 
 Analysis of the status of political, communal, economic, and transitional justice 
reconstruction and recovery within Bosnia-Herzegovina has shown that progress has been 
slight and met with much resistance, primarily on the part ethnopoliticians. This is to be 
expected in the context of the constitutional structure in place in the state—the power of these 
ethnonational politicians is dependent on an ethnicized population, and it is therefore not in 
their best interest to strongly pursue reconciliation and reconstruction within the state. 
Implementing policy that would increase the influence of minorities, bolster a sense of 
unification as citizens of the state, or decrease corruption, clientelism, and nepotism would 
threaten the power of ethnicized political parties. The institutionalization of identity through 
                                                 
123 Interview; organization office in Sarajevo, BiH; 25, June 2014. 
124 Emir; interview; organization office in Sarajevo, BiH; 25, June 2014. 
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the Dayton Peace Accords, specifically Annex 4 of the document, has led to the ethnicization 
of the politics and government of BiH. Not only are ethnicity and politics inexorably linked—
leading them to be largely equated in the public discourse—but this ethnicization/politicization 
extends to all aspects of life, from education to medicine, and almost always to negative ends. 
 Ethnopoliticians' efforts to normalize this discourse and protect the status quo have not 
gone wholly unchallenged, however. As was demonstrated by the JMBG and February protests, 
citizens are increasingly crossing ethnicized divisions to oppose the mismanagement, 
corruption, and discrimination of the BiH government, and call for systemic change. Harun is 
exceptionally hopeful for the potential impact of constitutional reform, stating, “Definitely 
institutional design creates new rules of the game, and I think that we would then be more 
hopeful in opening up the spaces for other forms of political articulation than strictly ethnic.”125 
But for Armin the situation is more desperate. He states: 
As long as we have ethnopolitics we will not have Bosnia-Herzegovina as a 
unified factor. And Bosnia-Herzegovina will essentially dissolve if certain groups 
are excluded from having their rights in this country... So we really have to move 
away from nationalism, it's going to destroy us completely—not only 
economically and socially, but it is really going to disintegrate the country 
politically. And the only option is the option of focusing on how we can make this 
country be a better place for everyone.126 
 
As society in BiH works to construct a new “social contract,” in the words of Emir, questions 
of who holds the power—whether there exists an “ethnic-based society, civic-based society, or 
some model that's in between the two”—will be of continued importance, influencing societal, 
economic, and transitional structures within the state. 127 
                                                 
125 Interview; office at Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo, BiH; 27, November 2013. 
126 Armin; interview; cafe in Sarajevo, BiH; 18, November, 2013. 
127 Emir; interview; organization office in Sarajevo, BiH; 25, June 2014. 
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Chapter 4.2: Case Study Analysis—Rwanda 
History and Context: Rwanda and the RPF 
 It is important to establish that—as is also the case with the genocide in Bosnia-
Herzegovina—the violence in Rwanda did not stem from so called “ancient hatreds.” Rather, 
it came about through “overt political manipulation, ruthlessly orchestrated by a morally 
bankrupt elite. Factors such as the growing landlessness, disparities between rich and poor, the 
ambitions of an increasingly ruthless elite losing their grip on power, regional politics and 
regional dynamics played a central role in the genocide and political slaughter” (Jefremovas 
1997, 102). When the new government was established in July 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) affirmed its commitment to the Arusha Accords and the power-sharing structure 
it established.128 However, over a considerably short period of time, the RPF unilaterally 
passed amendments that established a strong executive presidency, redistributed the 
composition of parliament, and thoroughly imposed the dominance of the RPF in the 
government. 
 Elections in post-conflict Rwanda are strictly regulated, and the degree to which they 
provide citizens with free choice or the opportunity to challenge the RPF's vision for political 
development in Rwanda is questionable (Beswick 2010, 234). In this way, Rwanda arguably 
returned to de facto one-party rule, what Reyntjens (2004) argues constitutes a dictatorship. 
This argument gathers strength from the banning of the Democratic Republic Movement 
(MDR); the arrest of former President Pasteur Bizimungu; the evidence that limits within the 
                                                 
128 The Arusha Accords were a set of five protocols signed in August 1993 by the government of 
Rwanda and the rebel RPF, under mediation, to end the three-year civil war. However, 
implementation of the Accords was delayed by the shooting down of an airplane carrying the 
presidents of Rwanda and Burundi—Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, 
respectively—on April 6, 1994. This incident became one of the major catalysts for the Rwandan 
genocide. 
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constitution restrict freedom of expression and association and reinforce the RPF's dominance; 
the arrests and 'disappearances' of opponents; and the intimidation of civil society more broadly. 
Indeed, “political opposition and criticism has been criminalized, and for stating their beliefs 
about the government, Rwandans can now be imprisoned, disappear, be forced into exile, or 
killed” (Hintjens 2008, 10). 
 The RPF has also introduced legislation, such as the Organic Law of 2003 and the Law 
Regulating the Punishment of Genocide Ideology, that established new categories of thought 
and speech crimes, including 'divisionism', 'ethnic ideology', and a 'genocide mentality'. While 
grounded in admirable intentions born from the events of the 1994 genocide,  these laws, have 
made open criticism of authority (i.e., the RPF) taboo if not outright illegal, and established a 
gilded stability that is largely maintained through the suppression of dissent and limiting 
citizens' civil and political rights (Hintjens 2008, 11). This has made post-conflict Rwanda 
fertile ground for growing grievances as structural violence breeds anger, resentment, and 
frustration, all at greater risk for renewed violence (Reyntjens 2004, 210). 
 In conjunction with legislation proscribing “genocide invoking” thought and speech, 
usage of the monikers of 'Hutu', 'Tutsi', and 'Twa' were banned as the new government officially 
rejected ethnic discrimination and even the notion of ethnicity. Instead, there are now only 
“officially sanctioned categories of social and political identification... The main categories 
are: (1) survivors; (2) old caseload returnees; (3) new caseload returnees; [and] (4) suspected 
genocidaires” (Hintjens 2008, 14). This is a dramatic demonstration of the power of officials 
and elites to name and refuse to name. Categorization was utilized to direct the development 
of the post-conflict society, driven by a belief that formal disavowal of ethnic division would 
reduce the salience and therefore the potential ability of such identifications to once again 
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inspire such extreme violence. 
 
Introduction to the Rwandan Blogosphere 
 The information on the conditions of peace in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide 
used in this case analysis is sourced entirely from blog posts from eleven authors—seven 
academics, one journalist, one activist, one employee in the Office of the President in Rwanda, 
and one youth writer. Six of these authors are either from or currently living in the region. The 
topics they address are varied, as interview questions could not guide the discussion. This 
analysis is supplemented with comments that were made on some of the posts by a variety of 
individuals living within and outside of Rwanda, as doing so goes further towards honoring 
Rwandan voices and opinions without constraints of imposed Western values. As there is no 
means by which to know or confirm their identities, all of these responses must be taken with 
a grain of salt, particularly as the Rwandan government has a long history of using social media 
to promote its own messages covertly. 
 The individuals blogging as well as those who were able to comment on the posts can 
certainly be classified as 'elites;' first, because the population is comprised of academics, well-
educated youths, politicians, activists, and journalists, all of whom are more inclined towards 
political awareness and involvement, but second, also because access to internet is quite limited 
in Rwanda. Therefore, the conclusions that can be drawn from this research must be presented 
as a derivative of this specific frame and not that of a wider, general opinion of citizens of 
Rwanda. This is, however, the same population that informs the data and conclusions for the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina case study of this research, providing parallel structures between the case 
studies. 
 
Political Design and Effectiveness 
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 The political system of Rwanda is undeniably defined by the domination of the political 
scene by the RPF and President Paul Kagame, who has been in power since winning the war 
taking over the government in 1994. The blog posts of activists, journalists, and academics 
within and focused on Rwanda used the term 'regime' almost as frequently as 'government' 
when talking about the political culture of the state—twenty-five versus thirty-four uses. While 
the term 'regime' is not necessarily laden with negative associations, when the regime is 
directly called a 'dictatorship' thrice and the adjective 'authoritarian' is used six times by four 
authors in reference to such varied elements as 'government', 'rule', 'character', and 'regime', 
suspicions grow. Kris Berwouts took this classification a step further when he likened the 
African state to North Korea in its paranoia and violence.129 Along the same vein—though 
considerably softer—commenter Michael Chambers referred to the governance structure as a 
“benevolent dictatorship.”130 Indeed, the most common adjectives used to describe the system 
are 'dictatorial' and 'inflexible'. Tales of expulsion, imprisonment, and banning of political 
opponents, not to mention accusations of extrajudicial killings, abound. Identifying himself as 
MCDOWELL KALISA, one commenter told his story in response to the post: 
I did join RPF as a soldier in 1991, after the genocide I continued to serve in the 
army up to 1997. In 1996 I started to sense RPF was going against what they were 
preaching during the war. I did choose to go neutral, as a journalist that's when they 
started to real feel uncomfortable with me, I was arrested, beaten many times, at 
the end am in exile paying the price of being neutral.131 
 
Kris Berwouts argues that “the independent press ceased to exist many years ago,” and because 
of this the RPF—and therefore Kagame—has absolute domination over the political culture of 
                                                 
129 Blog post; “Hell and Healing: Rwanda Twenty Years On;” 21, March 2014. 
130 Comment; “Debating Rwanda under the RPF” by Magnus Taylor; 10, October 2013. 
131 Comment; “Taking Sides in Rwanda” by Steve Terrill; 7, May 2014. 
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the state and is able to define “what is politically admissible,” managing public opinion with 
“an effective mixture of repression, social pressure and self-censorship.”132 Much of this is 
attributable to the governance structure following the 1994 genocide: with the victory of the 
RPF and the halting of violence against the Tutsi and Hutu moderates, News Rwanda asserts, 
Kagame “has worked tirelessly to maintain a dauntless narrative that depicts him as a white 
night,” indeed, as the 'messianic savior'.133 
 Blogger News Rwanda contradicts this narrative, arguing that “the current dictatorial 
tendencies that stifle dissent are unlikely to take us to the promised land.” 134  While the 
government is described by the writers as 'not blameless' and 'repressive', it was just as 
frequently referred to as 'ethnically inclusive', 'forward looking', and 'progressive'. What, then, 
is the truth of the current Rwandan system? Can it be defined by a 'visionary character', 
'benevolent' and 'competent' leaders, and as having 'good' and 'democratic' governance? Or, 
rather, is it a state defined by 'political conformity', 'unprecedented' and 'complete' state control, 
'narrow partisan' interests, and 'bad leadership'? The discourse surrounding the Rwandan state 
is bipolar, with little space for objective evaluation: researchers are framed as either with or 
against the government. In so doing, coupled with the implementation of judicial law defining 
and prosecuting 'genocide-related crimes', Kagame has established a system in which it is 
illegal to contradict his narrative or stand opposed to his government, lest risk being 
condemned as a genocide sympathizer or denier. This is the mechanism by which “image-
conscious Rwanda insists on a level of political conformity that is almost unprecedented 
anywhere,” according to News Rwanda.135 
                                                 
132 Blog post; “Hell and Healing: Rwanda Twenty Years On;” 21, March 2014. 
133 Blog post; “Questions We Ask In Silence;” 3, April 2014. 
134 Blog post; “Rwanda & Reconciliation: Collective Forgiveness?”; 23, July 2013. 
135 Blog post; “Questions We Ask In Silence;” 3, April 2014. 
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 This extends out of the political sphere and into the lived experience of individual 
citizens, explains Bert Ingelaere in a comment, in that the RPF 'saturates' all parts of life. He 
explains that given this “deep penetration of RPF authority in the lives and minds of 
Rwandans, ... there is no other option but to practice self-censorship in case you are inside 
Rwanda and you get a better picture of how it is on the ground.”136 Yet the results of the World 
Values Surveys in 2007 and 2012 show a new trend: Rwandans are increasingly likely to 
participate in lawful means of protest and dissent within the state. For example, there was a 
sizable increase in the percentage of respondents who stated that they 'might' join in boycotts 
or attend lawful demonstrations—an increase from 8.5% to 42.2% and an increase of 16.2% 
to 47.5%, respectively. In addition, while no percent change can be calculated, in 2012 38.2% 
of the participants stated that they might join in an unlawful strike; this indicates that a 
significant portion of the society is willing to join in unlawful protest and dissent as well (World 
Values Survey 2015). Coupled with whispers of growing dissatisfaction, this trend may point 
towards a new push for change in the state. 
 The existence of 'opposition' parties in Rwanda is mostly limited to “satellite parties,” 
states Kris Berwouts in a blog post, “whose main reason for existence is to create the illusion 
that Rwanda has a political system of active multiparty competition.”137 World Values Survey 
data about self-placement on a scale from left (liberal) to right (conservative), however, shows 
a startling shift. While the majority of Rwandans classified themselves as being on the 
conservative side of the spectrum both in 2007 and 2012, 49.1% rated themselves as 'true 
moderate' (defined here as either a '5' or a '6' on the spectrum) in 2012, a 29.3% increase from 
                                                 
136 Comment; “Debating Rwanda under the RPF” by Magnus Taylor; 9, October 2013. 
137 Kris Berwouts; blog post; “Hell and Healing: Rwanda Twenty Years On;” 21, March 2014. 
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the number in 2007. Similarly, while only 32.2% of Rwandans polled classified themselves as 
'moderate' (being between a '4' and a '7' on the spectrum) in 2007, more than 70% defined 
themselves this way in 2012, an increase of 40.1% (World Values Survey 2015). While it is 
uncertain precisely what this means for the politics of Rwanda, it is worth noting that there are 
growing divisions within the RPF between moderates and hard-liners that may be related to 
this this growing moderate base (Clark 2014). 
 Elections in Rwanda are referred to as '(s)elections' or simply 'selections' by three 
different bloggers, constituting a contestation of the validity or the freedom of the regularly 
held elections that have garnered Rwanda praises from much of the Western world. Describing 
the recent parliamentary elections that took place in September 2013, Susan Thomson, blogger 
for Democracy Watch, writes: 
The RPF handily won the most recent round of parliamentary elections... with 76% 
of the vote. In theory, it was contending with nine other parties. In practice, 
Rwanda's nearly six million voters had little choice on the ballot. A total of 98% of 
the votes went to the RPF and its four coalition parties. The continued dominance 
of the RPF in the electoral realm projects a semblance of political pluralism while 
masking the fact that all parties are expected to acquiesce to the ruling party. Two 
actual opposition parties have been banned and their leaders jailed.138 
 
The negative sentiments and descriptions of the elections are reflected in the rhetoric of the 
writers, which describes the elections as 'false', 'predictable', and 'predetermined'. Yet these 
sentiments were contradicted by Rwandans through the comments section on some of the blog 
posts. One, identified as Gerald Mbanda, wrote, “Susan knows very well that Rwandan MPs 
are elected by the people of Rwanda and not hand picked and therefore have all the powers 
                                                 
138 Blog post; “Rwanda's Twitter-Gate;” 17, March 2014. 
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and authority to carry out their mandate as empowered by the constitution.” 139  But, the 
reflections of other Rwandans contradict this positive outlook on the validity of elections: 
Theogene Rudasingwa, Kagame's former Chief of Staff now living in exile in the United States, 
for example, published in a recent book that “the outcome of the first election had to be 're-
fixed' because Kagame had won by more that 100%.”140 Denials of this 'fixing' of elections 
seem weaker when taken in conjunction with claims from the US embassy, reported by News 
Rwanda, that “the elections were marked by irregularities, which 'undermined the integrity of 
the vote.' The irregularities included the presence of security officials in polling rooms (their 
presence is to 'guide' the population as they vote).” 141 When asked about the validity of 
elections by the World Values Survey in 2012, the results were dubious to say the least. In only 
one category—'How often in your country's elections are votes counted fairly'—was 'I don't 
know' not the most frequent response: 29.1% of the population responded that they are counted 
fairly 'very often', while 27.6% responded that they 'don't know'. The highest percentage of 
responses to all the other questions in this category about frequencies during elections—
“opposition candidates are prevented from running,” “TV news favors the governing party,” 
“voters are bribed,” “election officials are fair,” “voters are threatened at the polls,” and “voters 
are offered a genuine choice in the elections”—was 'I don't know'. Response percentages of “I 
don't know” to these questions varied from 44.4% responding to 'How often are voters offered 
a genuine choice in the elections,' to 57.6% stating that they don't know 'how often voters are 
threatened with violence at the polls' (World Values Survey 2015). These results suggest that 
the respondents did not feel comfortable or safe answering the questions truthfully or 
                                                 
139 Comment; “Rwanda’s Twitter-Gate” by Susan Thomson; 18, March 2014. 
140 Jennifer Fierberg; blog post; “Rwanda, M23 and the UNSC;” 27, August 2013. 
141 Blog post; “After Years of Silence, US Embassy Speaks Out;” 23, November 2013. 
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potentially a lock of trust in government: if they trusted the government, they would believe 
statements from politicians, while if they do not trust the government, it is likely they would 
express doubt about what is being reported. 
 This raises questions about corruption within and the efficacy of the governance system 
in Rwanda. The diction used within the blog posts revolved around such topics as the 'heavy 
arm of the government', 'little real political authority', 'bigotry', 'unprecedented diplomatic 
crisis', 'mockery of democracy', 'strict policies of exclusion', and a 'fundamentally flawed 
political process'. Outside observers such as Pamela Abbott argue that “the country is not 
democratic and there is evidence of human rights abuses.”142 Yet there are almost as many 
mentions of 'political expediency',  'normal, democratic practices', and 'remarkable progress', 
with commenters such as Michael Chambers stating that, “It would seem that to whatever 
degree Africans may regret Rwandan democratic backsliding it is outweighed by their 
appreciation of Rwanda's capacity to get things done.”143 This being said, Rwandan exile News 
Rwanda defines the past twenty years as “Kagame's reign of terror in Rwanda and DRC,” and 
sees Kagame as “a symbol of the current oppressive system and the RPF machinery, which 
many (rightly) feel is responsible for killing a good share of Rwandans.” 144  Thus, it is 
important to interrogate the source of the arguments being made—particularly by Western 
voices—as it is no secret that the government of Rwanda has willfully and frequently engaged 
in disinformation and propaganda through social media and the news. 
 To search out the truest information about Rwanda, this research follows the narrative 
told by the widest variety of sources. For example, News Rwanda's opinions of Kagame are 
                                                 
142 Comment; “Rwanda’s Untold Story” by Filip Reyntjens; 24, October 2014. 
143 Comment; “Debating Rwanda under the RPF;” by Magnus Taylor; 10, October 2013. 
144 Blog post; “Rwanda & Reconciliation;” 23, July 2013. 
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echoed by Filip Reyntjens, a preeminent Belgian scholar on Rwanda, who describes Kagame 
as “probably the worst war criminal in office today.” 145  In addition, reported Theogene 
Rudasingwa, former Chief of Staff to Kagame and ambassador to Washington for Rwanda, 
stated, “If you differ strongly with Kagame and make your views known from the inside, you 
will be made to pay the price, and very often that price is your life'.”146 While “Rwanda is rated 
Africa's least corrupt country by the watchdog Transparency International,” Mark Weston 
admits that “many people [he] spoke to during [his] stay in Rwanda were afraid to discuss 
politics at all; others warned [him] against asking questions.”147 This calls into question the 
validity of international, macro-level data on Rwanda, and calls for a deeper, personalized 
analysis of conditions of the lived experience of Rwandan citizens. 
 
Communal Relations 
 Memorialization and historical framing contribute significantly to post-conflict 
recovery and reconciliation efforts, and these forces are particularly relevant in Rwanda: as 
Steve Terrill, a journalist and editor of Rwanda Wire wrote, “Impression management is an 
obsession in Kigali.”148 The RPF government has crafted a particular, official narrative that 
they keep 'well-guarded' against “attempts to complicate” it, described Magnus Taylor, an 
editor of African Arguments. 149  Words such as '[disinformation] campaign', 'narrative(s)', 
'story(-ies)', and '[idealized and invented] version' appear more frequently when discussing 
Rwanda than 'history' does, reflecting the pervasive belief that the Rwandan government 
manipulates or frames the past in particular ways that serve their political interests. 
                                                 
145 Quoted in “Howard French is Right” by News Rwanda; 13, January, 2013. 
146 Howard French, quoted in News Rwanda, “Howard French is Right,” January 13, 2013. 
147 Blog post; “Rwanda Twenty Years On;” February 24, 2014. 
148 Blog post, “Taking Sides in Rwanda,” May 6, 2014. 
149 Blog; “Debating Rwanda under the RPF;” 13, October 2013. 
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 The greatest and most-used tool in the government's toolbox is memorialization 
through state sponsored events, initiatives, and campaigns. 'Commemoration(s)', 'event(s)', 
'memorials', and 'ritual(s)', are common, and described as 'annual', 'big', 'commemorative', 
'historical', and 'perfectly directed'. But some also believe them to be 'meaningless'. As is the 
case with discourse on the political reality in Rwanda, opinions on the history as it is told by 
the government is extremely polarized. Commenter Elizana wrote, “Here in Rwanda; we are 
used of people like you, who are romour mongoring especially in this period when we are 
preparing to commemorate our loved ones who perished as the result of people like you who 
are just ignorant of the reality.” 150  Similarly, commentor Gerald Mbanda asserted that 
accusations of historical manipulation or framing are a tool of powerful Western forces to 
discredit the Rwandan government, stating that “it's an old story meant to re-write the Rwandan 
history, paint a negative image of the Rwandan President both at home and abroad.”151 On the 
other side of the debate, the actions of Kagame and his government are seen as deliberately 
misleading, a means of manipulating 'appearance', 'legacy', and 'image' through 'broader 
patterns of disinformation' and the utilization of 'rosy' language and perception. Blogger News 
Rwanda is a boisterous opponent to the way “genocide memorials and the annual 
commemoration” have been used by the Rwandan government, as the insistence “on a level of 
political conformity that is almost unprecedented anywhere,” these frames of the past 
“privilege a certain narrative while killing diversity of memories.”152 Blind acceptance of this 
narrative, they assert, fails to question “Who is being remembered and why? How does this 
contribute to the reconciliation agenda that Kagame claims to have achieved?”153 
                                                 
150 Comment; “Rwanda’s Twitter-Gate;” by Susan Thomson; March 18, 2014. 
151 Comment; “Rwanda’s Twitter-Gate;” by Susan Thomson; March 18, 2014. 
152 Blog post; “Questions We Ask In Silence;” 3, April 2014. 
153 Blog post; “Questions We Ask In Silence;” 3, April 2014. 
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 The narrative propagated by the Rwandan government is one of a 'rehabilitated nation' 
that has experienced 'much needed reconciliation', utilizing campaigns like Kwibuka20 and 
'simple disinformation strategy'.154 To contradict this narrative will have you labeled as a 
'revisionist' and likely be accused of crimes such as 'genocide ideology' or 'divisionism'. As is 
demonstrated by the experiences of Victoire Ingabire, a political opponent of the RPF, resisting 
these narratives can quickly lead to official sanctions. Howard French described her case: 
When she returned to Rwanda that year, having lived 16 years in exile, to prepare 
a run for president, her first stop was at the official genocide memorial. 'We are 
here honoring at this memorial the Tutsi victims of the genocide. There are also 
Hutu who were victims of crimes against humanity and war crimes, not 
remembered or honored here,' she said in a prepared statement. 'Hutu are also 
suffering. They are wondering when their time will come to remember their people. 
In order for us to get to that desirable reconciliation, we must be fair and 
compassionate towards every Rwandan's suffering. … Ingabire was promptly 
arrested and accused of 'genocide ideology'.155 
 
Her story demonstrates the firm hold Kagame and his government work to maintain on the 
official history of the state. But questions do still remain about what is the 'true' history of the 
events of 1994 and the years that followed. While the internationally pervasive history speaks 
to there being 800,000 victims in the genocide, commenter Leslie McTyre claims to have been 
working for a “UN Agency in Rwanda” immediately following the genocide, and, based on 
the results of a “survey [that] was flawlessly carried out notwithstanding the difficult 
conditions,” they “obtained a total of 1,230,000 killed by the genocidaires.”156 In addition to 
                                                 
154 Kwibuka means 'remember' in Kinyarwanda, and “describes the annual commemoration of the 
1994 Genocide against the Tutsi” (Kwibuka 2014). Kwibuka20 was “a series of events taking 
place in Rwanda... lead[ing] up to the national commemoration of the genocide in Rwanda, which 
[began] on 7 April 2014” (Kwibuka 2014). 
155 Quoted in News Rwanda; “Howard French is Right;” 13, January 2013. 
156 Comment; “Rwanda: Why claim that 200,000 Tutsi” by Marijke Verpoorten; 30, October 2014. 
- 104 - 
 
 
disagreements over the number of victims—which has yielded such comments as, “if u want 
to get the truth go and count the sculls. Our lost ones had names and they are all known”157—
there is considerable frustration over the fact that no “Rwandan will raise questions that relate 
to RPF's criminal responsibility.”158 News Rwanda claims that failing to address these crimes 
ensures that “their victims will remain silenced in a dark cloud of mystery,” and that “the ritual 
of forgiveness... will remain a one way traffic that begins with a Tutsi victim and ends with a 
Hutu perpetrator.”159 
 This opens the door to the ways in which the genocide is discussed and the impact this 
has on identities within the post-conflict state. Narratives of the genocide center on rhetoric of 
'victim' and 'perpetrator' that extend beyond the individual to encapsulate entire communities 
and identities through 'collective guilt' and 'collective victimhood'. This dichotomy has been 
institutionalized through state support of 'institutionalized forgiveness', placing culpability and 
innocence upon certain groups and framing Kagame as the 'hero' of the persecuted minority. 
As News Rwanda describes, “The 'voluntary' contributions that are offered by the 
impoverished masses to support survivors during this period further emphasizes this difference. 
It is an event for some (Tutsi survivors) and not an event for all.”160 This bipolar division of 
society has readily apparent, ethnicized dimensions. Indeed, despite official state policy being 
the abolition and denial of ethnic divisions, the means by which it has defined the categories 
of 'survivor', 'perpetrator', and 'returnee' have crystallized distinctions along these same ethnic 
lines, even if the categories have been given different names. This is reflected in the way all 
                                                 
157 Gs, comment, on “Rwanda: Why claim that 200,000 Tutsi died in the genocide is wrong,” October 
27, 2014. 
158 News Rwanda; “Ndi Umunyarwanda;” 29, November 2013. 
159 News Rwanda; “Ndi Umunyarwanda;” 29, November 2013. 
160 Blog post; “Questions We Ask In Silence;” 3, April 2014. 
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the blog posts discussed these categories. For example, five out of the seven times the word 
'survivor(s)' is used in the blog posts, it is referring specifically to 'Tutsi survivor(s)'. This 
choice in diction completely invalidates the lived experience of Hutu moderates who survived 
the violence of April 1994, as that population was also a significant target of the genocidal 
violence. Take for example this passage from a blog post by Marijke Verpoorten: 
The range of 150,000-300,000 survivors is commonly used. At the end of July 1994, 
head counting in refugee camps resulted in an estimated 105,000 Tutsi survivors. 
According to Gerard Prunier, 25,000 survivors who did not go to camps should 
also be added, and HRW adds another 20,000 surviving Tutsi in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and Tanzania. This gives a total of 150,000 Tutsi 
survivors.161 
 
Verpoorten switches back and forth repeatedly between 'Tutsi survivors' and simply 
'survivors'—this indicates that to her mind there is no difference and that they can be equated. 
This equating of 'survivors' with 'Tutsis' has also been undertaken by Kagame and his 
government, just as 'Hutu' has been equated with 'perpetrator'; these conflated concepts are 
what perpetuates the importance of ethnicity in Rwanda, as the status and role of Rwandans in 
society is still (if indirectly) based on ethnic affiliation. A commenter, Paul, reflected these 
beliefs: “While many of us rightly feel it uncomfortable talking about the Hutu-Tutsi polarities, 
to pretend that ethnicity isn't an important factor when discussing Rwanda is naïve at best and 
destructive at worst. Naïve because politics is organized along these identities and destructive 
in the sense that it denies (rather than challenges) a potentially explosive reality.”162 This too 
is a bipolar discussion, not only within Rwanda, but amongst the academics, journalists, and 
                                                 
161 Blog post; “Rwanda: Why claim that 200,00 Tutsi died in the genocide is wrong;” October 27, 
2014 (emphasis added). 
162 Comment; “Debating Rwanda under the RPF” by Magnus Taylor; 14, October 2013. 
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activists who work on and study Rwanda. Many bloggers and commenters—including Dave 
Poole,163 Helen Hintjens,164 David Himbara,165 and Ndorigus166—reflected in comments that 
they believed continued research on Rwanda within terms of ethnic divisions were outdated 
and lazy at best and potentially divisive at worst. Richard Karugarama Legero, a lawyer 
currently working in the Office of the President of Rwanda declared that “modern Rwanda 
articulated and implemented a vision of co-existence between Hutus, Tutsis and Twa which 
emphasizes the virtues of being Rwandan. The dividends from collective reconciliation and 
nation rebuilding have resulted in unprecedented social, economic and political 
transformation.”167 News Rwanda agrees with Helen, who wrote that “the disagreements over 
the present regime are political,”168 but asserts that: 
The other explanation is that it shows us what everyone (including US diplomats) 
know but are reluctant to say in public: that ethnicity remains a salient if 
manipulated aspect of Kagame's Rwanda. That far apart from the usually sold 
image of ethnic harmony, the reality remains stark. Power is instumentalized along 
ethnic lines and programs that would suggest women or youth emancipation are 
actually a deliberate ploy to obscure this 'hidden' reality.169 
 
'Hutu(s)' and 'Tutsi(s)' are mentioned in the blogs twenty-six and thirty-six times, respectively. 
Two of the five mentions of 'elites' refer specifically to 'Tutsi elites,' and 'Hutu' is most often 
used to describe 'civilians', 'compatriots', 'extremists', 'ideology', 'majority', and 'masses'. 
Indeed, many, including Professors Ingelaere and Verpoorten, argue that despite government 
                                                 
163 Comment; “Debating Rwanda under the RPF” by Magnus Taylor; 11, October 2013. 
164 Comment; “Debating Rwanda under the RPF” by Magnus Taylor; 13, October 2013. 
165 Quoted in Kris Berwouts, “Hell and Healing: Rwanda Twenty Years On,” March 21, 2014. 
166 Comment; “Rwanda’s Twitter-Gate” by Susan Thomson; 11, October 2013. 
167 Blog post; “In Rwanda it is Economic Development that Demonstrates Government's Respect for 
Human Rights;” 14, March 2014. 
168 Comment; “Debating Rwanda under the RPF” by Magnus Taylor; 13, October 2013. 
169 Blog post; “Ndi Umunyarwanda;” 29, November 2013. 
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attempts to build a single national identification, “Rwandan society is bi-polar, with a Hutu 
majority and a Tutsi minority;” that is, that “feelings of ethnic belonging are not redundant, 
and that they remain a central factor in Rwandan 'social identity'.”170 
 It is not only in spite of government attempts that ethnic identity still has relevance in 
Rwandan society, but also partially as a result of their strategic programs and narratives. 
Quoted in a post by Kris Berwouts, a Rwandan woman named Rose described the situation: 
'The regime is very ambiguous about the division between Hutu and Tutsi,' says 
Rose. 'For years and years, they explained to us that Hutu and Tutsi were categories 
that the Belgians had invented to silence and divide us and to maintain their control. 
It became a crime even to pronounce the words Hutu and Tutsi. They labeled you 
as a divisionist. You wanted to divide the community. Or worse, you became a 
nostalgic for the old regime and still adhered to the ideology of genocide. But now 
they come forward with their new program Ndi Umunyarwanda (I am Rwandan). 
They want individual Hutus to ask for forgiveness on behalf of all Hutus, and 
individual Tutsis to forgive them in the name of all Tutsis. … I must admit I can't 
follow anymore. Do Hutu and Tutsi exist, or are they mere inventions?'171 
 
News Rwanda reflected similar sentiments, questioning “Does the government of Rwanda 
honestly believe that people are stupid not to notice that you can't talk about 'genocide against 
the Tutsi' while denying the existence of Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda?”172 In order for the country 
to move forward, News Rwanda continues, the discourse must move away from dichotomies 
of good and evil and the focus on Tutsi survivors and Hutu killers, as such narratives 
“inevitably create difference, which in turn imputes superiority and inferiority, guilt and 
innocence.”173 
                                                 
170 Blog post; “Rwanda: Could State-led Mass Killings Ever Happen Again?”; 2, June 2014. 
171 Blog post; “Hell and Healing: Rwanda Twenty Years On;” 21, March 2014. 
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 Opening a free discourse within Rwanda has been strained due to the present 
atmosphere in the country: Richard, a commenter, describes it:  “Dichotomies, dualities, 
polarisations—familiar indeed! And very regrettable as is the shrinking or quasi disappearance 
of the middle way, the home of complexity, compromise, negotiation, discovery, dialogue, and 
change.”174 The authors of the posts (though very possibly representing a biased population) 
were keen to find means of having a voice, demonstrated by the use of 'debate', 'dialogue', 
'discourse', 'forum', 'all sides', 'voices of reason', and 'words' throughout the posts. Many appear 
to be desperate for thoughtful and nuanced discussion, but, according to News Rwanda, “Like 
many things in Rwanda, you either take it for face value or you don't. Serious evaluations are 
almost taboo.”175 
 'Media' is especially important to achieving these ends, particularly Twitter as it seems 
to already be playing a significant role in enriching the dialogue in Rwanda. 'Twitter', 'bloggers', 
'film', 'internet', 'media', 'tweets', 'Twitter-trolls', and 'website' were all terms utilized in the 
posts. Often, according to commenter Monique, “African voices are ignored and their 
narratives are disregarded as it does not make better reading.”176 With the utilization of social 
media such as Twitter, however, these voices have a platform and an audience that is interested 
in their experiences and insider knowledge, as digital media has become one of the most 
effective and possibly best ways to broach 'forbidden subjects' and break the pervasive 'deep 
silence' that has come to characterize the Rwandan discourse. This technology is not only being 
used by dissidents and civilians, however. The Rwandan government, reports News Rwanda, 
has not only a “journalist for hire, Andrew Mwenda” but also a “Twitter corps—a fanatic but 
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well paid group whose only task is to tweet and retweet Rwandan propaganda.”177 Exposure 
of this network of Twitter accounts under the employ of the Rwandan government has been 
labeled “Twitter-gate,” and has been described by Susan Thomson as: 
“the first crack in the armor of the RPF's longstanding disinformation campaign 
that has relied on exchange students, public relations firms, commemorative 
events, and a whole host of other techniques to craft an idealized and often 
invented version of what Rwanda was like before the onset of colonialism and 
what has become since the 1994 genocide.”178 
 
This is a promising step in deconstructing and problematizing the narratives propagated by the 
government, as well as opening the door to more complex narratives of the past that move 




 Discussion of the economic conditions within post-conflict Rwanda all take into 
account the fact that there has been sizable economic growth—particularly in GDP per capita—
over the past twenty years. As was discussed by Ingelaere and Verpoorten, there have been 
promising improvements attributable to “good technical governance of development programs, 
massive international aid, increased budget shares for agriculture and social sectors, as well as 
post-genocide catch-up and the rise of global coffee prices.”179 It is no secret that a sizable 
portion of the revenue of the state is from international donors, demonstrated by the frequent 
use of such terms as '(foreign) aid', 'development assistance', 'contributions',  'donor dollars', 
'donor(s)', 'foreign aid lifeline', and 'budget(ary) support'. Indeed, Rwanda is even referred to 
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as 'darling of donors' and one of the 'most effective aid users'. Reports from international 
monitoring organizations and businesses have had almost entirely positive things to say about 
the economic progress that has been made in Rwanda since 1994.  As mentioned by Dr. Richard 
Karugarama Lebero: 
The depth of reforms and the increasing levels of efficiency are well captured in 
numerous governance and business surveys conducted periodically by reputable 
institutions. On the basis of the reforms, Rwanda ranks favorably across most 
indicators. For instance, in the 2014 World Bank 'Doing Business Report', Rwanda 
is ranked as the second most improved country in the world and the second easiest 
place to do business in Africa.180 
 
Rwanda has received international acclaim for its remarkable economic rebound, which has 
sometimes been referred to as an 'economic miracle', and is often praised by Western observers 
as an exemplary model for the rest of Africa. Disagreements arise, however, once focus is 
turned from the pure numbers to discussions of corruption, inequality, and respect for human 
rights. Concerns have been levied, for example, by commenter Monte McMurchy—who writes 
from Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo—about the ability of the economic system 
to deal with “demography and the explosion in the African population coupled with extreme 
unemployment and youth” dominated society.181 
 One of the most significant ways this pressure is felt is through the tension between 
urban and rural populations, as the divide between the lived experiences of these groups has 
been expanding in the past decade. According to News Rwanda, more than 93% of the 
population of Rwanda is rural dwelling, while “much of the touted 'economic miracle' seems 
to have benefited Kigali (the capital) at the expense of everywhere else. This is strategic for 
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Kagame's PR purposes. Far from this facade, however, most of the country's villages remain 
chronically destitute.”182 The blog posts spoke to 'economic hardship', 'economic inequalities',  
'malnutrition', 'impoverished masses', 'economic uncertainty', 'chronically destitute villages', 
'relative winners' and 'relative losers', and the 'rich' and the 'poor(-est)'. Once again, the bipolar 
discourse in Rwanda is present, manifesting in debates over the level of development and 
poverty in rural areas. Commenter Lexa Ngira wrote, “The poor are there, just getting less poor 
every year.”183 This broaches important questions about the extent to which progress is being 
made and whether or not the rate that it is taking place is acceptable. Mark Weston argues that 
it is not, writing: 
Corruption and a growing gap between rich and poor have fanned the flames—
Rwanda has addressed the first of these, but inequality is increasing and the failure 
to make a significant dent in the poverty rate (which fell from 67% to 62% between 
1990 and 2011) suggests that the impressive growth in gross domestic product has 
benefited only a small urban elite.184 
 
If it is indeed true that the economic growth that has taken place within the country has been 
concentrated almost solely in urban centers—particularly Kigali—it is rather likely that a 'peasant 
resistance' will develop and gain strength. Ingelaere and Verpoorten see this potential for discontent, 
arguing that “systemic transformations in the structure of the rural economy may lead to... (relative) 
winners and losers, and in the case of Rwanda, involve coercive measures and policies that peasants 
find difficult to adapt to (such as mono-cropping, land consolidation and villagization).”185 
 Many critiques of the economic structure in Rwanda are centered on this question of 
concentrated economic gains: whether the purpose behind this was to serve the interests and 
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improve their quality of life of political elites or to present a polished and idyllic public face to 
current and potential donors, the opinions vary. In response to these critiques, many, such as 
commenter Peter, cite to the reports of “objective foreigners” and urge their opponents to look to 
such publications as the “world bank doing business report, Corruption index by transparency 
international, etc.”186 However, another commenter, Sam, calls into question the validity of the 
data collected and published by the so-called 'reputable organizations'. He argues that their 
statistics are based on numbers falsified and reported by the government and then reinforced 
by images of “Kigali where the towers are being constructed by the contributors of RPF on 
detriment of people who don't agree with dictatorship in the country and who can't even 
succeed with a small business because of being systematically harmed by RPF in anyway.”187 
 The RPF's authoritarian and repressive tendencies undoubtedly impact the way in 
which economic reform is felt and distributed across Rwanda. Indeed, modern Rwanda can be 
described rather succinctly as “orderly but repressive” (Gettleman 2010). As is discussed by 
News Rwanda, “Kigali may be the only capital in the world that is 100% free of homeless 
people. However, don't be deceived! This is hardly a proof of social progress. Rather, it is a 
reminder of the lingering repression.”188 This cleanliness was possible in part because the 
poorest citizens are not allowed into the city and many beggars, homeless people, and assumed 
petty thieves were sent without trial or legal processing to an island in the middle of Lake Kivu 
to be 'rehabilitated' (Gettleman 2010). Incidents such as these have contributed to arguments 
that in Rwanda “economic development has been achieved at the expense of human rights.”189 
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The continued presence of socio-political and economic inequalities in the face of an 
authoritarian and repressive regime calls up memories of the early 90s, and it is not a stretch 
to say Rwanda is still steeped in its violent past. Not all of the blog posts were as critical of the 
regime, instead calling upon the reader to recognize the hypocrisy in expecting exemplary 
rights protections from a state that is still very much in a post-conflict, transitional period. 
Richard Karugarama Lebero190 and Kishore Mahbubani191 argue that economic development 
is a crucial first step to be achieved even before implementing more comprehensive rights 
protections. Lebero, a lawyer employed in the Office of the President, writes: 
In essence, human rights can only be enjoyed when people are liberated from the 
scourge of hunger, insecurity, disease and poverty. It is also too simplistic to argue 
that emerging countries such as Rwanda are advancing economically at the expense 
of human rights. The premise of this argument overlooks the fact that strides in 
economic development are intertwined with respect for human rights.192 
 
It is indeed important to be cognizant of how a Western perspective can influence the ways in 
which certain programs, policies, and conditions are evaluated. As the data from these blog posts 
have demonstrated, however, the successes of the Rwandan government in improving economic 
conditions have not been felt by all members of the population. Thus, the exploitative nature of the 
state's policies and the negative repercussions they continue to have on the poorest sections of the 
population challenge the validity of arguments that human rights can only be protected after 
economic gains have been secured. 
 
Transitional Justice 
 The process of reconciliation in Rwanda has largely revolved around issues of 
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transitional justice, particularly trials through the ICTR and the communal gacaca courts that 
were used to prosecute lesser perpetrators of violence in 1994. In addition to these courts, 
Kagame and his RPF government codified new categories of thought and speech crimes, most 
notably 'genocide ideology'193 and 'divisionism'.194 These continue to be important concepts in 
the Rwandan discourse, demonstrated by the frequent usage of such terms as 'genocide 
denial/denier', 'genocide minimisation', 'ethnic divisionism' and 'genocide ideology' laws, and 
'revisionist'. But despite the normative value as laws such as these, News Rwanda argues, they 
have been perverted and used as “custom, ready-made charges for anyone even remotely 
critical of Kagame. Once accused, the individuals have faced the heavy arm of the government 
or have been sidelined into oblivion.”195 Indeed, Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, among others, have been demanding that these crime laws be updated (Human Rights 
Watch 2008). 
 Because of this corrupted use of these laws, there is shrinking confidence in the justice 
system, demonstrated in the results of the World Values Survey (2013). A comparison of the 
2007 and 2012 percentages for “Confidence in the justice system,”196 shows an increase in 
respondents lacking confidence in the system (responding 'not very much' or 'none at all') from 
                                                 
193 'Genocide ideology' was not officially a crime until 2008, but was used loosely to refer to crimes 
specified in the Constitution of 2003, articles 9, 13, and 33, with the idea of Ibengabyitekerezo bya 
jenocide,” meaning literally the ideas that lead to genocide. These ideas included revisionism, 
negationism, and minimization were punishable by law, as were all ethnic, regionalist, and racial 
propaganda. 
194 'Divisionism' was initially referred to as 'sectarianism', and is defined in Rwanda law no 47/2001, 
article 3 as: “The practice of sectarism is a crime committed by any oral or written expression or 
any act of division that could generate conflicts among the population or cause disputes;” the 
French version is clearer, however, reading: “La pratique du sectarisme est un crime commis au 
moyen de l’expression orale, écrite ou tout acte de division pouvant générer des conflits au sein de 
la population, ou susciter des querelles.” 
195 Blog post; “Steve Hege Victim of Kagame Propaganda Machine;” 3, December 2012. 
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20.7% in 2007 to 39.8% in 2012: an almost 200% increase. Additionally, less than half of those 
who responded that they had 'a great deal' of confidence in 2007 responded the same in 2012 
(a decrease from 33.0% to 14.7%, to be exact). Results such as these are supported by the blog 
posts describing the courts as 'not fair' and 'not free', with 'politically motivated' charges, 
'corruption', 'little evidence', 'hypocrisy', 'untrained judges', and 'unbelievably crowded prisons'. 
Indeed, News Rwanda went so far as to assert that arrest and “harassment by the Rwandan 
state are already part of an ongoing trend” within the country.197 A number of bloggers also 
alluded to government interference in judicial processes, using the trial of Victoire Ingabire as 
a pertinent example. A political opponent who returned from exile only to be placed in prison 
since 2010 for 'genocide ideology' and 'divisionism', Susan Thomson wrote of her case: 
The judge adjourned court until Wednesday, citing the need for competent 
interpretation, yet, on Twitter, the Government of Rwanda has declared victory in 
the case, stating that it (not the prosecution) has documents to prove her ties to 
'terrorists' groups in the region, and thus her guilt. Nice to see the government being 
this transparent on its interference in the judicial system.198 
 
Subjected to long, murky prison sentences for crimes that are vaguely defined, imprisoning of 
opponents, dissidents, and opposition is one of the most effective tools in Kagame's repertoire. 
Ultimately, Aloys Habimana states, “Programs like Ndi Umunyarwanda now and the gacaca 
courts before... They all exposed one side of the story. They don't help our country to move 
forward and they do not bring the people closer together. … I really think the community 
participates in these programmes just because they are forced to; not because they believe they 
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 More troubling for many, however, is the fact that the RPF has skirted justice for the 
crimes it committed during the four year war that led up to the genocide of 1994, leading some 
to assert that the ICTR was simply an exercise in 'victor's justice'. Multiple bloggers spoke out 
about this particular issue. Commenter Muckeracker wrote, “The only thing the world should 
demand is an open assessment without Kagame govt interference so that perpetrators Hutus or 
Tutsis and in particular those protected by the Rwanda's RPF govt be held accountable.”200 
Commenter RBRM concurred, writing that they believe that “the PRF hasn't been, but should 
be held accountable for the massacres we all know they committed.”201 The lack of equitable 
enforcement of the law within Rwanda enabled by the political design is all the more 
worrisome when one takes into account the fact that RPF crimes did not take place solely 
before April 1994, but that they have, according to News Rwanda, committed and gotten away 
with crimes “that include assassinations, mass murder and even genocide.”202 Howard French 
wrote about the experiences of Timothy Longman, a director for a human rights organization 
in the years following the genocide: 
A year after the genocide had ended, blood was still being spilled, recalls Timothy 
Longman, then the country director for human rights. “People would take me 
around and say, 'There's a mass grave right over here,' and you would ask, 'From 
when?' And they would say, 'Just from a few weeks ago—not from the genocide,'” 
says Longman, who now directs the African Studies Center at Boston University.203 
 
More recently, according to Susan Thomson, “The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front has all but 
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claimed responsibility for the murder of its former Spy Chief Patrick Karegeya in 
Johannesburg in January [2014].”204 With such sweeping influence over the outcome of court 
cases, particularly who is and is not charged with crimes, the RPF has largely given its 
members and supporters free reign. 
 Between the violence of the war, the genocide, and the repression that have taken place 
in since the 90s, News Rwanda argues that “Anyone who lived in Rwanda through the last 20 
years has a valid reason to be afraid.”205 And many Rwandans are afraid. 'Army', 'assassination', 
'mass atrocities', '[another/grenade/revenge/shameful/unprecedented' attack(s)', 'grenade blast', 
'bloodbath', 'brutality', 'carnage', chaos', 'danger',  and 'unbelievable havoc' are just some of the 
many words about security, vulnerability, and fear that infiltrate almost every single blog post. 
Aloys Habimana sees this perpetuation of fear as an expected result of the potential for violence 
persisting, haven only been pushed under the surface, not eliminated, by the pressure and 
intimidation of the state. He argues that the continued existence of a “policy of exclusion... the 
elimination of political opponents and critical voices in general... [and] greed” as elements of 
the lived reality of Rwanda are what prevent the system from “get[ting] the risk of violence 
under control.”206 
 But not all have such a pessimistic and fearful outlook on the state of affairs within 
Rwanda—yet another manifestation of the polarized discourse that is pervasive throughout 
Rwandan society. Mark Weston argues that: “Hundreds of thousands of refugees have returned 
from the Congo, Burundi and Tanzania and been reintegrated into their communities. The 
justice system has convicted most of the worst genocidaires, while those who committed lesser 
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crimes have paid their dues and returned to their villages.”207 However, Habimana argues that 
a considerable number of refugees are remaining abroad because they do not feel safe in 
Rwanda. 208  As security is the primary concern of most Rwandan citizens, it is not 
inconceivable that, according to News Rwanda, if the government is able to offer more security 
for the present as well as moving forward, “many people will tend to forgive the agony of the 
past.”209 In many ways this parallels opinions of the state in terms of economic improvements: 
many appeared to be willing to overlook the missteps, authoritarianism, and repression of the 
state as long as quality of life improves economically and in terms of security. 
 Given the growing importance of the internet and media to social and political life in 
Rwanda, it is no surprise that many are concerned by persisting restrictions on freedom of 
speech, particularly through the crimes of 'genocide ideology' and 'divisionism'. These are 
amongst the most common terms used in the blog posts, including such phrases as 'denial of 
liberties', '[free/open/political] expression', '[restricted] freedom [of expression/of speech]', 
'online harassment', 'severe restriction of free speech', and 'deep silence'. Indeed, freedom of 
expression was the only human right mentioned specifically by name in any of the blog posts. 
Kazungu, a commenter, wrote: “We in Rwanda know the truth. The only problem is that we 
don't have the luxury to speak it out. Even when we make online comments, we, like 
@Goldstone, use fake names for fear of …... (fill the gap).”210 This usage of fake names is 
directly related to the “program of online harassment of journalists, human rights workers and 
diplomats... being run from inside the Office of the President of Rwanda” that was uncovered 
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by journalist Steve Terrill.211 Under these conditions there is essentially no space for critical 
journalism or independent voices, which contributes significantly to the polarization of the 
discourse on post-genocidal Rwanda. “The independent press ceased to exist many years ago,” 
concludes Kris Berwouts, “the RPF defines what is politically admissible and public opinion 
is managed by an effective mixture of repression, social pressure, and self-censorship.”212 
 Ultimately, there is little way to know the 'truth' of what is taking place in Rwanda, as 
there is little means by which a researcher or journalist can gain information about the state of 
affairs from someone living within the country. As a commenter Sam explained: “If you really 
want to know the reality of the country you don't speak with the people inside the country 
unless you guarantee a full security afterwards because nobody will dare risk his life to tell the 
truth, … so no Rwandan inside country will tell you the different story from what the 
government tells.”213 Drawing from a variety of sources that have found platforms on which 
they feel comfortable being honest and comparing these perspectives to find a common middle 
ground, this research hopes to have found that which is nearest to the truth. 
 
Conclusion 
 Analysis of the status of political, communal, economic, and transitional justice 
recovery efforts in Rwanda has shown that discourses surrounding the progress of the state 
over the past twenty years is polarized. The constitution has endowed the RPF immense 
authority—particularly in regards to constructing and enforcing narratives of a singular, 
official narrative of the past—that has allowed it to have de facto single-party rule and 
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perpetuated authoritarianism and repression within the state. The institutionalized absence of 
ethnic identity has resulted in the substitution of ethnic monikers for the categorizations of 
'victim', 'perpetrator', and 'returnee', along these same lines, utilizing ideas of 'collective 
victimhood' and 'collective guilt'. Many of the bloggers found this system to be responsible for 
persisting high poverty rates, consistent inequality, and violations of human rights through 
restrictions of free speech, repression of opposition and opponents, and even extrajudicial 
killings and other violence. In this polarized debate, those who see primarily progress towards 
post-conflict recovery—including Marc Hoogsteyns 214  and Lexa Ngira—argue, “who is 
anyone to judge Rwanda's reconciliation—tell me where it has been done before… come on, 
name on a place where it has worked or even been tried.”215 The other side of the debate, such 
as News Rwanda and Susan Thomson, maintains that the progresses of the state are being used 
to mask the human rights abuses of the RPF as well as “long-standing political tensions, 
unresolved resentments, and the rise of an authoritarian regime.”216 
 While there is little space for balanced, critical analysis, the voices that approach this 
type of discourse—for example, commenter Kazungu—acknowledge the successes of the state 
but argue that they cannot and should not be used to mask the human rights violations. They 
write: 
Being great in the Doing Business index and killing opponents are two different 
issues. One is very good and the second one is very evil and doesn't get erased by 
the first. If you stifle the press and make good roads, you have still stifled the press. 
If you detain every political opponent and give every Rwandan insurance 
coverage, you have still oppressed opposition. If you send squads to kill opponents 
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and send thousands of troops to keep peace in Darfur, you remain a killer. 
Period!217 
 
There remains considerable hope for uncovering the truth of post-genocidal Rwanda, however, 
harkening in part back to a proverb in Kinyarwandan that translates to “'Truth goes through 
fire but doesn't get burnt.' It might take long but time will tell.”218 
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Chapter 5: Moving from Micro to Macro—Case Comparisons 
 Prior analyses of state progress towards development, post-conflict recovery, and, 
ultimately, the idealized 'end goal' of political, social, and economic progress, have often relied 
on macro-scale data. Drawing on such data sources as state- and NGO-produced reports, macro 
data yields a broad image of the general conditions within a state, and, because of the 
standardized coding rules utilized in the construction of the dataset, these results are more 
commonly used for longitudinal analyses. For the purposes of this study, results yielded from 
six macro datasets are used to evaluate the progress of post-conflict recovery programs in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda. Ultimately, this chapter compares 1) Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Rwanda, 2) micro and macro data sources for each state, 3) the explanative power of the 
two hypotheses proposed by the literature and implemented as policy in the states, and, finally, 
4) these two hypotheses and the alternative hypothesis proposed by this research design. 
 
Political Terror Scale 
 The Political Terror Scale (PTS) data codes the annual reports on human rights  
published by the US State Department and Amnesty International to determine two scores 
communicating the level of 'terror' within a state during that particular year, ranging from least 
prevalent (1), to most prevalent (5). In the context of this measure, 'terror' refers to “state-
sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment” (Gibney, Cornett, 
Wood, & Haschke 2012).219 Analysis of PTS data from 1994-2013 shows that levels of terror 
have been decreasing consistently in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda since 1993, though 
there has been slight increase in scores in both countries from 2012 to 2013 (Figure 1). This 
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being said, political terror has consistently been higher in 
  
Rwanda than in BiH, with 2008 being the only exception. These results argue that the 
conditions in both states have decreased from the highest level (5) of political terror to levels 
where violations persist but some improvements have been made. 220  These results are 
elucidated by comparing them with those compiled by the CIRI Human Rights Data Project, 
which uses the same data sources (Amnesty International and US Department of State reports), 
but takes a different approach, attempting a greater degree of precision in measuring abuses. 
 
CIRI Human Rights Data Project 
 The CIRI dataset breaks down the political terror measured by PTS and expands its 
scope as well, utilizing four categories: physical integrity rights, civil liberties, women's rights, 
and independent judiciary (Cingranelli & Richards 2014). For the first two of these, scores are 
taken for elements that fall into these categories and then aggregated into a final 'physical 
                                                 
220  A rating of 5 is defined as: “terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these 
societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or 
















Figure 1: Political Terror Scale
BiH
Rwanda
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integrity' or 'civil liberties' score—the aggregated physical integrity scores are shown in Figure 
2. This data shows that BiH has maintained higher respect for physical 
 
integrity rights overall and that this respect has been relatively consistent over time. The 
disaggregated data for BiH (Figure 3) shows that while there has consistently been very low 
numbers of disappearances, extrajudicial killings, or political prisoners, it has had considerable 
fluctuations in the use of torture. This accounts for the improvement shown from 2003 to 2008 
in the aggregated data and its subsequent decline. On the other hand, while the Rwandan 
government improved its respect for these rights overall from 2004 to 2007, it has steadily 














Figure 2: Physical Integrity Rights (Aggregated)
BiH
Rwanda
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declined since, returning to 2003/2004 levels. Looking at the disaggregated data for Rwanda, 
however, a much different story is told (Figure 4). Rwanda's 
data show no sustainable progress made towards improving respect for any of the rights; the 
most significant, however, has been in reducing rates of extrajudicial killings, which have 
decreased since 2000. 































Figure 5: Civil Liberties (Aggregated)
BiH
Rwanda
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results that point to a closing of the gap between the scores of Rwanda and BiH (Figure 5).  
While Rwanda's initial score was significantly lower—only a 3 out of a possible 14—than that 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the gap between the two has declined, albeit unsteadily, as respect for 
civil liberties has increased in Rwanda overall since 2001 and decreased in BiH, though it has 
remained relatively stable since 2007). Analysis of the disaggregated data for each of these 
states yield disparate results. In the case of BiH, the data for each variable differs significantly 
(Table 1). For example, electoral self-determination remained at a steady, moderate level from  













2001 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
2002 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
2003 2 1 1 1 1 0 2 
2004 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 
2005 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 
2006 2 1 2 1 1 1 0 
2007 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 
2008 1 2 0 1 1 2 0 
2009 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 
2010 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 
2011 1 0 2 1 1 1 0 
 
2001 to 2011, while there was high volatility in levels of freedom for domestic movement. 
Ultimately, while there was moderate improvement to freedom of speech and religion, there 
was also sharp declines in foreign freedom of movement and worker's rights, with no consistent 
improvement in any other variables. Looking to the disaggregated data for Rwanda, the story 
is mixed as well (Table 2). While there has been moderate improvement concerning domestic 
freedom of movement, there has been an overall decline in respect for worker's rights and 
religious freedom, and persistent volatility in freedom of speech and electoral self-
determination. 

















1993 2 2 0 1 1 2 1 
1994 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 
1995 1 1 0 1 0 2 2 
1996 1 1 2 0 1 2 1 
1997 1 2 2 1 0 2 1 
1998 1 2 2 0 0 2 1 
1999 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
2000 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 
2001 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2002 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
2003 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 
2004 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
2005 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 
2006 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 
2007 1 2 2 0 1 0 0 
2008 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
2009 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 
2010 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 
2011 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 
 
 Turning to the fourth element measured by the CIRI dataset, women's rights, one can 
see that while BiH has maintained stable, moderately high levels of respect for women's rights, 












Figure 6: Women's Rights (Aggregate)
BiH
Rwanda
- 128 - 
 
 
with the highest levels of variation being in respect for women's economic rights, Rwanda has 
consistently increased its level of respect (Figure 6). The moderate level of respect for women's 
political rights in BiH is attributable to women consistently making up less than 30% of the 
legislature. In Rwanda, similarly, there has been variable gains in women's economic rights, 
but the state has had continuous gains in women's political rights, with women now constituting 
more than 30% of the legislative body.221 
 Analysis of the final aspect of the database does not yield promising information for 
judiciary independence after genocidal violence (Figure 7). Both states had moderate levels of 
judiciary independence, each with dips into complete dependence or domination from the 
government, but little to no progress has been made, remaining at a coding of '1'.222 This is 
particularly concerning in these two states where issues of justice, truth, and accountability 
have very much been brought to the forefront of political and social discourse. 
 
 
                                                 
221 Indeed, Rwanda is the first and only country in the world to have a female-majority parliament 
(Dudman 2014). 
222 In the coding scheme utilized by CIRI, the score of one (1) is utilized when “there are structural 
limitation on judicial independence... without active government interference or involve 
occasional or limited corruption and judicial intimidation from non-governmental actors” 
(Cingranelli, Richards, & Clay 2014). 












Figure 7: Independent Judiciary
BiH
Rwanda
- 129 - 
 
 
Freedom House Index 
 Utilizing a variety of sources—including “news articles, academic analyses, reports 
from non-governmental organizations, and individual professional contacts”—Freedom House 
assigns each country two ratings—from 1 to 7—for political rights and civil liberties 
(Puddington 2014).223 Looking at both the legislative protections and how effectively they are 
implemented, the average of these two scores is used to determine each state's Freedom Rating, 
and it is this rating that was used to compare the states of Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Figure 8). As this graphic shows, there has been gradual but clear improvement in the levels 
of freedom in each state. That being said, neither states has changed 'brackets', meaning that 
BiH is still classified as 'partly free', as it was in 1998; and, similarly, Rwanda is still classified 
as 'not free'. Overall, BiH has maintained a freer status than Rwanda, and has made more 
significant progress towards improving the degree of freedom within the state. 
 
 
                                                 
223 '1' representing the most free and '7' the least free; these ratings are based on the country's scoring 














Figure 8: Freedom Rating
BiH
Rwanda
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Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
 Analysis of change over time in perception of corruption in each country tells a 
somewhat perplexing story (Figure 9). Perceived corruption has gone down significantly in 
Rwanda from 2005 to 2011, while the perception of corruption in BiH has remained by and 
large the same (Transparency International 2014). This result is puzzling when taken in parallel 
to the results shown in other macro datasets, for example the CIRI Civil Liberties measure and 
the Freedom Index. CIRI data showed that while there was a decline in respect for civil liberties 
in BiH from 2001 to 2011, Rwanda's increase during the same time frame did not lead to higher 
respect for civil liberties than in BiH. If the CIRI data were to complement that of the CPI, one 
would expect to see an increase of perceived corruption (corresponding to a lower CPI score) 
or greater stability in respect for civil liberties, rather than, for example, the drastic decline in 
respect for worker's rights beginning in BiH in 2004. The Freedom Index data shows only 
moderate improvement in both countries since 1998, offering no parallel trend to complement 
the shrinking corruption perception in Rwanda. 
 
 












Figure 9: Corruption Perception Index
BiH
Rwanda
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Alternative Measures of Development 
 In recent years, alternative means of measuring development have come into greater 
prominence, including the Human Development Index (HDI)—which measures life 
expectancy, education, income, and standard of living so as to move beyond solely economic 
measures of development—and the GINI Index—which aims to measure income distribution 
and thus inequality within a state. As theses indexes are still recent in their creation, the coding 
and calculation rules have been undergoing refinement, making more longitudinal comparisons 
difficult. That being said, Table 3 displays the data available from these two measures for  
Table 3: GINI Coefficients and HDI Values 2001-2013 
 2001 2005 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 
GINI 
Coefficient 
BiH 28.03 ####### 33.04 ####### ####### ####### ####### 36.2 
Rwanda 46.68 ####### ####### ####### ####### 50.82 ####### 50.8 
HDI 
Value 
BiH ####### 0.715 ####### 0.727 0.726 0.729 0.729 0.731 
Rwanda ####### 0.391 ####### 0.432 0.453 0.463 0.502 0.506 
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda. The HDI values show that both states have been improving 
in human development measures, though this process has been moving faster in Rwanda. That 
being said, Rwanda is still classified as having “low human development,” while BiH is 
classified as having “high human development” (UNDP 2014). While these results parallel 
those found by the CPI—little to moderate improvement in BiH, but more significant progress 
in Rwanda—that is the only macro dataset analyzed for this research to show this same trend. 
 Turning to the GINI Index, the data shows worsening income inequality in both 
countries (World Bank 2014). While likely attributable to the communism of the Yugoslav era, 
income inequality began and remained far lower in BiH than in Rwanda. Yet, the change in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina's GINI coefficient from 2001 to 2013 was much higher than Rwanda’s. 
All the GINI Index numbers must be considered with caution, as it is a relative measure and 
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does not take into account per capita income as a whole, preventing it from making meaningful 
statements about quality of life or economic opportunity. It does, however, speak to the ways 
in which wealth—particularly after violent conflict—is distributed within the country, and may 
speak to levels of corruption or the misallocation of foreign aid funds. 
 
World Happiness Report (WHR) 
 The World Happiness Report is the newest of these macro datasets, and because of its 
methodological process it only has data beginning from its founding in 2012; thus, only data 
from 2013 is utilized for this study. This data is compiled using surveys that have participants 
rate their subjective well-being on a ladder (10 being the best possible life, 0 being the worst), 
while also measuring emotional state (did you laugh yesterday, etc.), life expectancy, 
community support, perception of corruption, prevalence of generosity, and freedom to make 
life choices (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs 2014). The 2013 data—which presents the averages 
of the three years 2010-2012—gives BiH a happiness score of 4.813, and Rwanda a score of 
3.715. Comparing these to the adjusted numbers of the years 2005-2007, BiH experienced little 
change—decreasing by 0.087—while Rwanda experienced a more drastic shift—decreasing 
by 0.500. This shift in Rwanda roughly corresponds with the data proposed by CIRI, matching 
trends with decreased respect for the civil liberty of electoral self-determination as well as a 
general decline in respect for physical integrity rights in Rwanda from 2007 to 2011 and on. 
 
Comparison to Micro Data 
 Analyzed independent of the in depth, micro case studies, the macro-scale data often 
times lacks coherency and connection, the indexes and databases contradicting one another as 
often as they would be complementary. In addition to this, the results they do offer lack the 
contextualization necessary for them to be explanative and ultimately for them to be applied 
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to implementing practical policy strategies. For example, the CPI rather accurately captures 
the stagnation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, demonstrating the way in which corruption is perceived 
to be consistently high with little change. What it fails to elucidate, however, is how the 
political structure has fed into, allowed, and perpetuated this stagnation by incentivizing the 
maintenance of the status quo by political elites. Similarly, while CIRI data demonstrates that 
there has been a decline in respect for freedom of speech in Rwanda, it does not draw 
comparisons to the similar declines seen in political integrity rights within the state, 
particularly disappearances and political imprisonment, all of which can be tied together as 
actions of an authoritarian state bent on suppressing the dissident voices of opponents and the 
opposition. 
 There are other limitations to the capacity of macro-level data to measure and explain 
the post-conflict status of states. Most problematical to the particular focus of this research is 
the fact that none of these macro datasets effectively address issues of communal relations 
following genocide, which is truly vital to a meaningful discussion about transitional justice in 
these societies following communitarian violence. In addition, almost all of the macro datasets 
privilege Western ideals of capitalist, liberal democracy, which bears colonizing tendencies. 
Freedom House, for example, explicitly states that a key assumption driving their methodology 
is “that freedom for all peoples is best achieved in liberal democratic societies” (Puddington 
2014). 
 This research has found that macro-level data can serve as a useful complement to data 
gathered at a micro-level and analyzed through in depth case study. In so doing, the themes 
that emerge from individual observation, opinion, and experience are supported by larger 
trends evidenced by macro data, and micro data can explain the trends apparent in macro data 
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and connect across variables to make more meaningful analyses and conclusions. This process 
of merging the macro- and micro-level data to make the most comprehensive and substantive 
conclusions for the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda is undertaken in the next section. 
 
Evaluation of Hypotheses 
     Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 If nothing else, the case analysis of BiH yielded this conclusion: everything is 
politicized or ethnicized, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina these are the same process. The ethnic-
framing of the political structure has effectively entrenched the ethnic distinctions that divided 
the country during the war of the early 90s, offering politicians incentives to preserve the status 
quo. Significant amounts of the power and wealth of BiH is distributed according to the power 
divisions between the same political parties that were in power during the conflict, and 
corruption and clientelism remain rampant. Perceptions of corruption in the government have 
remained high due to politicians continuously blocking the political process to achieve their 
ends, and it is this stagnation in the political system that led citizens to take to the streets in 
February of 2014 in protest. The CIRI dataset shows that respect for civil liberties has 
decreased in the state over the past decade, and many, for example, now view the elections as 
little more than symbolic exercises and 'mini-censuses'. As politicians have concentrated 
wealth among their ranks, they have built themselves into a ruling elite, demonstrated in part 
by rising inequality within the state and the deepening urban-rural divide. The economic 
stagnation within the state—epitomized by persistent high unemployment rates, particularly 
within the youth population—and worsening respect for worker's rights has only contributed 
to citizens' dissatisfaction. The emphasis on security concerns as a crucial tool of political 
parties for preserving their positions of power has preserved fear and mistrust within the 
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population despite manifest improvements in respect for physical integrity rights (with the 
exception of rates of torture). Further, efforts towards justice through the prosecution of war 
crimes and war criminals has yielded disappointing results, through both the exceptionally 
large backlog of cases as well as the warm receptions multiple convicted war criminals have 
received upon returning to their homes after serving their sentences. 
 These persisting problems within the state despite the stated institutional goals are most 
clearly demonstrated by the lack of rights and protections outside strict definitions of ethnic 
belonging, as the preservation of these divisions is of paramount to the interests to the ruling 
elite. It is within this context that the institutionalized heterogeneity hypothesis must be 
evaluated. This hypothesis as proposed by the literature is: 
H1: If the degree of institutionalized heterogeneity is high, then the degree of peace 
will be high. 
 
Evaluated using Bosnia-Herzegovina as a case study, it is clear that this hypothesis fails. 
Despite the moderately positive subjective well-being of citizens, the system implemented in 
BiH in the aftermath of genocide has failed to effectively make progress towards political, 
communal, economic, or transitional justice elements of peace. In conclusion, this hypothesis 
can be rejected using the data provided by the micro- and macro-level data of this case. 
 
     Rwanda 
 Analysis of macro- and micro-level data for Rwanda has produced similarly 
disheartening results. The state is characterized by authoritarian and repressive governance 
whose claims of ethnic blindness are almost completely farcical. The RPF regime itself is built 
upon ethnic divides, as it grew from a Tutsi resistance force, and the narratives of the past that 
are foundational to the policies and actions of the state supplant the categories of 'Hutu' and 
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'Tutsi' with those of 'victim' and 'perpetrator'. In enforcing this narrative, freedom of expression 
is severely restricted, and rates of disappearances and politically-motivated imprisonment are 
high. The authoritarian nature of the regime carries through to heavily regulated elections with 
low respect for electoral self-determination amongst the population. In working to mask these 
tendencies of the state, perception management—particularly at the international level—is 
high, defined by the utilization of development projects in the capital and high respect for 
women's rights as tools to assure continued aid and international support. Yet economic 
recovery has been uneven, with low respect for worker's rights and consistently high levels of 
inequality, which have worsened the urban-rural divide. Indeed, poverty levels remain high 
within rural communities, contributing to the continued 'low human development' status of the 
state. The perception management at the hands of the state is not only responsible for broad 
suppression of freedom of speech, but has led to the development of a bipolar discourse that 
prevents critical discussion of conditions within the state or government policies. This divide 
may also partially account for inconsistencies between the macro datasets, particularly in 
regards to respect for physical integrity rights and whether or not judicial actions within the 
state are anything more than 'victor's justice'. 
 Ultimately, the state's position is that development is the preeminent concern in the 
post-conflict period, as adequate development is vital in order for true respect and enjoyment 
of human rights to take place. It is within this context that the institutionalized homogeneity 
hypothesis must be evaluated. This hypothesis as proposed by the literature is: 
H2: If the degree of institutionalized homogeneity is high, then the degree of peace 
will be high. 
 
Evaluated using Rwanda as a case study, it is clear that this hypothesis fails. Beyond the 
subjective well-being of citizens being exceptionally low, the system implemented in Rwanda 
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following the genocide has also failed to effectively make progress towards political, 
communal, economic, or transitional justice elements of peace. Thus, as was the case with the 
hypothesis on institutionalized heterogeneity, this hypothesis too can be rejected using the data 
provided by the micro- and macro-level data of this case. 
 
     An Alternative 
 Both of the hypotheses presented by the literature and tested using the cases of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Rwanda rely upon the principle of rigid institutionalization of identity, 
despite taking oppositional stances on what type of institutional identity is preferable. This 
research proposed an alternative hypothesis, that: 
HA: If the degree of institutionalized identification is high, then the degree of peace 
will be low. 
 
As both of the hypotheses proposed by the literature were rejected through the case study 
analyses in this research, it is clear that institutionalized identification does not contribute 
significantly to higher levels of peace. Indeed, the sizable institutional roadblocks and limited 
respect for rights that persist in each state actually lend support to this alternative hypothesis. 
The limits of peace in each of these states indicates that not only is it the case that neither of 
the often implemented constitutional structures successfully bolster peace within the state, but 
these structures actually inhibit progress towards sustainable, comprehensive peace. Given this, 
it is clear that an alternative constitutional structure is required, which would not only lack 
institutionalized identity, but would work to foster suppressed voices and encourage diversity 
over homogenization. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 This research aimed to answer the question: Does the way in which identity is 
constructed through governance in post-genocidal states affect post-conflict recovery? 
Through in depth case study analysis of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, it tested the 
hypotheses proposed by the literature and implemented in policy that institutionalized 
heterogeneity and institutionalized homogeneity, respectively, were the foundations of 
sustainable peace. The analysis of post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated that 
politicized ethnicization dominates all aspects of life, resulting in high levels of corruption and 
inactivity in the political system; economic stagnation exemplified by persisting high levels of 
unemployment; persisting communal divisions built on politically perpetuated and exploited 
fear and mistrust; and questionable progress in achieving true transitional justice. In the case 
of Rwanda, analysis indicated that the single-party rule of the RPF has resulted in sizable 
restrictions on freedom of expression, human rights, and political dissent and opposition, all in 
the name of economic development which has been restricted to urban areas; the creation of a 
bipolar discourse on the conditions of the post-conflict state; and the perpetuation of ethnic 
divisions masked by monikers of 'survivor' and 'perpetrator'. 
 Given these results, this research was able to dismiss these two hypotheses, in turn 
lending support to the alternative hypothesis proposed by emerging complexity theory and 
advocated for by this research. This hypothesis posited that institutionalization of identity was 
actually detrimental for the establishment of sustainable peace, defined through negative (i.e., 
absence of physical integrity violations, absence of political oppression, etc.) as well as 
positive (i.e., presence of freedom of association and assembly, presence of economic 
opportunity, etc.) definitions of peace. 
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 The outcomes of this research have implications for the theory and literature of identity, 
post-conflict, and constitutional design studies. Pertaining particularly to fluid versus fixed 
nature of identity, this research demonstrates that identity can be both, depending upon the 
contexts of individual and state-level factors. The Bosnia-Herzegovina case study speaks to 
the flexibility of identity: if identity were rigidly fixed, civic identification movements such as 
that promoted by Naša Stranka in the lead up to the census would have no support and 
individuals would continue to strongly identify with ethno-religious categories. Both of these 
were shown to not be the case within this context. In Rwanda, the rigidity of identity became 
apparent: despite governmental proscription of the use of ethnic categories, the lived 
experiences of citizens with privilege, discrimination, and marginalization demonstrated the 
persistent relevance of these categories. With these results this research bolsters the conception 
of contextually dynamic or fixed identification, and that these identifications are subject to 
reification, construction, and reconstruction, making them more complex than proposed by 
primordialist consociationalism or absolute constructivist assimilationism believe. 
 In terms of post-conflict studies, this research complicates and problematizes the focus 
of many post-conflict theories, which often place emphasis on the importance of addressing 
and resolving the antagonisms that fueled the initial conflicts. But, in heedlessly pushing for 
post-conflict states to decide on the definitive truth of what happened, supporting the concept 
of 'pure forgiveness', and thus attempting to close discussion, post-conflict theory and literature 
have enabled and in some cases supported the establishing of new, fixed boundaries. These 
boundaries, in turn, can often and have been used as fodder or motivation for dissent and 
eventual conflict. Such was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where resistance to the 
ethnicization of everyday life was a significant contributing factor to the protests in July 2013 
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and February 2014. James Scott—who found this same everyday resistance present in 
Rwanda—describes these as 'hidden transcripts', wherein individuals subtly and (largely) 
symbolically resist the existing power structure and undermine the authority of the regime in 
often unexpected ways (Scott 1990). 
 The most significant theoretical implication of the results of this research is the way in 
which they challenge existing literature on consociational and assimilative systems. The 
principal behind both of these constitutional designs is that the system will make representation 
more fair and equitable within the state, and in so doing reduce the likelihood for violence as 
all citizens will feel that their voices are heard and their rights respected. Consociationalists 
believe that this is achieved through ensuring representation for each ethnic group through 
reserved seats and minority veto; assimilationists believe that this is best done by encouraging 
civic identification or a single national identification so everyone is treated equally. As was 
demonstrated by these case studies, however, neither system had high levels of electoral self-
determination, never reaching above a '1', indicating a lack of transparency, voter fraud, 
electoral irregularities, intimidation, harassment, and government manipulation of voter 
registration lists (Cingranelli & Richards 2014). Clearly these systems failed in their most basic 
of tasks: ensuring equal representation and protection for all citizens under the law. 
 The impacts of this research on the literature and theory of this topic has direct 
implications for policy as well, particularly as the international community continues to be 
actively involved in many of the peace settlements brokered in conflicts around the world, 
either through direct state-to-state involvement or through international organizations such as 
the United Nations. From these positions of influence, states and institutions have the 
opportunity to influence the governance structure instituted within the state: this was seen 
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directly in the cases of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq, for example. Thus, this analysis 
advocates on behalf of Horowitz's conception of five means by which to reduce ethnic tensions 
in post-conflict states: (1) dispersing political power; (2) emphasizing intraethnic competition 
and conflict; (3) incentivizing interethnic cooperation through policies on elections and 
territorial disputes; (4) encouraging interests-based alignments; and (5) reducing inequalities 
between groups through redistribution measures. Through deep contextualization that 
recognizes not only geographic variation—meaning that the solution that worked perfectly in 
one state will likely not translate into a sustainable solution for another state—and recognition 
of the “multiplicity of rational viewpoint” the implementation of Horowitz's policy 
recommendations could affect real change (Dixon 2011, 320). The focus must be on 
accommodating and honoring difference, not subverting it, and this must be reflected 
throughout the conflict resolution and post-conflict processes. 
 Beyond literature and policy, this research has implications in terms of the methodology 
and focus of research moving forward. The most significant of these is the usage of blogs and 
comments as an alternative to interviews with individuals on the ground. This research 
successfully demonstrated that content analysis of blog posts yields comparable results to those 
compiled from in-country interviews. This is significant in that it opens the doors to new 
possibilities of digital anthropology, particularly in cases where it's not only feasible to use 
these as data sources but perhaps even desirable, such as was the case with Rwanda. Physical 
presence in the country would actually have placed limits on what populations there was access 
to and asking the questions that were the focus of this research could have put collaborators in 
danger and received negative response from the government and expulsion from the state. Thus 
the usage of blogs and other forms of digital media (i.e., Facebook posts, tweets, Tumblrs, and 
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Instagrams) as primary sources analogous to interviews could increase access to regions or 
communities that would have previously been inaccessible. Take, for example, the case of 
Syria. Through the utilization of cell phone videos, tweets, and blog posts, not only could a 
study of the conditions within the state be conducted, but one would have access to information 
from individuals living across the territory rather than a limited number of locations that the 
researcher would have had access to. 
 In explaining the methodology of this research, the potential challenges and limitations 
of this study and its potential conclusions were addressed. Returning to this discussion, the 
first of these concerns was that the design might not adequately account for alternative 
variables that might impact the result, for example, the sizable differences in geographic 
location, historical background, and duration of the genocidal violence (though the events of 
April 1994 in Rwanda did follow four years of civil war, bringing the total war years closer 
together). Ultimately, this research argues that these elements are primarily antecedent 
variables that would most significantly influence a state's decision to implement one 
constitutional structure over another. That being said, they may have additional direct influence 
on the development of sustainable peace within the state—for example, the influence of 
Croatian and Serbian nationalist parties in bordering Croatia and Serbia have undoubtedly had 
continued impact on the lived experiences of people living in BiH as well as the politics of the 
state. Therefore, there certainly needs to be additional research on this subject moving forward. 
 A second foreseen limitation of this research is that the utilization of case study as the 
means of analyzing these hypotheses would—while having high explanatory power—diminish 
the generalizability and the parsimony of the conclusions. While it is true that the data itself is 
very case-specific, there are general trends that emerged across the two case studies that points 
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to the possibility that it may have greater generalizability. Most significant among these is that 
both cases indicate that when identity has been institutionalized this crystallization is exploited 
by politicians and political parties to reinforce their narratives of the past and preserve their 
claim to power and authority. Indeed, in the constitutional and political structure's assertions 
of what constitutes acceptable identification, it dictated who the acceptable bearers of this 
power and authority are and lead to the concentration of wealth and development among an 
elite class based in urban areas. 
 In addition to answering the research question first proposed by this study, this research 
has asked many more. How do geographic location, historical heritage, influence of 
neighboring states, or duration of conflict impact the degree of peacefulness within a post-
conflict state twenty years after the official cessation of violence? Would similar results have 
been found for the Rwandan case study had interviews been conducted within the state? Do 
cases exist where elements of Horowitz's complexity theory have been implemented in the 
aftermath of ethnicized conflict and, if so, what impact have they had on the development of 
sustainable peace? Further research would do well to address these puzzles, for example by 
conducting interviews on the ground in Rwanda and comparing them with the results of this 
study. This might be feasibly done by a researcher with the access and thorough knowledge of 
the socio-political and cultural context to indirectly ask questions to get at the state of affairs 
in modern Rwanda, as was done by Bert Ingelaere in his recent study (2010). Additional 
research could also be done to investigate the lived experience of rural populations in the years 
following genocide and the implementation of a new constitutional structure and government, 
so as to more fully understand the variance and division between urban and rural populations, 
which emerged as a prominent theme in this research. Further expansion of James Scott's work 
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on hidden transcripts could contribute to the conclusions of this research, offering a potential 
mechanism through which populations in post-conflict states resist state institutionalization of 
identity. And finally, exploring topics of post-conflict governance and identity more broadly, 
there is ample opportunity to ask questions about the process of identity construction in post-
conflict states, with particular focus being given to inter-ethnic communal relations and the 
relationship of the population to the state-level and community governments. 
 Ultimately, this research made great strides in answering questions about the impact  
government instituted identity construction in post-genocidal societies, concluding that 
existing paradigms of governance fail the populations they claim to serve and radical 
reconceptualization of these systems is necessary for a true, sustainable peace. A new avenue 
of ethnographic research was explored, as the utilization of social and alternative media has 
risen in use around the world and may serve as a useful window into societies in addition to its 
present usage as a new form of community and platform for construction of the self. This study 
contributes to the extensive literatures on identity, post-conflict society, and governance, and 
calls for approaches that rely on 'thick' understandings of local contexts and that these contexts 
can develop and change over time, invigorate suppressed voices, and honor diversity over fixed 
categorization. 
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